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        AN COURTS REALLY BUILD DEMOCRACY in a state emerging from 
undemocratic rule? If so, how they do this, and what are their limits in this regard? This thesis 
seeks to explore the development since 1945 of a global model of democracy-building for 
post-authoritarian states, which accords a central position to courts. In essence, constitutional 
courts and regional human rights courts have come to be viewed as integral to the achievement 
of, or even constitutive of, a functioning democratic state.  
The roles courts play in supporting a democratisation process are onerous, and differ 
starkly from the roles of such courts in long-established democracies of the Global North. 
Courts in the new democracies of the post-war world have been freighted with weighty 
expectations to ‘deliver’ on the promises of a new democratic order, while navigating their 
own place within that developing order–or, in the case of regional human rights courts, 
inserting themselves into the democratisation process from without. At both the domestic and 
regional levels, from within and without the state, they are somehow expected to ‘judge’ 
democratisation. They are required to assess what is needed to support the democratisation 
process at any given point, especially in light of key deficiencies of the newly democratic order, 
and to judge when the democratisation context requires a different approach than may be 
appropriate in a mature democracy, such as the US or Ireland.  
However, the grand claims made for these courts as democracy-builders in existing 
scholarship have never been subjected to systematic analysis, nor have the overlapping roles 
of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts been considered in tandem. This 
thesis addresses a very significant research gap by drawing together a scattered and fragmented 
scholarship on the roles of courts in new democracies, integrating discussion of regional 
human rights courts, providing an innovative conceptual framework for how courts at each 
level act and interact as democracy-builders, and tracing connections between different 
normative arguments concerning the roles courts should play. As the first attempt at a 
wholesale exploration of the effectiveness and viability of the existing global court-centric 
model for democratisation, this thesis examines what we think courts do as democracy-
builders, what they actually do, and what they should do. In doing so, it argues for a significant 
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            S A YOUNG LAWYER WORKING FOR the Chief Justice of Ireland, I would visit 
his chambers almost every day–often multiple times a day. There, amidst the oak furniture, 
heavy curtains and blizzard of court submissions was the unshakeable sense of judicial power; 
the sense of judge-made law in utero, to be birthed later in the more austere surroundings of 
the Supreme Court itself.  
Having been the Chief Justice’s chambers for almost a century, it took little imagination 
to picture the first Chief Justice of an independent Ireland in the 1920s, Hugh Kennedy, 
tackling his judicial duties under new constitutional arrangements that differed radically from 
the unentrenched British constitution under which all Irish lawyers had been trained. The 
Constitution of 1922 lay in the slipstream of more ‘modern’ constitutions, with its separation 
of State powers, extensive bill of rights and, crucially, express conferral on the superior courts 
of the power to review ordinary law for compatibility with the constitution. That power would 
be amplified under the new constitution of 1937, adopted to sweep away most of the remaining 
constitutional vestiges of British authority.  
It was a world in which judicial power, though present, bore little relation to what we 
see around the globe today.1 Despite the power placed in their hands, continuity with the 
British legal tradition remained the dominant theme for two generations of Irish judges, 
content to play a marginal role in governance by policing the boundaries of legality in the same 
way as their counterparts across the Irish Sea. They did not begin to exercise their ample 
powers with any vigour until the 1960s, when a new approach recast the Court in a more 
 
1 Even the US Supreme Court’s use of judicial review did not become truly expansive until the post-war 
period. See M Schor, ‘Mapping Comparative Judicial Review’ 7 Washington University Global Studies Law 





American mould, shrugging off the restraint of the British judicial style and placing the Court 
in a more assertive posture vis-à-vis the other branches of government.  
By the time they did rouse themselves, the judges of the Supreme Court had already 
started to cede constitutional supremacy to external organs. The principle in the 1937 
constitutional text that the Court’s decisions ‘shall in all cases be final and conclusive’2 had 
begun to unravel in the face of the first judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
1960, delivered over 800 miles away in Strasbourg–in an action taken against Ireland.3 Ireland’s 
entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 later required submission to 
the jurisdiction of that organisation’s Court of Justice. Of course, the full effects were not to 
be felt for some decades. 
 
*   *   * 
 
For large swathes of the world, the notion of the highest domestic court merely policing legality 
at the periphery and, in principle, having the final say in constitutional matters, is no longer a 
reality.  
Indeed, before the Supreme Court of Ireland had found its voice, the European 
landscape after 1945 had begun a profound legal and cultural transformation, with the activity 
of constitutional courts in Germany and Italy initiating a paradigm shift toward a central role 
for such courts in democratic governance. The courts of mainland Europe had more pressing 
reasons than the Irish superior courts for flexing their muscles. Unlike the incremental Irish 
steps toward full independence in a democratic (albeit thinly democratic) setting, these courts 
seized their task in a context of discredited parliaments and a strong hangover from the 
corruption of democratic processes, which had led to authoritarian rule. In a relatively short 
time they came to be viewed as anchors in an uncertain world, extolling the rule of law and 
adherence to constitutional values which voiced a reaction, in the starkest manner, to the 
barbaric experiences of wartime and its immediate aftermath. 
In the ensuing decades, constitutional courts and strong judicial review were established 
across the globe in states emerging from undemocratic rule: in Southern Europe, Latin 
America, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and, most recently, in a number of the 
constitutional transformations in the Arab world. This has led to a tendency to conflate 
assertive adjudication with successful democratisation processes. At the international (regional) 
 
2 Article 34.4. 6°, Constitution of Ireland 1937. 




level, various developments have enhanced this perception that courts have a role to play in 
supporting and shaping democratisation processes: the elaboration of strong lines of 
jurisprudence by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from the late 1980s in a regional 
context of democratising states;  the sweeping expansion of the Strasbourg Court’s territory in 
the 1990s to encompass states emerging from Communist rule; and, most recently, robust 
decisions of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, beginning in 2013.  
 
*   *   * 
 
How have we travelled so far from the vanished world of pre-war Ireland, and has our post-
war obsession with courts as democracy-builders proven to be justified? In addressing these 
questions, this thesis seeks not only to add to our current knowledge concerning this subject, 
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        HIS THESIS SEEKS TO EXPLORE the development since 1945 of a global model 
of democracy-building for post-authoritarian states, which accords a central position to courts. 
In essence, instead of being viewed as epiphenomenal, constitutional courts and regional 
human rights courts4  have come to be viewed as integral to the achievement of, or even 
constitutive of, a functioning democratic state. In other words, they are seen as central to 
successful democratisation.5 It is an onerous role, which differs significantly from the judicial 
role in long-established Western democracies (hereinafter, ‘mature democracies’). In the sense 
of the thesis title, courts are required to somehow ‘judge’ democratisation. They are expected 
to both assess what is required to support the democratisation process at any given point, 
especially in light of key deficiencies of the newly democratic order, and also to judge when 
the democratisation context requires a different approach than may be appropriate in a mature 
democracy, such as the US or Ireland.  
This tends to lead, at the extreme, to an expansion of the judicial role beyond the usual 
limits seen in mature democracies, and a blurring of the boundaries between judging law and 
judging democratic propriety. It also freights courts with weighty expectations to ‘deliver’ on 
the promises of a new democratic order, while navigating their own place in that developing 
order–or, in the case of regional human rights courts, inserting themselves into the 
democratisation process from without. However, the aim here is not merely to examine 
adjudication for its own sake. Rather, the effectiveness and viability of the global court-centric 
model for democratisation, as it currently exists, is the overarching concern that drives this 
 
4 The terms ‘constitutional court’ and ‘regional human rights court’ are defined at the end of this Introduction. 




enquiry. This thesis, then, focuses on the evolving, interacting and overlapping roles 
constitutional courts and regional human rights courts play in ‘building’ democracy, as distinct 
from the governance roles such courts play in a mature democracy.  In doing so, it examines 
what we think courts do as democracy-builders, what they actually do, and what they should 
do. 
 
1 ORIGIN OF THE THESIS & KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The germ of the thesis lay in the rather simple observation that the Supreme Court of Brazil 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had taken divergent stances in 2010 on the 
validity of Brazil’s Amnesty Law of 1979–a core component of that state’s transition to 
democratic rule in 1985. For the Supreme Court, the law was constitutional, as a valid catalyst 
for the democratic transition, and its amendment or repeal was a political question for the 
representative branches of government. By contrast, the Inter-American Court deemed the 
law invalid as enshrining continued impunity for serious human rights violations, contrary to 
the pan-regional American Convention on Human Rights. The result on the ground was 
something of a fudge: the law remains on the statute books, but the State complied with a 
number of the Inter-American Court’s other orders; chiefly, by establishing a Truth 
Commission which facilitated an official and public discussion of human rights violations 
under the military dictatorship of 1964-1985.  
Was the Supreme Court’s approach correct, by batting the decision back to the elected 
branches of the state? Or was the Inter-American Court’s approach preferable, not only in 
vindicating human rights in the instant case, but also in addressing the impunity ‘bottleneck’ 
in Brazil’s democratisation process left by this legislative legacy of the democratic transition–
one which the State, and Brazilian society more generally, had proven unwilling or unable to 
address?  
This discussion could so easily become fixated solely on the question of which court 
should have the ‘final say’ regarding key societal questions, or on general concerns as to the 
democratic legitimacy6 of courts of any stripe resolving questions that cut to the heart of the 
identity and foundations of a democratic political community. However, to take such an 
approach would add little to an extremely well-trodden debate concerning the rise and 
legitimacy of judicial governance power in democratic states since the latter half of the 
 
6 It is recognised here that ‘democratic legitimacy’ is a somewhat vague term. It is employed in this thesis 




twentieth century, which has become a “central obsession”7 of constitutional scholars. In this 
thesis, a rather different set of questions raised by the Brazilian scenario is addressed: 
 
 How have domestic constitutional courts and regional human rights courts become 
such central actors in post-war democratisation processes? 
 What roles do these courts actually play in democratisation processes, and how does 
the democratisation context shape their roles? 
 What roles should courts play in a new democracy, as compared to a mature 
democracy? 
 
1.1 GLOBAL RESONANCE 
 
In 2015 these questions are of global relevance. In the decades since the establishment of 
constitutional courts in the defeated Axis powers of post-war Europe (Austria, Germany and 
Italy)8 and the inauguration of the regional European Court of Human Rights for Western 
Europe in 1959, the court-centric legal paradigm for supporting democratisation has spread 
worldwide.  
In the various ‘waves’9 of democratisation since 1945 a ‘new constitutionalism’,10 focused 
on transformative constitutional texts and expansive bills of rights, saw constitutional courts 
and strong judicial review become ‘standard equipment’ 11  for states transitioning from 
Communist, military and autocratic rule, across Europe, South America, Africa, East Asia and, 
to a limited extent, now the Arab region;12 with states often profoundly influenced by the 
perceived democratisation successes of post-war European courts.13 Regional human rights 
courts, in turn, have been established in two other world regions: the Americas and Africa.14 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is perceived as having played a key role in 
 
7 EC Dawson, ‘Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality Based on Margin of Statutory Passage’ 16 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 97 (2013) at 100.  
8 Constitutional courts were established in Austria, Germany and Italy in 1945, 1951 and 1956 respectively. 
9 See Chapter One, Section 2. 
10 M Shapiro & A Stone, ‘The New Constitutional Politics of Europe’ 26 Comparative Political Studies 397 
(1994). 
11 D Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers” in L Diamond & M Plattner (eds.), 
Democracy: A Reader (JHUP, 2009) p.183. 
12 Constitutional courts have been established in Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The draft Constitution of 
Libya also envisages the establishment of a constitutional court. See <http://www.constitutionnet. 
org/files/c3_-_judiciary_const_court_draft_work_-_eng.pdf>.  
13 Ginsburg observes: “Germany’s Constitutional Court is arguably the most influential court outside the US 
in terms of its institutional structure and jurisprudence.” T Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional 
Review’ in A Caldeira, RD Kelemen & KE Whittington (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 
(OUP, 2008) pp.85-86. 




democratisation processes across Latin America since the late 1980s.15 A democratisation role 
was conferred on the European Court of Human Rights with enlargement of the Council of 
Europe in the 1990s to include the new democracies of the post-Communist world in Central 
and Eastern Europe.16 Since its first judgment in 2013 the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights has taken a strident approach in cases concerning non-inclusive electoral arrangements 
and free speech.17 In September 2014 the Arab League announced the establishment of a 
regional Arab Court of Human Rights.18 
The focus on courts as key actors in new democracies shows no sign of abating, in 
scholarship or practice. For instance, at a recent conference on constitutional reforms in the 
Middle East and North Africa–bringing together judges, constitutional lawyers, and political 
activists from across the region, as well as international experts–discussion of legal mechanisms 
for enhancing rights protection and supporting nascent or potential democratisation processes 
in Arab states was dominated by courts.19 Delegates debated the promise and perils of domestic 
courts and the recently-announced Arab Court of Human Rights as democratic or 
undemocratic institutions, as well as a formal Tunisian proposal for an International 
Constitutional Court, to issue decisions on mass rights violations, the holding of elections and 
serious violations of international law principles related to democracy. 20  Even sessions 
specifically devoted to non-judicial mechanisms persistently returned to talk of judicial review, 
as though on a loop. Beyond the Arab region, a chorus of scholars and policy-makers support 
the establishment of human rights courts in the remaining world regions (Asia and the Pacific21), 
or even a World Court of Human Rights.22  
Thus, the promise of domestic constitutional courts and regional human rights courts as 
democracy-builders now forms a fil rouge connecting post-authoritarian states across the globe. 
 
15 See the quotations at the start of Chapter Two. 
16 In 1998 the Council of Europe’s recently-resigned Deputy Secretary General opined: “The [Council’s] new 
task is to play an active role in “democracy-building” in the post-communist countries...”. P Leuprecht, 
‘Innovations in the European System of Human Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with 
Reinforcement?’ 8 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 313 (1998) at 317. 
17 Discussed in Chapters Two and Four.  
18 See Chapter Two. Such a court had been mooted as long ago as 1986: see AA An-Na’im, ‘Human Rights 
in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective’ 23 Human Rights Quarterly 701 (2001) at 714-715.  
19 Arab Association of Constitutional Law, Third Annual Conference, ‘Enforcement Mechanisms and the 
Protection of Political, Economic and Social Rights’, Beirut, Lebanon, 16-17 October 2014. The author 
attended as an invited speaker.  
20 See ‘Project of the Establishment of an International Constitutional Court’, Tunis, 2013, available at 
<http://www.carthage.tn/sites/default/files/files/ICCo%20Brochure_%20Eng_%20Oct_%202013.pdf>.  
21 See, regarding Asia: S Chiam, ‘Asia’s Experience in the Quest for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism’ 
40 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 127 (2009-2010).  
22 See e.g. M Nowak, ‘On the Creation of a World Court of Human Rights’ 7 National Taiwan University 




These courts represent a central ‘democratisation technology’ in the minds of many scholars, 
and in the toolkit of domestic and international constitution-makers and law-makers.  
 
1.2 THE DISTINCT ROLE OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 
 
What is distinctive about the roles of these courts in new democracies, compared to their 
functioning in mature democracies? A central claim of this thesis is that the democratisation 
context alters courts’ roles, and changes our perspective on familiar questions concerning the 
legitimate roles courts can play in democratic governance, for five principal reasons.  
First, in new democracies strong judicial review, 23  which accords the final say on 
constitutional matters to the courts, often forms a fundamental component of the political 
bargain underpinning the very transition to democratic rule. It is thus viewed, not as an option, 
but as a prerequisite for the democratic project. Second, a new democracy is paradigmatically 
underpinned by a new or substantially revised constitution (or a new constitutional 
understanding24) and a significant residue of authoritarian-era laws, which requires the courts 
to engage in wholescale constitutional construction while remaking ordinary law in the 
democratic image of the constitution. This differs starkly from the general constitutional ‘fine-
tuning’ role of a court in a mature democracy. Third, submission to the jurisdiction of a 
regional human rights court is often viewed as a symbolic act underscoring a commitment to 
democratic rule, as well as a useful adjunct to support nascent domestic institutions. Fourth, 
the relationship between the courts at each level is itself shaped by the trajectory and 
vicissitudes of the democratisation process, with regional adjudication, designed as a ‘back-up’ 
system, tending to assume more prominence where domestic adjudication is deemed lacking, 
whether due to the unwillingness or incapacity of the domestic constitutional court to engage 
in robust decision-making. Finally, in new democracies the capacity of other actors in the 
democratic order to play their part in democracy-building is limited, in a context where multi-
party politics is often nascent or stifled by dominance of a single party, civil society is weak 
and citizens are unschooled in democratic deliberation and the wielding of political power.  
These reasons all point to some justification for strong judicial review as a necessary 
component of successful democratisation, although they do not address the extent to which 
courts should assume central roles in democratisation processes, nor the true nature of their 
adjudicatory function in such processes. In the sense of ‘judging’ democratisation, we are faced 
with the crucial question of when the specific demands of supporting or navigating the 
 
23 The term ‘strong judicial review’ is defined at the end of this Introduction.  




democratisation process justify a court’s taking a more assertive or more deferential approach 
than might be appropriate in the context of a mature democracy. Whether we can trust courts 
to carry out such a difficult task, what happens when the courts at each level disagree, and 
whether we can trust other State organs in new democracies, or even the people, to carry more 
of the ‘democratisation burden’ apportioned to courts under the post-war model, are all vital 
questions.  
 
2 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
The key questions set out above are not systematically addressed in existing scholarship on the 
role of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts in democratisation processes, 
which is scattered across a wide array of distinct but overlapping research fields. These 
generally consist of a shared terrain between two key disciplines–political science and law. On 
even a short roll-call are legal theory, political philosophy, constitutional theory, comparative 
constitutional law, law and politics, judicial politics, democratisation studies, transitional justice, 
and international human rights law.  
The core scholarship here is a small number of region-specific analyses of the roles 
played by constitutional courts in new democracies, including Wojciech Sadurski, Jan Zielonka 
and Kim Lane Scheppele on Central and Eastern Europe; Roberto Gargarella, Siri Gloppen, 
Gretchen Helmke and Irwin Stotzky on Latin America (and, to a lesser extent, Africa); Theunis 
Roux and Magnus Killander on Africa; and Tom Ginsburg on East Asia.25 Others, such as 
Andrew Harding, Peter Leyland, Samuel Issacharoff, Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Oscar 
 
25 See W Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer, 2008); W Sadurski (ed.), Constitutional Justice, East and West: Democratic 
Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Springer, 
2002); J Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: Institutional Engineering 
(OUP, 2001); K Lane Scheppele, ‘Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the 
Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe’ 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1757 (2006); 
K Lane Scheppele, ‘Democracy by Judiciary (Or Why Courts Can Sometimes Be More Democratic than 
Parliaments)’ in W Sadurski, M Krygier & A Czarnota (eds.), Rethinking the Rule of Law in Post-Communist 
Europe: Past Legacies, Institutional Innovations, and Constitutional Discourses (CEUP, 2005); K Lane 
Scheppele, ‘The New Hungarian Constitutional Court’ 8 Eastern European Constitutional Review 81 (1999); 
G Helmke & J Ríos-Figueroa (eds.), Courts in Latin America (CUP, 2011); S Gloppen, BM Wilson, R 
Gargerella, E Skaar & M Kinander (eds.), Courts and Power in Latin America and Africa (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010); S Gloppen, R Gargerella & E Skaar (eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The 
Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies (Routledge, 2004); I Stotzky (ed.), Transition to 
Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary (Westview Press, 1993); T Roux, The Politics of 
Principle: The First South African Constitutional Court, 1995-2005 (CUP, 2013); T Roux, ‘The South 
African Constitutional Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence: A Response to Samuel Issacharoff’ 5 
Constitutional Court Review 33 (2014); T Roux, ‘Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa’ 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 106 (2009); M Killander (ed.), International 
Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa (PULP, 2010); T Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New 
Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (CUP, 2003). See also A Harding & P Nicholson (eds.), 




Vilhena Vieira and Upendra Baxi provide cross-regional comparisons of constitutional 
courts.26  
Analysis of the specific roles played by regional human rights courts in new democracies 
remains rare. Europe is the principal focus, with three main works on the European Court of 
Human Rights: an edited collection by the transitional justice scholars Michael Hamilton and 
Antoine Buyse; a monograph by the transitional justice scholar James Sweeney; and a co-
authored work by Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary focusing on the European 
Court’s widely criticised judgment in Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina,27 which found 
aspects of the Bosnian consociational political system to be incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Literature on the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights is more modest, and analysis of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
remains scant, given that its first merits judgment was not issued until 2013.28  
Despite providing significant insights into the roles of courts in the post-war model for 
judicialised democratisation, these roles as yet remain unclear and far from fully understood. 
The existing scholarship suffers from five central deficiencies.  
First, existing scholarship does not engage sufficiently with the foundational concept of 
democratisation itself; in terms of what it really means, when it starts and ends. This is essential 
to any discussion of how we view courts’ roles in this process. Second, there is a tendency to 
focus on single-country case-studies, and an inordinate focus on a small number of empirical 
contexts (e.g. South Africa, Hungary, Colombia). Third, it fails to capture the very particular 
context of adjudication in a new democracy, and how this context shapes not only how the 
courts approach their adjudicative role, but also objective justifications for a role that differs 
from that of courts in mature democracies. Fourth, in the majority of the literature, produced 
 
26 See A Harding & P Leyland (eds.), Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 
Publishing, 2009); S Issacharoff, ‘Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging’ 99 Georgetown Law 
Journal 961 (2011); S Issacharoff, ‘Constitutional Courts and Consolidated Power’, NYU Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 459 (2014); S Issacharoff, ‘The Democratic Risk to Democratic 
Transitions’, NYU Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 418 (2013); D Bonilla Maldonado 
(ed.), Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia 
(CUP, 2013); O Vilhena Vieira, F Viljoen & U Baxi (eds.), Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing 
the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa (PULP, 2013). See also D Kapiszewski, G Silverstein & 
RA Kagan (eds.), Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective (CUP, 2013). 
27 ECHR, App. Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06 (22 December 2009). 
28 See A Buyse & M Hamilton (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights 
(CUP, 2011); JA Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era: Universality in 
Transition (Routledge, 2013); C McCrudden & B O’Leary, Courts & Consociations: Human Rights versus 
Power-Sharing (OUP, 2013); D Rodríguez-Pinzón, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System and 
Transitional Processes’ in Buyse. & Hamilton (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence; and D García-Sayan, ‘The 
Inter-American Court and Constitutionalism in Latin America’ 89 Texas Law Review 1835 (2010-2011). The 
leading work on the African regional human rights system was published before the African Court had issued 
its first full judgment in 2013: M Kiwinda Mbondenyi, International Human Rights and their Enforcement 




largely by political scientists, and lawyers using political science methodologies, the unique 
nature of courts as legal institutions is easily obscured. The primary focus tends to be on judicial 
behaviour and strategy, using game theory and other behavioural methodologies. This provides 
useful insights, but often fails to fully capture the nature of adjudication in a new democracy, 
and tends to privilege the outcome and impact of judgments over their content. This leaves an 
incomplete picture, which fails to appreciate the impact of doctrinal development and 
contestation within courts on the roles they assume as democracy-builders. 
Fifth, and perhaps more importantly, there is a glaring divide between a vast literature 
on domestic constitutional courts in new democracies and a much smaller literature on the 
impact of regional human rights courts on such states. Analysis of courts at the domestic level 
does not integrate the role of courts at the regional level, or vice versa, with the result that their 
interaction in the context of democratisation is never fully explored and remains 
underconceptualised. In addition, existing scholarship fails to capture, more generally, the 
multiple and overlapping systemic interaction between courts and non-judicial sites of 
constitutional authority across the domestic and regional levels, and how this raises a complex 
scenario of ‘variable geometry’ where assertive action at any one site has ramifications for the 
roles carried out by the other actors.  
This glaring gap reflects the fact that the relevant literature as a whole is contained in 
discrete silos. There is little connection or communication between specific fields of 
scholarship that analyse different aspects of the roles of courts in new democracies. In 
particular, as we will see, normative arguments concerning the roles that courts should play in 
supporting democratisation processes often engage to a limited extent not only with the core 
debate on the judicial role in mature democracies, 29  but, more importantly, with other 
normative arguments focused on the role of courts as democracy-builders. To a certain extent, 
this fragmentation is due to the differing preoccupations of scholars, addressing different 
questions to those in this thesis.  
 
3 PROJECT SCOPE & ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
3.1 WHAT THE THESIS AIMS TO ACHIEVE 
 
Evidently, no thesis can attempt to fully address all of the deficiencies in the literature described 
above. I conceive of this project, not as answering all of the questions, but rather, asking the 
right questions; questions that are not addressed in any systematic way in the existing literature.  
 




The main aim of the thesis is to make a meaningful contribution to existing normative 
debates concerning the proper roles of courts as democracy-builders, which considers the 
strengths and limits of the court-centric post-war model of democratisation, integrates the role 
of regional courts, and which is more mindful of the strengths and weaknesses of adjudication 
at the domestic and regional levels. In order to do so, it provides a historical account of the 
development of the judicialised post-war model of democratisation; constructs a conceptual 
and analytical framework which is heuristically useful for exploration of what is distinctive 
about the democratisation context and the role of courts in that context; and seeks to reveal 
the ‘real world’ nature of adjudication in the democratisation context at both the domestic and 
regional levels. 
The Brazilian scenario briefly discussed at the start of this introduction remains at the 
heart of the thesis, but it is used to illuminate the post-war global model of court-centric 
democratisation as a whole. To do so, the thesis traces the origins of the post-war template for 
adjudication as a component of successful democratisation to the experience of post-1945 West 
Germany, and its global spread through the various post-war waves of democratisation across 
the world, which from the 1980s onwards began to include regional human rights courts as 
well as domestic constitutional courts. The thesis underscores the different roles played by the 
courts at each level, by conceptualising these roles in a general sense, applying this conceptual 
framework to examine the roles of the Brazilian Supreme Court and Inter-American Court in 
Brazil’s democratisation process, and placing these roles in comparative perspective. By placing 
the inter-court contestation concerning Brazil’s amnesty law within a much wider historical, 
regional and global context, we get a sense of how courts in new democracies worldwide have 
come to be perceived as such central actors to successful democratisation processes, as well as 
their limits in this regard and the democratic difficulties raised by their centrality.  
 
3.2 A FEW CAVEATS 
 
A number of caveats are warranted regarding the scope and orientation of this project. While 
the thesis proceeds from the premise that the roles of courts at both levels in democratisation 
processes are not epiphenomenal, this is not to suggest that the courts are always the most 
important actors in democratisation processes. Nevertheless, what courts do remains highly 
significant and can have a crucial impact at critical junctures in the democratisation process.  
In addition, the thesis does not directly focus on the very specific case of the European 




powers of the European Parliament), on the basis that the EU and ECJ are entirely European 
phenomena which have not been replicated, and are unlikely to be replicated, elsewhere.30  
Nor do I view it as a ‘rights’ thesis, in the sense that it does not analyse the role of courts 
exclusively through the lens of human rights. In addition, the thesis does not deal at any length 
with issues such as judicial selection and judicial independence, which are addressed in detail 
in other works.31 The thesis also does not focus on post-conflict contexts, although some of its 
content may have some relevance to those contexts.  
Finally, while the temporal scope of the thesis may appear extremely long, at 70 years, 
the heart of the thesis concerns a time-span running from the late 1980s, when the European 
and Inter-American human rights courts began to operate in earnest and the global spread of 




To whom is this thesis addressed? Despite its cross-cutting approach, perhaps the most natural 
home for the thesis is in the ‘big tent’ of law and politics. It is therefore primarily aimed at 
adding to existing analyses by scholars such as Alec Stone Sweet, Kim Lane Scheppele, Denis 
Galligan, Martin Shapiro, Roberto Gargarella, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Karen Alter, Tom 
Ginsburg, Ran Hirschl, Samuel Issacharoff, James Sweeney and Christopher McCrudden.  
That said, there are a variety of ‘entry points’ to the thesis, whether one is interested in 
law and development, the interface between domestic and international law, ‘judicial dialogue’, 
post-national governance, the democratic legitimacy of strong judicial review, comparative 
constitutional law or the spread of regional human rights courts.  
More widely, it is hoped that the thesis may be of use to policymakers and organisations 
involved in legal reform in existing and future democratising states, as they are currently 
operating without any systematic account of the potential, operation, limits and drawbacks of 
constitutional courts and regional human rights courts, and the interaction between such courts. 
Such an account is sorely needed if they are to make recommendations that fully appreciate the 






30 Addressed in more detail at the end of Chapter One.  
31 See, e.g., A Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition (Springer, 2012); PH Russell & DM 
O’Brien, Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (UVP, 




4 STRUCTURE, ARGUMENTS & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The thesis contains five substantive chapters.  
Chapter One explores the concept of democratisation as the first step in sketching an 
analytical framework for examining the role of courts in supporting democratisation processes. 
The chapter seeks to explain what is distinctive about democratisation, including how we 
define it, what temporal markers it contains, and when it might be said to end. It addresses the 
relationship between democratisation theory and the conceptual framework provided by 
transitional justice theory and explains why the former framework is preferred in this thesis, 
as avoiding the terminological and conceptual confusion rife in the literature, and permitting 
the sequence of events typical of democratisation to be more precisely located. This allows the 
activity of courts to be related to, and viewed within, the overall context of democratisation. 
The chapter then constructs an analytical framework fundamentally based on a reading of 
democratisation theory, but refined through exploration of the relationship between 
democratisation and two other key concepts: democracy and constitutionalism, at both the 
domestic and regional levels. 
Chapter Two narrates the development of the global model of court-centric 
democratisation, and the widespread perception of courts as central to democratisation 
processes. It argues that the model, and the perceptions underpinning it, stem from a novel 
form of constitutional adjudication pioneered by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
from 1951 onward, and a perception of the court as central to West Germany’s successful 
return to full democratic governance by the 1970s. It is contended that this led not only to 
constitutional courts assuming prominence in constitution-making for subsequent new 
democracies, but also paved the way for meaningful adjudication by regional human rights 
courts, with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as the quintessential ‘democratisation 
court’ at this level. The chapter challenges the perception of the power of courts to drive 
democratisation as based on unsound premises, tending to elide the propitious context for 
democratisation in Western Europe states of the immediate post-war period (particularly 
Germany), and tending to place unrealistic expectations on courts in regional contexts outside 
Western Europe, which have not enjoyed the same advantages.  
Having challenged the unrealistic perception of courts as democracy-builders in Chapter 
Two, Chapter Three seeks to explore in more depth the roles that constitutional courts and 
regional human rights courts actually play in democratisation processes. The aim of the chapter 
is to conceptualise the different but intersecting roles that the domestic and regional courts 




compared to a mature democracy, fundamentally shape the roles assumed by the courts. The 
chapter first conceptualises the roles of constitutional and regional human rights courts 
separately, asserting that the former act as primary sites of normativity embedded within a 
single democratisation context, whereas the latter act as secondary sites of normativity, external 
to any particular democratisation context, which can assume primacy where the domestic 
courts are perceived as failing to provide sufficient rights protection. This discussion is then 
refined through a fuller conceptualisation of the interaction between the courts at each level, 
challenging and adding nuance to the common presentation of the courts as partners in a 
coherent system of adjudication.  
Chapter Four applies the conceptual framework set out in Chapter Three to a 
comparative analysis of the Brazilian scenario discussed at the start of this Introduction, in 
order to achieve a finer-grained picture of the texture and nature of ‘democratisation 
jurisprudence’ at each level, based on empirical evidence. The chapter first explores the 
different impacts of the Supreme Court of Brazil and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights on Brazil’s democratisation process, and the implications of the conflictual relationship 
between the two courts for action by other actors in the democratic order. The Brazilian 
context is then discussed against the wider regional and global contexts, through significant 
comparison to the African and European contexts, which shows the extent to which it 
exemplifies, and departs from, the post-war model of court-centric democratisation. 
Based on the empirical data and conceptual framework built up in the first four chapters, 
Chapter Five explores normative debates on the appropriate role for courts as democracy-
builders, contrasting these with the ‘core’ debate on the role of courts in a mature democratic 
order. The chapter critically reviews the existing normative debates as generally failing to 
integrate adjudication at the regional level, talking past one another, and having insufficient 
regard for concerns regarding democratic legitimacy. The chapter then presents a normative 
position that departs in key ways from existing positions, particularly by integrating regional 
human rights courts. First, it makes an argument for how existing courts might operate more 
effectively separately, and as a system, to support democratisation, placing particular emphasis 
on the need for regional courts to remain cognisant of their epistemic limits when assessing 
whether robust intervention in the democratisation process is warranted, and the possible 
impact of such intervention on the domestic court. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it 
explores a range of constitutional design options for the future that may improve the capacity 
of courts to act effectively as democracy-builders, arguing for a significant departure from 




Finally, the concluding remarks engage in a spot of ‘future-gazing’, asking whether the 





The methodology of the thesis blends elements of philosophical, doctrinal and social analysis 
of courts as democracy-builders, but the fundamental purpose is to analyse the roles of these 
courts as social institutions,32 and how they impact on, function in, and are affected by the 
particular social and political context of democratisation. If a label must be attached to the 
overall methodological thrust, perhaps the most apt is ‘practical reasoning’.33 This seeks to 
derive general conclusions from particular instances and to appreciate a complex reality, rather 
than framing a general argument and applying it to specific instances. It is not the fundamental 
choice of an inductive approach over a deductive approach. Rather, a reflexive relationship is 
maintained between both approaches. Theoretical discussion at the beginning serves to frame 
how we view and filter an embarrassment of empirical data on courts in new democracies. In 
turn, the analysis of empirical data feeds into the theoretical discussion in the final chapter. 
The thesis remains, at all times, tethered to the empirical reality. 
The thesis is conducted through a small-n research design that combines critical 
literature review with a focus on a small number of case-studies, along diachronic and 
synchronic axes. Necessarily, different methodological approaches predominate in each 
chapter: Chapters One and Five are theoretical in nature; Chapter Two is largely historical, 
Chapter Three is conceptual, and Chapter Four’s case-study focuses on doctrinal analysis 
within the conceptual framework set out in Chapter Three.  
The core case-studies, of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Chapter Two, and 
the comparative case-study of the Brazilian Supreme Court and Inter-American Court in 
Chapter Four, are used as empirical foils for discussing normative stances on the roles of such 
courts in Chapter Five. In particular, focusing on the Latin American context as the core case-
study serves a dual purpose. First, it adds to an existing literature whose dominant focus to 
date has been on constitutional courts in the European context, and where only the role of the 
European Court of Human Rights in new democracies has been the subject of systematic study. 
Second, as compared to the very particular European context, the reality of regional 
 
32 See further, DJ Galligan & M Versteeg (eds.), Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions (CUP, 
2013). 
33 A useful summary of ‘practical reasoning’ is found in S Brewer (ed.), Evolution and Revolution in Theories 




governance in Latin America, and the institutional set-up of the Inter-American regional 
human rights system, is more similar to that seen in Africa. The Latin American experience 
therefore not only deepens our understanding of courts as democracy-builders in that region, 
but appears to have more resonance for the African context than the European experience, as 
seen in Chapter Four. 
The reliance on doctrinal analysis in Chapter Four warrants some explanation, given that 
textual analysis of decisions appears somewhat démodé in research on courts, where political 
scientists, and their methodologies, are increasingly dominant. It is used in this thesis because, 
ultimately, it is the only way to unpack the very real contestation within courts themselves 
regarding the permissible limits of their role, their view of their constitutional ‘mission’ in the 
new democracy, and their perception of the democratisation context itself, as well as their 
systemic interaction with one another and with third party actors at the domestic level.  
In a sense, a judicial decision is the closest one can get to a ‘unit’ of democratisation. 
Each case presents a vignette, whether of political power plays, authoritarian impulses, inter-
branch conflict, individual-State conflict, State-international conflict or inter-court 
contestation. From the vignettes one progressively builds a collage, which–however 
impressionistic–illuminates the contested roles of the courts in democratisation processes, and 
the nature of those processes, as a whole. It is also vital to a presentation of courts which seeks 
to avoid representing them as monolithic entities, of one mind and voice. Such analysis is 
therefore ‘added value’ lawyers can bring to the existing scholarship. 
 
6 DEFINING KEY TERMS 
 
For the purposes of clarity, it is worthwhile to define and briefly discuss key terms in the text.  
 
6.1 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
 
Typically, the term ‘constitutional court’ denotes a decision-making institution which is 
separate from the ordinary judiciary, and which has the final, and usually exclusive, say on the 
interpretation of the constitution, as well as the constitutional validity of laws and State action. 
The term ‘supreme court’, by contrast, denotes a judicial institution at the apex of the ordinary 
judiciary, which operates both as the final interpreter of the constitution as well as the final 
court of appeal concerning various non-constitutional matters.  
Although constitutional courts and supreme courts exhibit significant differences (see 
below), this thesis employs the term ‘constitutional court’ for both types of court, where they 




reference to ‘constitutional and supreme courts’, or to ‘apex courts’; the latter term being 
widely used, but which, in reference to constitutional courts, is not technically correct. 
For the purposes of analytical clarity a certain ideal type has to be used. A constitutional 
court is defined, using Conrado Hübner Mendes’s minimal formula, as “a (i) multi-member 
and non-elected body that, (ii) when provoked by external actors, (iii) may challenge, on 
constitutional grounds, legislation enacted by a representative parliament.”34  
 
Supreme Courts v Kelsenian Courts 
 
Notwithstanding the definition above, it is necessary to briefly observe that a number of basic 
typologies are employed in the literature, the most fundamental being the distinction between 
supreme courts in the ‘American’ mould (hereinafter, ‘supreme courts’) and ‘European’ 
constitutional courts based on the principles elaborated by the Austrian legal philosopher Hans 
Kelsen in the 1920s (hereinafter, ‘Kelsenian courts’).35 The former have general jurisdiction 
while the latter specialise in constitutional adjudication. Review can be decentralised or 
centralised. Ordinary courts in ‘American’ systems are empowered to disapply laws deemed 
unconstitutional while the supreme court enjoys the exclusive power to invalidate laws.36 In 
Kelsenian systems the constitutional court enjoys a monopoly on questions of constitutionality. 
In ‘American’ systems constitutional questions only come before the supreme court as part of 
a concrete case; whereas Kelsenian courts can perform abstract review of laws as well as 
concrete review. Abstract review may be a priori (before a bill is promulgated as law) or a 
posteriori (after a bill becomes law).  
Enduring and useful as this typology is, it is important to recognise that it does not 
capture the diversity and complexity of courts in regions such as Latin America, which defy 
traditional taxonomies by mixing decentralised review with centralised review, through the 
creation of novel constitutional review mechanisms that do not exist in other world regions, 
and with review powers in some states shared between supreme courts and Kelsenian courts.37 
Though often described as a ‘hybrid’ of ‘American’ and ‘European’ models, given the venerable 
tradition of judicial review in the region such characterisation can be unhelpfully reductive and 
West-centric. 
 
34 C Hübner Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy (OUP, 2013) p.11. 
35 The wide variety of systems of strong judicial review is presented by, e.g., A Mavčič, The Constitutional 
Review (Bookworld Publications, 2001); and A Harding, P Leyland & T Groppi, ‘Constitutional Courts: 
Forms, Functions and Practice in Comparative Perspective’ in Harding & Leyland (n26). 
36 In the US system the Supreme Court technically does not ‘invalidate’ laws, but the effect of a finding of 
unconstitutionality is to bar the application of the law, leading to a very similar result. 
37 J Frosini & L Pegoraro, ‘Constitutional Courts in Latin America: A Testing Ground for New Parameters 




Much of the literature on strong judicial review in the new democracies of the post-war 
world focuses on Kelsenian courts. Considered, as Sujit Choudhry notes, “an expected 
component of new democracies”,38 it is true that the institution is virtually standard in Europe 
and has been the most popular institutional form for strong judicial review in new constitutions 
of the post-war era, 39  with the German, Hungarian, South African and Colombian 
constitutional courts garnering the lion’s share of attention in English-language scholarship. 
However, it is important to emphasise that outside Europe the majority of new democracies 
worldwide have not opted for this model, preferring instead to retain the existing supreme 
court, or to reform it by installing a new constitutional chamber, adding new powers, changing 
its jurisdiction, or simply purging its membership (see Table 2.1 on p.65).  
This is true of Latin America, Africa and Asia, despite the misleading impression given 
by the fact that the majority of the most well-known courts in each region are all Kelsenian 
courts (those of Colombia, South Africa and South Korea). To focus solely on Kelsenian 
institutions, then, would tell only part of the post-war story. Differences in institutional design 
are discussed at more length in Chapter Three. 
 
6.2 REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
 
The definition of constitutional courts above may also be used for regional human rights courts, 
with the addition of three criteria: (i) the body has been established by an international treaty; 
(ii) it is the final interpreter of rights enshrined in an international treaty setting out a bill of 
rights for a specific world region; and (iii) its competence does not go beyond rights 
adjudication.  
This definition thus includes solely the three regional human rights courts in Europe, 
the Americas and Africa, 40  and excludes other regional courts which may have some 
jurisdiction concerning rights adjudication, such as the apex courts of, respectively, the EU, 
the Andean Community (AC) and the African Union (AU);41 and sub-regional entities such as 
the (now suspended) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. It also 
 
38 S Choudhry, Constitutional Courts After the Arab Spring (Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU 
Law, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014) p.16. Available at <http:// 
constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Constitutional-Courts-after-the-Arab-Spring.pdf>. 
39 A Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutions and Judicial Power’ in D Caramani (ed.), Comparative Politics 3rd ed. 
(OUP, 2014) p.160. 
40 As stated above, the Arab League has resolved to establish an Arab Court of Human Rights. In Asia, 
embryonic advances in the human rights architecture have been made. See D Shelton, The Regional 
Protection of Human Rights (OUP, 2010) p.1051 et seq. 
41 As the president of the EU’s Court of Justice emphasised in 2014: “The Court is not a human rights court: 
it is the Supreme Court of the Union.” S Douglas-Scott, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a 
Christmas bombshell from the European Court of Justice’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (24th December 2014). 




excludes global entities which cannot be considered ‘regional’ and whose jurisdiction goes 
beyond human rights matters to international criminal law, international humanitarian law, 
international economic law, or international law sensu lato.42 For the avoidance of all doubt, 
the definition also excludes national human rights courts, such as the ad hoc Human Rights 
Courts of Indonesia. 
 
The Three Existing Courts: Fundamental Similarities and Differences 
 
At present, the three regional human rights courts in Europe, the Americas and Africa together 
have jurisdiction over 91 of the UN’s 190 member states: the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, France, conducts oversight of 47 states; the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica, has jurisdiction over 20 states; and to date 24 states 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights based in 
Arusha, Tanzania.  
The Inter-American and African systems owe their existence in large part to a process 
of legal and institutional mimesis, looking to the European experience for inspiration from the 
beginning. Like the European Court, each represents the apogee of an incremental process of 
institutional development. All three courts have contentious jurisdiction, advisory jurisdiction, 
the power to order relief where a rights violation is found, or even provisional measures where 
necessary. However, they are far from facsimiles of the European system, having institutional 
machinery more similar to one another than to the European system: both continue to operate 
with a non-judicial Commission and a judicial Court; whereas the European system became a 
wholly judicial affair centred on the sole institution of the Court with adoption of Protocol 11 
to the ECHR in 1998, which dissolved the European Commission on Human Rights. 
Differences in institutional design are discussed at more length in Chapter Three. 
 
6.3 STRONG JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
This thesis is, ultimately, about the role of strong judicial review in new democracies. At the 
domestic level, the fundamental typology is between ‘strong’ judicial review, which as a matter 
of constitutional law accords the ‘final say’ on constitutional questions to the constitutional 
court, empowering it to invalidate legislation repugnant to the constitution, and ‘weak’ judicial 
review, under which the courts can declare laws to be inconsistent with the constitution, but 
where the ‘final say’ on the validity of a law rests with parliament in line with the principle of 
 
42 E.g. the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the adjudicative 




parliamentary supremacy. Worldwide, strong judicial review is by far the most common form,43 
with weak review systems primarily a phenomenon of the common law world (e.g. New 
Zealand). In principle, judicial review by regional human rights courts most strongly mirrors 
strong judicial review at the domestic level. The respective founding treaties explicitly state 
that the court’s judgments are final, and enjoin States Parties to comply.44 While it remains a 
useful fundamental distinction for the discussion that follows, as we will see, adjudication in 
the real world often departs from this rather neat typology.  
It is also worthwhile to briefly note at the outset that the dominant understandings of 
the rise of judicial power worldwide and the permissible and possible roles of constitutional 
courts and regional human rights courts derive from scholarship focused on courts in long-
established democracies. They have thus been hammered out on the anvil of Western empirical 
realities, where the role of courts has either developed within an evolutionary progress toward 
democracy (e.g. the UK, Canada), or, as in much of post-war Western Europe (e.g. Germany, 
Italy, Spain), has developed in a regional context aided by the post-war ‘economic miracle’ and 
the significant institutional and normative ballast of the European Community (now Union). 
The core literature on the global expansion of judicial power, under the rubrics ‘judicial 
politics’45 and ‘judicialisation of politics’46 charts the unprecedented and increasing transfer of 
fundamental political and social questions from elected representatives to courts, and is 
overwhelmingly the scholarly product of political scientists. It focuses on the nature of strong 
judicial review in Western states such as the US, Italy and Germany,47 and the rise of ‘weak’ 
review in a minority of other Western states,48 as well as the emergence and growing power 
since the 1950s of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in the international sphere. These include 
 
43 See Chapter Two, Section 1. 
44 See Articles 44 and 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Articles 67 and 68 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and Articles 28 and 30 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, some 
view the operation of these courts as closer to ‘weak’ judicial review: see, e.g. A Føllesdal, ‘Much Ado about 
Nothing? International Judicial Review of Human Rights in Well-Functioning Democracies’ in A Føllesdal, 
B Peters, J Karlsson Schaffer & G Ulfstein (eds.), The Legitimacy of Regional Human Rights Regimes (CUP, 
2013). See, further, Chapters Three and Five. 
45 See D Kommers, Judicial Politics in Western Germany: A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court (Sage 
Publications, 1976); ML Volcansek (ed.), Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe (Cass, 
1992); A Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France (OUP, 1994); H Jacob et al., Courts, Law and Politics 
in Comparative Perspective (YUP, 1996); and A Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics 
in Europe (OUP, 2000). 
46 See N Tate & T Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (NYUP, 1995); M Shapiro & A Stone 
Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (OUP, 2002); and R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins 
and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (HUP, 2004). See also G Sturgess & P Chubb, Judging the 
World: Law and Politics in the World’s Leading Courts (Butterworth, 1988). 
47 Shapiro & Stone Sweet, ibid. 




the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU), the adjudicative organs of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the European Court of Human Rights.49  
That the birth of strong judicial review arose through the US Supreme Court’s arrogation 
of the power to invalidate unconstitutional laws50 has cast a long intellectual shadow: scholars 
in this field routinely assume that courts, like other political institutions, seek to optimise and 
expand their power–a view often shared by scholars outside the field.51 Indeed, examples of 
this expansionist tendency abound: the Irish Supreme Court’s use of an ‘unenumerated rights’ 
doctrine in the 1960s to expand rights protection; 52  the European Court of Justice’s 
unprecedented role in progressing legal integration in the European Community and 
‘constitutionalising’ the founding treaties; 53  and the characterisation of the European 
Convention as a ‘living instrument’ by the European Court of Human Rights, which has 
allowed it to expand rights protection under the Convention in line with present-day 
understandings.54 In more recent years the discussion has expanded from courts’ involvement 
in policy-making to their intervention in matters of ‘pure’ politics, such as Germany’s 
relationship with the EU, the foundational definition of Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic 
state’, 55 or the current tug-of-war between the Spanish and Catalan governments concerning 
Catalan independence.56  
The dramatic post-war rise in judicial power in the domestic and international arenas has 
lent a particular piquancy to a long-standing debate between so-called ‘political 
constitutionalists’ and ‘legal constitutionalists’. The former place their faith in the political 
process to protect rights and minorities, and perceive a fundamental conflict between 
principles of representative democracy and the enjoyment of constitutional supremacy by 
unelected judges. The latter, concerned with the tyranny of the majority, support justiciable 
constitutional limits on governmental power and action, viewing judicial power to invalidate 
 
49 See, e.g., Sturgess & Chubb (n46). 
50 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803). 
51 See, e.g., Sturgess & Chubb (n46), Ch.4. 
52 See R Keane, ‘Judges as Lawmakers: The Irish Experience’ 2 Judicial Studies Institute Journal 1 (2004). 
53 See, e.g., A Rosas, E Levits & Y Bot (eds.), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses 
and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law (Springer, 2012). 
54 See, e.g., A Føllesdal, B Peters & G Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human 
Rights in a National, European and Global Context (CUP, 2013). 
55  See R Hirschl, ‘The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide’ 75 
Fordham Law Review 721 (2006-2007). 
56 See, e.g. V Ferreres, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court faces direct democracy’ I-CONnect, 23 September 
2009, <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2009/09/the-spanish-constitutional-court-faces-direct-democracy/;   
and ‘The Secessionist Challenge in Spain: An Independent Catalonia?’ I-CONnect, 22 November 2012, 
<http://www.iconnectblog.com/2012/11/the-secessionist-challenge-in-spain-an-independent-catalonia/>. 
See also a recent draft working paper by P Bossacoma i Busquets, ‘Constitutional Roads to Independence: 
The Problematic Catalan Case in the Light of the Scottish Experience’, Constitutional Law Discussion Group, 




unconstitutional laws as necessary to counter dangerous majoritarian impulses and to provide 
sufficient protection for fundamental rights. As regards state supervision by regional human 
rights courts, political constitutionalists perceive heightened democratic deficiencies in their 
operation;57 while legal constitutionalists focus on questions of heterarchy and hierarchy as 
between domestic and international courts, and the challenge of managing co-existence in a 
shared transnational judicial space.58  
As we will discover in the following chapters, the democratisation context not only 
fundamentally alters the roles that courts assume in democratic governance, but the drivers of 
those roles, and has also led to a parallel discussion of the judicial role beyond the familiar core 
debate about the permissible limits of judicial power in mature democracies. First, we need to 
explore what is meant by the foundational concept of ‘democratisation’, as a first step toward 




57 See, e.g., R Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of Regional Human Rights Conventions: Political 
Constitutionalism and the Hirst case’ in Føllesdal, Peters, Karlsson Schaffer & Ulfstein (n44). 














      
HAT, PRECISELY, DOES DEMOCRATISATION MEAN? Exploring the 
meaning of the concept is crucial to any enquiry as to the role of courts in this process. It is 
particularly central to our conceptualisation in Chapter Three of the roles courts play in the 
process, and the discussion in Chapter Five of normative stances arguing for a distinctive role 
for courts due to the particular demands of the democratisation context. What, then, is 
different about democratisation as a context and process, as opposed to the context of a stable 
Western democracy? When does it start? When does it end?  
This chapter aims to set out a workable analytical framework for exploring the roles that 
constitutional courts and regional human rights courts play in democratisation processes, and 
why the framework of the thesis is based on the concept of ‘democratisation’ rather than 
possible alternative concepts, such as ‘transitional justice’. The chapter first examines the ways 
in which ‘democratisation’ as a concept is used and how it relates to other terms of art in the 
literature, such as ‘transitional justice’ and ‘transitional constitutionalism’. The chapter then 
discusses the meaning of ‘democratisation’ in democratisation theory and lays out a minimal 
analytical framework for discussing democratisation and the courts in the following chapters. 
The framework, we will see, focuses in particular on the concept of ‘consolidation of 
democracy’, which is refined for the purposes of the thesis by exploring the relationship 








1 THE PREVALENCE OF ‘DEMOCRATISATION TALK’ IN LAW 
AND POLICY TODAY 
 
Law, policymaking and scholarship have become increasingly suffused with ‘democratisation 
talk’ in recent decades. Consider the following samples: 
 
Democratization is a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian 
society. Democracy is a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and 
mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people. 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization, 199659 
 
CONSIDERING that … one of the purposes of the OAS is to promote and consolidate 
representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; 
… 
REAFFIRMING that the participatory nature of democracy in our countries in different aspects 
of public life contributes to the consolidation of democratic values and to freedom and solidarity 
in the Hemisphere; 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, 200160 
 
The Council of Europe’s philosophy has always been to provide a “school for democracy” under 
which [“hybrid regimes”] would gradually deepen their commitment to democratic 
consolidation. 
‘Smart Power – Ways of Enhancing the Council of Europe’s Impact’ 
Advisory Report by the Think-Tank Task Force, 201461 
 
[The changing role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights] reflects the part that 
the IACHR played in dealing with authoritarian governments and during transition periods and 
the role it currently has with respect to the consolidation of democracy. 
OAS, Tenth Anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 201162 
 
According to [Tom] Ginsburg quite often transition to democracy precedes the development of 
an independent judiciary, and courts are more likely to strengthen democratic consolidation after 
transition. 
Anja Seibert-Fohr, 201263 
 
The purposes of ASEAN are … 
To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and 
protect fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms… 
 
59 United Nations (New York, 1996) p.1. 
60 Preamble. Adopted by the Organisation of American States (OAS) in Lima, 11 September 2001. Available 
at <http://oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm>.  
61 Strasbourg, January 2014, p.20. Available at <http://www.coe.int/t/policy-planning/think_tanks/Smart_ 
power_ report.pdf>.  
62 P.21. Available at <http://www.oas.org/docs/publications/Tenth%20Anniversary%20of%20the%20Inter-
Amer ican%20Democratic%20Charter.pdf>.  
63 Seibert-Fohr (n31) p.1334: citing T Ginsburg, ‘The Politics of Courts in Democratisation’ in JJ Heckman, 




Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 200764 
 
13.  The Assembly … suggests that it be ensured that lustration laws and similar administrative 
measures comply with the requirements of a state based on the rule of law, and focus on threats 
to fundamental human rights and the democratisation process. 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1096 (1996)65  
 
[W]e observe judicial decisionmaking that furthers goals of democratic consolidation by 
identifying for legislators national constitutional paths along which internationally defined 
democratic reforms may be pursued, preserving national integrity while acknowledging 
international reality. This “international reality” is the context of powerfully felt but often 
nationally distasteful international constraints within which democratic consolidation is taking 
place in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe. 
Nancy Maveety and Anke Grosskopf, 200466 
 
Recognising the contributions of the African Union and Regional Economic Communities to 
the promotion, nurturing, strengthening and consolidation of democracy and governance; 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 200767 
 
As a student who believes that I am taking a step to assist the democratisation in Turkey, I 
request from the Chancellor of our University that Kurdish be taught in our University, under 
optional courses. 
Excerpt from submissions of the applicants in Írfan Temel and others v Turkey, 200968  
 
From this global sampling, we see that a whole language and terminology developed in the 
field of democratisation theory–‘democratisation’, ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’–is widely 
used. ‘Democratisation’ is used in the sense of moving toward participatory government, 
representative government, a basis for stability, peace and development, freedom and solidarity, 
and even, in the words of the Kurdish student above, as possibly a synonym for more just 
government. It is often linked with other concepts, such as human rights protection and 
governance, suggesting that they are rather natural and complementary groupings. There is a 
distinction made in some of the quotations between ‘transition to democracy’ and 
‘consolidation of democracy’, while other documents employ different language, such as 
‘strengthening’ democracy and ‘promoting’ democracy. The following sections attempt to 
 
64 Article 1(4). Adopted by ASEAN on 20 November 2007. Available at <http://www.asean.org/archive/ 
publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>. 
65 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1096 (1996) on ‘Measures to dismantle the 
heritage of former communist totalitarian systems’. 
66  N Maveety & A Grosskopf, ‘‘Constrained’ Constitutional Courts as Conduits for Democratic 
Consolidation’ 38 Law & Society Review 463 (2004) at 464. 
67 Preamble. Adopted by the African Union in in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 January 2007. Available at 
<http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf>.  




explain the development of this ‘democratisation’ terminology and chart a way through the 
conceptual thicket. 
 
2 A DEMOCRATISING WORLD 
 
‘Democratisation’ would have been a relatively unfamiliar term to the pre-war hero of our 
preface, Chief Justice Hugh Kennedy. Although it finds its origins in the new verb ‘démocratiser’ 
coined in the heady years of post-revolutionary France69 it did not come into common usage 
until the 1970s. Certainly, its use by lawyers was rare until the 1970s: for instance, a HeinOnline 
search reveals only 815 publications referring to ‘democratization’ between 1900 and 1970, 
and these generally contain fleeting references to democratisation in the sense used in this 
thesis. 70  By contrast, searching for the same term between 1970-2014 returns 14,118 
publications.  
The increasing prevalence of the term and our prevailing understandings of what it 
means were forged during the post-war period in the unprecedented moves across the world 
toward civilian rule through full, free and fair elections. The conventional–albeit contested–
narrative draws on Samuel Huntington’s concept of ‘waves of democratisation’ in which 
multiple states took steps toward democratic rule at roughly the same time.71 The first took 
place in the Western World–mainly Western European and North American states–in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (1828-1926). The second took place in the immediate 
post-war period as Italy, Austria, West Germany and Japan committed to democratic rule after 
authoritarian periods and decolonisation took place in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa. 
The third, most extensive, wave began in 1974 with Portugal’s Carnation Revolution, followed 
by a return to democratic rule in Spain in 1978, and spreading to Greece, Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and various states in East Asia and Africa in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and also encompassing another round of decolonisation in the 1970s.  
Each ‘wave’ is viewed as having been followed by a ‘reverse wave’: in the 1920s-1940s 
by authoritarian regimes such as the National Socialist and other fascist regimes of Europe; 
and in the 1960s-1970s by the souring of democratic governance in newly independent African 
 
69 Prominent revolutionary thinkers date the verb to 1792: PV Vergniaud, Oeuvres de Vergniaud ed. A 
Vermorel (A. Faure, 1867).  
70 See, e.g. B Mirkine Guetzevich, ‘The Spanish Constitution of 1931’ 11 New York University Quarterly 
Law Review 1 (1933-1934) at 10, 14. 
71 The concept of ‘waves’ of democratisation has been subjected to robust criticism but remains useful as a 
shorthand for the various global phases of democratisation: See S Huntington, The Third Wave: 




states and the striking emergence of military rule across Latin America.72 We may now be 
witnessing a ‘reverse wave’ affecting a significant number of ‘third wave’ democracies, although 
this is not entirely clear.73 
The current convulsions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)–in states as 
diverse as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco–may not yet constitute a ‘fourth wave’ of 
democratisation.74 Yet, as Cynthia Arnson and Abraham Lowenthal recently observed, due to 
these developments, transition from authoritarian rule is now back at the heart of international 
politics;75 and, it might be added, has injected fresh blood into scholars and policymakers 
working on constitutional and international law. 
On the minimum criteria of free, fair and periodic elections–i.e. electoral democracy, as 
compared to full liberal democracy–we have moved from a world where 9 states in 1900 (out 
of 55 states in total; 16%) could be considered democratic,76 to 69 states in 1989 (out of 159; 
43%), to today’s tally of 125 (64%) of the 195 states of the United Nations which today meet 
this requirement (see Fig. 1.1 below).77 However, there is an enduring tension between the 
minimal conception of ‘democracy’ as simply allowing citizens to choose their political leaders 
at the ballot box and the broader conception of that term which, as this chapter recounts, tends 
to include respect for fundamental rights, a commitment to democratic constitutionalism, 
constraints on State authority and the dispersal of public power. There is a world of difference 
between, say, Norway and Nepal, or Canada and Colombia. Some states briefly achieve 
electoral democracy but lose this status quickly. Two electoral democracies were removed from 
the 2014 global list: Thailand, due to a coup d’état on 22 May 2014; and Libya, where initial 
 
72 Huntington, ibid., pp.15-17, p.290 et seq. A key work is J Linz & A Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes (JHUP, 1978). 
73 Recent years have seen democratic decay in regions such as Central and Eastern Europe, the Andean region 
of South America, African states such as Kenya, Nigeria and Cameroon and various states in Asia. See, e.g., 
P Blokker, New Democracies in Crisis? A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Routledge, 2013); G Crawford & G Lynch (eds.), Democratization in Africa: 
Challenges and Prospects (Routledge, 2013); AR Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The 
Chávez Authoritarian Experiment (CUP, 2010); ESK Fung & S Drakeley (eds.), Democracy in Eastern Asia: 
Issues, Problems and Challenges in a Region of Diversity (Routledge, 2013); and A Croissant & M Bünte 
(eds.), The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
74 Some claim the CEE transitions to be a ‘fourth wave’: e.g., M McFaul, ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracy 
and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transition in the Postcommunist World’ 54 World Politics 21 2 (2002). 
75 CJ Arnson & AF Lowenthal, ‘Foreword’, in G O’Donnell & PC Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (JHUP, 2013) p.vii. 
76 See JM Colomer, ‘Disequilibrium Institutions and Pluralist Democracy’ 13 Journal of Theoretical Politics 
235 (2001) at 241; and ‘Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present’ at <http://www.un.org/en/ 
members/growth.shtml#1980>.  
77 Freedom House, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist. Freedom in the World 2015. Available 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    










3 RETURNING TO SOURCE: THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOC-
RATISATION THEORY 
 
In order to set out a useful framework for analysing the roles of courts in democratisation 
processes, it is necessary to understand the evolution of the concept in democratisation theory, 
a research field located in the discipline of political science. Democratisation theory 
encompasses three key fields: (i) transition to democracy; (ii) consolidation of democracy; and 
(iii) quality of democracy. Known by the unlovely terms ‘transitology’ and ‘consolidology’, the 
first two areas date from the 1970s and 1980s respectively,78  while literature on the quality of 
democracy is of a much more recent vintage, dating to the late 1990s.  
While this literature provides useful frameworks for understanding the overall trajectory 
and nature of democratisation in a post-authoritarian state, it also tends to highlight the 
difficulty of grasping democratisation. As a meta-concept which covers the initial concrete 
movement in a non-democratic regime to elections, and thereafter, to the progressive 
realisation of a democratic order in the mould of a long-established liberal democracy of the 
Global North, democratisation is prismatic and expansive, referring to a system of processes 
which is almost unknowably complex, along a continuum of indefinite length, and with its 
ultimate horizon–the “quintessentially contested”79 concept of democracy–compounding and 
underpinning its problematic nature. 
 
3.1 TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
 
The literature on transitions to democracy was spurred by the ‘third wave’ of democratisation 
in the 1970s, and developed alongside the global cresting, troughing and eventual breaking of 
that wave in the 1990s. Building on pre-existing literature concerning definitions of democracy, 
this literature tended to adopt the minimalist definition of democracy proposed by Joseph 
Schumpeter in the 1940s,80 requiring no more than free, fair and regular elections.   
Thus, the most common approach in the political science literature to delimiting this 
phase of democratisation is to chart its beginning and end on the basis of pivotal moments 
related to a democratic electoral process: the beginning marked, for example, by an official 
commitment by the authoritarian government to hold free and fair elections, or the sparking 
of a revolutionary insurrection; the end point marked by successful realisation of free and fair 
elections, the convening of a parliament with power to check the executive, or the election of 
 
78 See e.g. P Schmitter & J Santiso, ‘Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy’ 19(1) 
International Political Science Review 69 (1998) at 72, 77. 
79 G O’Donnell, ‘The Perpetual Crises of Democracy’ 18 Journal of Democracy 5 (2007) at 6. 




a new president.81 This ‘transitology’ literature is accordingly relatively unproblematic, as there 
is general consensus on where its temporal bounds lie and of what its nature consists, meaning 
that it is “relatively simple to define, operationalize, and identify.”82 
 
3.2 CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY 
 
By contrast, the concept of ‘consolidation’ in the ‘consolidology’ literature is highly contested. 
As the ‘third wave’ polities continued to develop post-transition, political science scholars 
constructed increasingly elaborate frameworks of theoretical analysis to categorise the various 
regimes, to determine whether they could be considered to be consolidated, and to identify 
their nature vis-à-vis the long-established democracies of the Global North. The concept is 
“double-barrelled”,83 incorporating both ‘democracy’ and ‘consolidation of democracy’: thus, 
various conceptions are found in the literature and a fundamental line of division relates to the 
underlying definition of democracy itself, whether minimal (‘thin’) or substantive (’thick’).  
Based on the minimal Schumpeterian definition of democracy, Samuel Huntington in 
the early 1990s offered a ‘two-party turnover’ test to assess whether a post-authoritarian 
democratic regime has become consolidated, i.e. two successive peaceful transfers of power 
from one party to the opposition was one indication that consolidation has been achieved.84 
Juan Linz’ more rounded conception views consolidation as achieved when elections and 
related civil liberties have been institutionalised, all major political actors have renounced 
alternatives to democracy and submit to operating within a democratic framework, “and no 
political institution or group has a claim to veto the actions of democratically elected decision-
makers”; in other words, when democracy has become “the only game in town”. 85 This 
‘classical’ conception of ‘consolidation of democracy’ is therefore limited in scope, seeking 
solely 
to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy 
beyond the long term [and] of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression…86 
 
81 See, e.g., J Linz, ‘Transitions to Democracy’ 13 The Washington Quarterly 143 (1990) at 157. Evidently, 
such events can only be identified as markers of transition retrospectively, as promises of liberalisation can 
come to naught. 
82 B Schneider, ‘Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments’ 30 Latin 
American Research Review 215 (1995) at 219. 
83 C Schneider, The Consolidation of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America (Routledge, 2008) 
p.8.  
84 See Huntington (n9) p.266. 
85 Linz, ‘Transitions’ (n81). 




More demanding conceptions of consolidation were subsequently elaborated in the 
1990s. These, alongside elections, place a heavy emphasis on the rule of law and the protection 
of civil liberties and fundamental rights,87 due to concerns that the minimalist Schumpeterian 
definition of democracy was over-inclusive. That definition allowed regimes with significant 
democratic deficits but which hold regular and (relatively) free and fair elections to lay claim 
to the label of ‘democracy’–variously termed ‘illiberal’,88 ‘thin’89 and ‘façade’ democracies.90 Yet, 
these ‘thicker’ conceptions, based on normative and substantive definitions of democracy, 
rendered it considerably more difficult to ascertain whether a democracy can be said to be 
consolidated and the proponents of the substantive definition did not provide a satisfactory 
answer. 
For instance, Robert Dahl’s normative concept of democracy, ‘polyarchy’, ascribes seven 
essential attributes to a democratic regime: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive 
suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information; and 
associational autonomy.91 Ascertaining whether such a regime has been achieved is more 
difficult than ascertaining when ‘electoral democracy’ has been achieved. The ‘thicker’ 
conception also renders it extremely difficult to ascertain where a state lies on the consolidation 
spectrum, and elaborate models for assessment, which incorporate every possible element of 
a liberal democratic regime, have tended to be of limited use.92   
 
87 Philippe Schmitter, for instance, made use of a bipartite classification of procedural and structural minima, 
encompassing “civic rights of contestation and association, secret ballots, universal suffrage and ‘the rule of 
law’” and “regular elections, multiple political parties, associational recognition and access, and an 
accountable executive.” See P Schmitter, ‘The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, 
Sequences and Types’ in G Pridham (ed.), Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from 
Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Dartmouth, 1995) p.550. 
88 See F Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’ Foreign Affairs 22 (1997) at 43. 
89 See R Munck, ‘Introduction: A Thin Democracy’ Latin American Perspectives 5 (1997) at 21.  
90 Guillermo O’Donnell used the terms ‘façade democracy’ and ‘democradura’ to refer to a post-transition 
regime which has suffered a ‘slow death’ of democratisation “by the process of successive authoritarian 
advances.” See G O’Donnell, ‘Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes’ in S Mainwaring , G O’Donnell & J 
Valenzuela (eds.) Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in 
Comparative Perspective (UNDP, 1992) p.19, p.33. 
91 RA Dahl, On Democracy (YUP, 2000) pp.90-99. 
92 Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz constructed perhaps the most complex formula for democratic consolidation, 
as involving three separate but interrelated elements: (i) behavioural consolidation (the absence of any 
significant anti-democratic movements in a polity); (ii) attitudinal consolidation (requiring public support for 
democracy as the most legitimate form of government); and (iii) constitutional consolidation (entailing the 
submission by all political and other actors in the regime to a specific framework of laws, institutions and 
procedures; ‘the rule of law’). ‘Democratic consolidation’ was further subdivided into five ‘arenas’, each with 
its own guiding principles, provided in parentheses here: civil society (freedom of association and expression); 
political society (free, fair and regular elections); rule of law (unconditional adherence to the Constitution); 
state apparatus (usable and effective bureaucracy); and economic society (institutionalised market economy).  
Linz and Stepan suggested that progress in these ‘arenas’ could be assessed against any or all of the three 




The conceptual confusion has been compounded by the use of ‘consolidation’ in both 
a negative and a positive sense in the literature. Viewed negatively, the objective is to identify 
signs of threatened backsliding from electoral democracy to authoritarianism, whether by the 
“slow death” of successive authoritarian advances and a weakening of the existing democratic 
structures (‘democratic decay’ or ‘deconsolidation’), resulting in a repressive façade democracy, 
or by the “quick death” of a coup, invasion or other crisis; and to ascertain with some 
confidence when a new democracy could be expected to persist into the future.93 The common 
conception in the literature of ‘consolidation’ as the absence of breakdown suggested that 
consolidated democracies that broke down were never in fact consolidated.94   
Viewed positively, the concept in its ‘classical’ sense can refer to the minimal process of 
the institutionalisation of the basic structures of a democratic regime, or more broadly to 
advances in the quality of democracy, or ‘democratic deepening’; in other words, advancing 
from electoral democracy to liberal democracy (and thereafter to advanced democracy) by 
supplying the missing features of a full liberal democracy on the model of the established 
democracies of the West: a process which appears to have no clear terminus.95   
Many criticisms of the concept of ‘consolidation’ are found in the literature. It is 
ultimately meaningless; a congested “cluster concept” without a true core, or at worst, no more 
than a label for the study of new democracies, which could be characterised as “highly 
consolidated” or “persistently unconsolidated” depending on the conception of ‘democratic 
consolidation’ employed.96 It is overly West-centric; using the long-established democracies as 
the standard model of democracy, while ignoring that these democracies developed at a slower 
pace and in wholly different historical, societal and geo-political contexts to those of new 
democracies.97 It is tainted by excessive teleology; evincing a tendency to view consolidation 
as a process that would progress unfettered were it not for certain obstacles, and an expectation 
in the 1980s onwards that the new ‘third wave’ regimes would “soon come to resemble the 
sort of democracy found in admired countries of the Northwest”98–which appears naïve to 
twenty-first century eyes. 
 
93 See e.g. G O’Donnell, ‘Transitions’ (n90) p.33; and L Diamond, Developing Democracy (n87). 
94  See Timothy Power’s foreword to A Nervo Codato (ed.), Political Transition and Democratic 
Consolidation: Studies on Contemporary Brazil (Nova Science, 2006). 
95 See Schedler (n86) at 94. 
96 Ibid., at 101-102. 
97 In addition, Huntington’s ‘two-party turnover’ test for consolidation, closely modelled on the tradition of 
strong two-party systems in Anglo-Saxon countries, was viewed as revealing an “Anglo-Saxon bias”. See 
e.g. Schmitter, ‘Consolidation’ (n87) p.543. 




The most damning criticism of consolidology as an intellectual project in the 1990s was 
that, while designed to explain the nature and development of the ‘third wave’ regimes, it failed 
to provide a useful tool for analysing the numerous post-authoritarian regimes that had 
transitioned to democracy but which stubbornly continued to linger at various points on the 
spectrum of an ill-defined conceptual space between the two main referents of electoral 
democracy and liberal democracy.99  Equally scathing criticisms are also found in more recent 
literature.100 
In the late 1990s leading ‘consolidologists’ such as Guillermo O’Donnell turned their 
focus to other analytical frameworks, chiefly the concept of ‘quality of democracy’ (QoD),101 
designed to provide a means of analysing the true quality of a democracy, whether it is a long-
established democracy, a ‘third wave’ democracy, or otherwise, against a complex set of criteria. 
However, the problem with the QoD framework is that, in addressing all democratic regimes, 
it provides few pointers for achieving a better grasp of democratisation as a process, leaving 
us in a sort of analytical cul-de-sac. There are now any number of indices for ‘rating’ democracy 
across the world, each weighted toward different measures, which simply highlights how 
contested the task of assessing democratic quality remains.102 
Although ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ appear to constitute somewhat tarnished 
conceptual currencies, they are far from passé discourses. Indeed, the transitology and 
consolidology literatures continue to grow apace and the concept of quality of democracy has 
not supplanted the concepts of transition and consolidation as its proponents may have hoped. 
As Arnson and Lowenthal assert in their foreword to the 2013 edition of the 1986 vade mecum 
of democratisation theory, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions and 
Uncertain Democracies: “The core insights developed by the project remain relevant today.”103 
We find recent high-quality comparative research on democratisation explicitly taking that 
book as its starting point,104 and other scholars continuing to find value in the conceptual 
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framework of democratic consolidation.105 Regime transformations across the Arab world 
have also driven a recent uptick in new scholarship using the framework of transition and 
consolidation.106 
Significant aspects of the earlier consolidation literature are of particular utility for 
research on the role of courts in democratisation processes; in particular, Schmitter and 
O’Donnell’s concept of ‘disaggregation’, which permits analysis of a democratic regime’s 
component parts, suggests that democratic consolidation might be approached at different 
levels of analysis: at the level of a specific political institution (‘group structuration’); the ways 
in which certain political institutions relate to one another (‘(partial) regime structuration’); or 
as a process of linking the Gestalt, or network, of nascent political institutions to the economic 
and social groups on whose support or acquiescence such institutions were dependent.107   
Indeed, the bulk of the literature conforms to this typology, tending to focus on the 
development and role of specific institutional types, institutions and actors, such as 
presidentialism, parliament and political parties;108 on patterns of interaction between political 
institutions, such as executive-legislative relations;109 and on the wider interaction between 
political institutions and other actors, such as elites, civil society, the military and the Catholic 
Church, and including analysis of processes and values which provide a framework for 
interaction, such as human rights and labour politics.110  
 
4 EXISTING FRAMEWORKS: CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION AND 
COMPETITION 
 
Democratisation theorists have not tended to place much emphasis on law and courts in their 
work, and little effort has been expended to fully integrate the impact of courts and 
adjudication into their theoretical frameworks. This is despite the rule of law and the protection 
of fundamental rights being central to all but the most minimal conceptions of consolidation 
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in particular: as Juan Linz put it: “No Rechtsstaat, no democracy.”111 Schmitter suggests: “If 
‘electoralism’ was the panacea of the transition stage, constitutionalism is probably that for 
democratic consolidation.”112 However, there is a certain dismissiveness in the political science 
literature toward constitutional design and the process of constitutional adjudication, 
seemingly due to the ease with which many post-authoritarian regimes circumvented 
constitutional constraints and disregarded the judgments of constitutional courts.113   
Other scholars in both political science and law have taken up the task, focusing in 
particular on so-called ‘third wave’ democracies.114 This may be viewed against the wider effort 
in the literature, especially since the 1990s, to assess the myriad connections between law, 
courts and politics in both established liberal democracies and ‘third wave’ democracies, 
addressing themes such as the global expansion of judicial power at the domestic and 
international levels and the ‘judicialisation’ of politics.115 This literature, in the parlance of 
democratisation theory, tends to focus on group structuration (i.e. the development of the 
court itself) and partial regime structuration (primarily the relations between the constitutional 
court and the other branches of the state; or between the regional human rights court and the 
state).  
The next two sections discuss the two principal ways in which democratisation is 
discussed in the literature on courts. First, scholars simply use terms such as ‘democratisation’, 
‘transition’, ‘consolidation’, ‘democratic improvement’ and ‘democratic deepening’ as basic 
rubrics when analysing any state which has moved from authoritarian governance to 
governance based on periodic free and fair elections. Second, distinct fields of scholarship, 
principally transitional justice, focus on a broad concept of ‘transition’, which covers a wide 
variety of contexts. 
 
4.1 CONFUSION: (MIS)USE OF DEMOCRATISATION THEORY TERMINOLOGY 
 
Democratisation theory terminology is widely used in the literature on courts in new 
democracies, by both political scientists and lawyers. However, there is striking conceptual and 
terminological confusion across (and even within) the majority of the literature. The principal 
problem is the failure to acknowledge the polysemic and contested nature of terms such as 
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‘democratisation’ and ‘democratic consolidation’. Authors tend to refer to the concept as 
though its meaning is self-evident, without providing any definition of the term or even a brief 
traversal of its various conceptual components. This is, in one sense, understandable: given 
the charged and somewhat circular conceptual debates in democratisation theory, scholars 
working on courts have not wished to get bogged down in precise definitions. Presented with 
a landscape of conceptual quicksand, the temptation is to run as swiftly as possible across it 
lest the author lose all momentum. 
For instance, in his introduction to the edited collection, Democratic Consolidation in 
Eastern Europe: Institutional Engineering ,116 Jan Zielonka states: “We try to avoid complex 
debates about definitions…” 117  References throughout the text to ‘consolidation’, 
‘consolidated democracy’ and ‘democratic consolidation’–even in contributions which include 
‘democratic consolidation’ in the title–therefore leave the concept undefined and use the terms 
as minimal headings.118  
The same tendency is evident in many other works. Nancy Maveety and Anke 
Grosskopf’s article on constitutional courts as ‘conduits for democratic consolidation’, 119 
despite making numerous references to ‘democratic consolidation’ and including an entire 
section elaborating ‘a theory of courts in democratic consolidation’, adds little to the reader’s 
understanding of the authors’ conception of consolidation.120 A further example is a relatively 
recent edited collection on the accountability function of courts in new democracies,121 which 
examines the political role of constitutional courts in new democracies in Latin America and 
Africa in holding political power-holders accountable when they act outside their 
constitutionally defined powers. While it indicates that ‘democratic consolidation’ is a central 
theme,122 little attempt is made to define the term. 
The distinction between the key concepts in democratisation theory–‘transition’ and 
‘consolidation’–is also often under-appreciated. For instance, throughout the edited collection 
 
116 Zielonka (n25). 
117 Ibid., p.v. 
118 Ibid., e.g., Chs. 1, 2, 4 and 8. 
119 Maveety & Grosskopf (n66). 
120 Ibid., at 463, 464, 466-469, and 485. 
121 Gloppen, Gargarella & Skaar (n25). 
122 For example, the editors of Democratization and the Judiciary (n25) state at p.1: “Courts are important 
for the working and consolidation of democratic regimes. They facilitate government by contributing to the 
rule of law and by creating an environment conducive to economic growth.  They also have a key role to play 
with regard to making power-holders accountable to the democratic rules of the game, and ensuring the 
protection of human rights as established in constitutions, conventions and laws.” Similar statements are 
found in, e.g., J Couso, ‘The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of Domestic Transition, 1990-
2002’ p.70; and R Uprimny, ‘The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in 




mentioned above, contributors refer to ‘consolidated’ and ‘non-consolidated’ democracies; the 
title of the book uses the umbrella term ‘democratization’, which incorporates both transition 
and consolidation, and certain authors appear to eschew any strict conceptual separation 
between ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’, using the former term in a very broad sense which 
does not fit with the existing literature on democratic consolidaton, 123 or even using the terms 
interchangeably. 124  The unfortunate result is that the utility of otherwise highly valuable 
scholarship, and interesting observations and theses posited by the authors, is somewhat 
attenuated: we cannot be sure what the authors’ conception of ‘consolidation’ is; when it begins, 
what it consists of, and what they perceive its end point to be.125 
Other analyses have attempted to engage more meaningfully with the literature on 
democratic consolidation. Christopher Walker, in his 2008 article on the Supreme Court of 
Argentina and democratic consolidation, provides a summary of much of the political science 
literature on the concept of ‘democratic consolidation’.126 However, no mention is made of the 
difficulties inherent in the concept, and one is left unsure as to precisely what characterisation 
of the concept Walker prefers.  
Francesco Biagi similarly engages with the concept of ‘consolidation’ in some depth.127 
However, like Walker, he fails to squarely address the problems inherent in the concept, and 
his central thesis appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the concepts ‘democratic 
transition’ and ‘democratic consolidation’, and the distinction between them. On the basis that 
the division between ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ is the promulgation of a new constitution, 
Biagi suggests that talk of consolidation refers to the “stabilization and deepening of [the] 
principles and values” contained in the constitution, but that it is contradictory to consolidate 
that which exists only “on paper”. 128  Biagi posits as a solution the conceptualisation of 
‘democratic transition’ as incorporating two stages: “transition” and “substantive transition”, 
the latter referring to the ‘bedding down’ of constitutional norms.129  However, he does not 
explain how the new concept would relate to the established concept of ‘democratic 
 
123 Javier Couso’s title refers to ‘The Era of Transition, 1990-2002’ while Irwin Stotzky refers to “the past 
three decades of democratic transition” on p.202.  
124 Stotzky on p.201 states: “The transition or consolidation process is not always a progressive one.” 
125 For example, Stotzky, in the concluding chapter of Democratization and the Judiciary (n25) acknowledges 
at p.200: “The complex question of when a democracy has been consolidated depends upon justificatory 
theories of democracy and is intimately connected with the stability of a specific political system.” 
126 CJ Walker, ‘Toward Democratic Consolidation - The Argentine Supreme Court, Judicial Independence, 
and the Rule of Law’ 4 High Court Quarterly Review 54 (2008). 
127 F Biagi, ‘The Constitutional Courts as the Guardians of “Substantive” Transitions: The Cases of Italy, 
Spain and the Czech Republic’, VIIIth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional 
Law, Mexico City, 6-10 December 2010. 





consolidation’ and it is left unclear whether the latter is to be reduced in scope to refer solely 
to advances in the quality of democracy, or whether it is to be replaced by the new concept of 
‘substantive transition’ altogether.   
Other authors forego any real use of democratisation theory terminology and concepts, 
even though their analyses are directly relevant to the concept.  For instance, in their 2001 
article on the role of constitutional courts in establishing and maintaining democratic 
government,130 which focuses on the Russian Constitutional Court of the 1990s, Lee Epstein 
and his co-authors do not make any use of ‘consolidation’ as an overarching framework. 
 
4.2 COMPETITION: THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE OR COMPETING CONCEPTS 
 
A key question for this thesis is why it does not use the analytical framework provided by 
existing transitional justice scholarship. In the field of transitional justice, the concept of 
‘transition’ is the dominant focus, and is used in a far more expansive manner than we have 
encountered in democratisation theory. The field is rooted in the attempt to understand the 
theoretical and practical implications of addressing past human rights violations in polities 
which have experienced violent conflict or the brunt of authoritarian government, and its core 
focus has been on accountability and justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, and 
domestic and international criminal court proceedings, with a strong comparative bent.131  
As such, the concept and field of transitional justice both dovetails with and transcends 
the concept of democratisation and democratisation literature. Like democratisation theory, 
the field has advanced in pace with real-world developments; focusing chiefly on the need to 
address past human rights abuses in two world regions (Latin America and CEE) where a 
majority of states transitioned to electoral democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the 
growing use and sophistication of peace negotiations and agreements in internal state conflicts 
across the world.132 It is not a subset of democratisation, in that it encompasses scholarship on 
states that are not undergoing any form of democratisation, but which are undergoing other 
forms of transition: for instance, the transition from war to peace. However, there is significant 
overlap in the empirical contexts addressed by both fields, and some contexts–notably those 
of South Africa, Guatemala and El Salvador in the 1990s–featured a clear fusing of the post-
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authoritarian context and emergence from armed conflict, in a context where all actors were 
at least agreed that the ‘transition’ involved movement to democratic rule. 
As the field has developed, it has come to colonise an increasingly expansive conceptual 
territory, to focus on the overall role of law in such ‘transitional’ contexts (in the broad sense 
of ‘transition’ used in the literature), and the nature of the rule of law in such contexts. In 
particular, Ruti Teitel’s concept of ‘transitional jurisprudence’ suggests that the notion of the 
rule of law in these unstable political contexts is contingent and operates both to maintain 
order as well as facilitating the political transformation, which requires a lesser fidelity to 
ordinarily cardinal precepts such as consistency and predictability in the law.133 Scholars have 
paid increasing attention to contextual factors affecting transitional justice processes, including 
not only the nature and reform of the constitutional order, through a focus on ‘transitional 
constitutionalism’ as inextricably entwined with transformative politics,134 but also the impact 
of international law and standards as exerting a ‘pull’ on even powerful states. As Christine 
Bell and her co-authors note: 
This pull may be particularly strong in transitional societies where a context of conflict can no 
longer be invoked to justify departure from international standards. Equally, the intimate 
oversight relationship between international institutions and such societies creates powerful 
incentives for such state [sic] to ‘play ball’ (or be seen to) with international legal norms.135 
In recent years the concept of ‘transition’ itself in transitional justice, and its conceptual 
boundaries, have become increasingly blurred as scholars have re-framed justice issues 
originally outwith the bounds of the concept as ‘transitional justice’ issues. We now see 
‘transitional justice’ applied to justice processes which are conducted in stable democracies far 
removed from any societal transition, conflict or political regime change.136 For example, the 
term has been used in reference to reparations for women incarcerated in a parallel prison 
system of laundries run by religious institutions in Ireland until the 1990s.137 While this might 
be viewed as a helpful expansion of a field that has yielded significant insights in its traditional 
locus, it might also be viewed as degrading the concept to a loose, ‘imperial’ meta-concept, 
with reduced analytical utility: for every concept, there is a point at which elasticity degenerates 
into amorphousness.  
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Moreover, when we speak of the Constitution of South Sudan as a ‘transitional 
constitution’, and the UK Constitution as being ‘in transition’138 there is ample scope for 
confusion. In one sense, this is simply because it is at the same time both a word of ordinary 
English and a term of legal art, but where these uses are not clearly marked the capacity for 
the term to lack any clear meaning across the literature is obvious and the term of art can 
simply collapse into the ordinary usage. The conceptual confusion rife in other research areas 
is also a feature of transitional justice scholarship. For instance, in their introduction to the 
leading edited collection on the European Court of Human Rights, Michael Hamilton and 
Antoine Buyse refer to transition as a motif, the aim to “consolidate transitional gains”, the 
“transition from one legal system to another.” 139  
Transitional justice scholarship appears to recognise to some extent the limitations of 
the ‘transition’ framework in capturing the challenges law and courts face in new democracies. 
Hamilton and Buyse expressly acknowledge that “the line between transitional and non-
transitional settings is evanescent”.140 More importantly, both they and James Sweeney in his 
monograph on the European Court’s transitional jurisprudence broaden their enquiry to 
encompass various matters that are not ‘classic’ aspects of transitional justice: in particular, by 
examining the relationship between democracy and the protection of expressive, associative 
and electoral rights.141 
There is no attempt here to claim that the concepts of ‘transitional justice’ and ‘transition’ 
have lost all analytical utility. However, they are characterised by a degree of openness and 
imprecision that would tend to impede rather than assist the aim of this study. To analyse the 
role of strong judicial review in the development of democratic governance, the framework of 
democratisation theory provides sharper, if far from perfect, tools. In particular, unlike 
‘transition’ in the sense used in transitional justice, it has at least clearer start and ultimate end-
points, i.e. a beginning in undemocratic rule and the end-point being, normatively, the 
polyarchy of Dahl’s imagining, or empirically, the political systems of the West, with all their 
imperfections.  
The next section attempts to set out a minimal conceptual framework for analysing the 
role of courts in democratisation processes, but a large caveat is required from the outset. 
Whether one is working in the field of democratisation studies or transitional justice, more 
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recent putative democratisation processes are often harder to characterise than past processes 
in the post-war era. Indeed, Arnson and Lowenthal emphasise that we cannot simply equate 
democratisation processes today with those of the past: today’s processes are generally 
occurring, and will occur, in states of lower socio-economic levels than most of those in 
previous decades, with lower national cohesion and the very different blend of Islamist political 
forces, in a context where the simple left-right Cold War ideological divisions no longer play a 
large part. They also observe: “Many of the European transitions were influenced by the strong 
drive toward regional integration and incorporation into the European Union, a factor that 
does not exist in today’s transitions” and that we do not know how contemporary processes 
will be affected by international and transnational actors.142 There is often little consensus on 
what the transition (in the transitional justice sense) is from and to, and in some cases, such as 
the Andean region, there is talk of new ‘postliberal’ forms of democracy.143 
This may blunt somewhat the utility of the following analytical framework for 
contemporary democratisation processes, but it is in any case designed more squarely to 
address the democratisation processes of the ‘third wave’, and the analysis is conducted with 
these limitations and differences in mind. 
 
5 TOWARD A WORKABLE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Due to the above problems, it is often unclear how authors view or demarcate the start and 
end points of the democratisation process (at what point does a state become a ‘normal’ 
democracy?) and the extent to which their analysis appreciates and accommodates the differing 
contexts of adjudication in a new democracy as compared to a mature democracy. This renders 
it rather difficult to assess precisely what impact a court has had on the democratisation process, 
despite an embarrassment of riches in terms of raw data and qualitative analysis.  
This thesis does not seek to expend significant energy in interrogating the meaning of 
democratisation itself: it simply aims to derive an analytical framework from existing 
scholarship which is useful for the exploration of the key research questions, which avoids the 
terminological and conceptual confusion rife in the relevant literature, and which permits the 
sequence of events typical of democratisation to be more precisely located; allowing the activity 
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5.1 THE BASIC FRAMEWORK: BETWEEN ‘TOO MUCH’ AND ‘NOT ENOUGH’ 
 
As has been well established by now, the main challenge in analysing democratisation is in 
constructing a framework which achieves a balance between setting the standard at the 
normative ideal of polyarchy or the empirical benchmark of existing mature liberal 
democracies, as found in the Global North (‘too much’) and the minimal standard of electoral 
democracy (‘not enough’).  
Beyond the problematic treatment of the concept in law and political science, one might 
resort to sociological analysis, for instance–focusing, perhaps, on what democracy, as the 
desired end-point of democratisation, means to people in a given polity–as holding out the 
potential to achieve a more organic and context-sensitive method of approaching a better 
understanding of democratisation. However, the danger with going too far down this route is 
that ‘democracy’ can so easily become freighted with meanings, expectations and hopes that 
no political system could deliver–the promise of freedom, the promise of fairness, the promise 
of prosperity–that these all become cargo in democracy’s hold, threatening to bring it down 
through the sheer weight of expectation. Democracy, in this vein, almost becomes conflated 
with justice; indeed, one sociological treatment of Brazil’s legal development since return to 
democratic rule in 1988 hinges on the notion of travelling toward ‘total justice’. 144  No 
contemporary democracy–no matter how well-regarded–has achieved this goal.  
Moreover, as democratisation progresses, what people expect democracy to deliver 
tends to expand, not contract; thus tying our view of democratisation to expectations of 
democracy locks us into a recursive pattern, where the ultimate conceptual co-ordinates of 
democracy recede to an infinite horizon that cannot be reached. We cannot relentlessly expand 
what ‘democracy’ is, or stuff it with every ‘good’ imaginable, and expect it to retain any 
meaningful conceptual shape. There must be a point–not a bright line, but a foggy area of the 
continuum–where ‘democracy’ ends and other concepts such as ‘justice’ begin; otherwise, the 
latter is redundant and democracy becomes a sort of ‘black hole’ of meaning, swallowing 
everything (positive) in its path. Equally, there has to be some point at which ‘democratisation’ 
ends and ‘democracy’ begins; otherwise democratisation becomes an endless process, with no 
clear terminus; the shining city of democracy being always over the next hill, as a normative 
ideal rather than an empirical possibility.  
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Democratisation theory, for all its faults, provides the best prospect of achieving a useful 
analytical framework for addressing the democratisation context and toeing a line between 
democratisation as ‘too much’, and ‘not enough’. The thesis draws on recent scholarship by 
Carsten Schneider, who, in an attempt to rehabilitate the ‘consolidation’ concept, based on 
previous ‘classic’ conceptions, opts for a more minimal “negative and thin” conception centred 
on the “expected persistence” of democratic governance, defining a consolidated regime as 
one which 
…allows for the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms or 
associations, information and communication, for the purpose of free competition between 
leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claims to rule…without 
excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting members of the 
political community from expressing their preference.145 
This conception of consolidation, which echoes Dahl’s polyarchy to some extent, tends 
to avoid an ‘all or nothing’ approach, containing enough elements to exclude illiberal 
democracies but not expecting a young democracy to contain every element present in a long-
established democracy before it can be considered to be ‘consolidated’. A particular advantage, 
compared to older scholarship, is that it is based on a more comprehensive foundation of 
empirical research: Schneider’s propositions are derived from a time-series, cross-sectional 
data set which covers over 30 countries around the world across a 25-year time period, on the 
basis of which Schneider sets out a Democratization Data Set, derived from other literature in 
the field, which incorporates 12 indicators of consolidation based on the behaviour of 
“politically relevant actors”.146 Importantly, in this thesis the conception of consolidation is 
not used to assess precisely when consolidation has been achieved, but to guide our 
understanding of the courts’ roles in achieving this level of democratic progress.  
Schneider in his work indicates 12 indicators of consolidation based on the behaviour 
of “politically relevant actors”.147 These indicators are: (i) No significant political party denies 
the legitimacy of the existing constitution;148 (ii) Regular elections are held and their outcomes 
are respected by those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties; (iii) The 
elections have been free and fair; (iv) No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral 
conditions; (v) Electoral volatility has diminished significantly; (vi) Elected officials and 
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representatives are not constrained in their behaviour by non-elected veto groups within the 
country; (vii) A first rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has 
occurred within the scope of the rules already established; (viii) A second rotation-in-power or 
significant shift in alliances of parties in power has occurred within the scope of the rules 
already established; (ix) Agreement, formal and informal, has been reached on the rules 
governing the formation of associations and their behaviour; (x) Executive format; (xi) 
Territorial division of competence; and (xii) Rules of ownership and access to mass media.149   
Looking at these indicators with the eyes of a constitutional lawyer, the potential role of 
courts in the objective of arriving at such a state of affairs would appear to be focused on 
ensuring that the electoral system is representative, fair, and inclusive; addressing constitutional 
challenges to electoral results; assisting in elaboration of the meaning and scope of the rights 
to association and assembly; interpreting constitutional ambiguities regarding the format of the 
executive; managing centre-periphery relations (which may not be as salient in a unitary state); 
and ensuring media plurality and freedom, as against both state intervention and private 
monopolies. Also implied is the core democratic right to free speech. It appears clear that a 
court can play little role as regards items (iv); but it can play a certain role as regards item (vi); 
for example, by reducing the capacity of military actors to act as veto players in governance by 
reducing the scope for trials of civilians under military jurisdiction, or by striking down amnesty 
laws which shield military actors from prosecution for past abuses. We will pick up this 
discussion again in Chapter Three. 
We now have our initial steps towards elaborating a concept of ‘democratisation 
jurisprudence’. On the basis of the above, my thesis will discuss democratisation according to 
a simple schema comprising two key phases: (i) transition to electoral democracy, as defined 
in the above section by reference to a key event integral to democracy (usually the achievement 
of a freely elected government), provides an initial departure point that clearly demarcates the 
previous authoritarian regime from the democratic regime; and (ii) consolidation of democracy, 
as defined by Schneider; with, at least by implication, a residual category of ‘post-consolidation’, 
which would be closer to a ‘normal’ mature democracy. However, it is a skeletal framework 
and, as regards the central concept of consolidation, requires significant fine-tuning. 
 
5.2 BRINGING LAW INTO THE FRAMEWORK 
 
As stated in the Introduction, this thesis, focused as it is on constitutional adjudication, is 
centred on the consolidation phase. More specifically, and importantly for lawyers, it focuses 
 




on what happens after the sublime moment of constituent power, in which the state is 
endowed with a new constitution (or alternatively, after substantial revision of the existing text); 
and after which, typically, a new constitutional court is established to guard the new 
constitution and help to make its paper promises a concrete reality. The position of regional 
human rights courts is entirely different: a state may have accepted the jurisdiction of such a 
court before the transition to electoral democracy, or after. This will have an effect on the 
relationship between that court and the domestic democratisation process; a factor considered 
in more depth in Chapter Three. 
‘New’ is broadly used here: as regards constitutions, one can even include as a ‘new’ 
constitution an existing text that is interpreted and applied very differently in the new 
democratic era (e.g. in Chile). Second, as the next chapter indicates, although the dominant 
focus in the literature has been on the establishment of ‘European’-style Kelsenian courts in 
new democracies, separate from the ordinary judiciary, a majority of new democracies in the 
post-war era have eschewed this option, choosing instead to endow the existing supreme court 
with new powers, reforming its jurisdiction, or creating a ‘constitutional chamber’ within the 
court. In rare instances, a Kelsenian court is already in place, the role of which changes 
significantly within the new democratic dispensation.  
More importantly, the framework seeks to allow us to focus on the role of courts in the 
construction, not of a full liberal democracy, but of the essentials of a democratic order in 
which, as stated above, not only full, free and fair elections are regularly held, but in which 
fundamental rights are respected, a commitment to democratic constitutionalism is present, 
State authority is subject to constraints and public power is dispersed between different actors. 
Construction of the minima of a democratic order is explored in depth in Chapters Three. 
 
5.3 DEMOCRATISATION, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
In conceptualising the role of constitutional law and courts in democratisation processes we 
might speak of two enmeshed and mutually constitutive processes: ‘democratic consolidation’, 
which covers the process across the entire polity, at different levels, and ‘constitutional 
consolidation’, which covers one plane of the wider process, while simultaneously transcending 
it. 
It is important to emphasise here the marked tension between democracy and 
constitutionalism–the latter being simply defined here as “the commitment, on the part of any 




rules and principles.” 150  Though strongly linked in the contemporary constitutional 
imagination, they are not simply partner concepts which can develop together in seamless 
harmony. The “antagonistic impulses” 151  of each have been well canvassed by theorists 
including Neil Walker, Luigi Ferrajoli, James Tully and Samuel Issacharoff. 
Ferrajoli, like many others, has observed that the normative paradigm of a post-war 
constitutional democracy does not fit with formal or procedural conceptions of democracy 
(i.e., conceptions based mainly on electoral criteria and a minimal sphere for meaningful 
participation by citizens in democratic governance). He argues that constitutional democracy 
cannot exist in the presence of powers unlimited by law; including the will of the majority. In 
this modern paradigm the law carves out a sphere of “what cannot be decided”; in other words, 
there are certain issues that are not amenable to the decision-making process which channels 
the will of the people, as mediated by their representatives.152  Thus, while the freedom of 
majority rule–the sphere of what can be decided–is broad, it is strictly limited by the sphere of 
what cannot be decided, as set out in substantive rules of law. Ferrajoli does not, however, view 
constitutionalism and democracy as existing in opposition, but rather, sees the constraints of 
constitutionalism as not only facilitating but strengthening democracy in the fuller, post-war, 
sense of governance by subordinating public powers and all individuals in the political 
community to the protection of fundamental rights, thereby broadening political democracy 
and the notion of popular sovereignty.153  
Neil Walker departs from attempts to ‘define up’ democracy by imbuing it with 
constitutional elements, or ‘defining down’ constitutionalism to render it merely subservient 
to the aims of thin procedural conception of democracy. Instead, he argues that the 
relationship between the two concepts presents a high level of complexity that is not always 
appreciated: democracy of itself is incomplete; and it is this incompleteness which both 
provides the justificatory basis for modern constitutionalism and which renders it inherently 
fragile.154 Constitutionalism, in his view, provides a means of ‘completing’ democracy, but 
democracy in turn cannot supply constitutionalism with all of its vital components.  
This tension, between democratic rule qua will of the majority, and constitutional 
democracy, which places constraints on the majority, and derives normative sustenance from 
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sources outside democracy, is even more keenly felt in new democracies than mature 
democracies. Effectively, elected representatives and the wider public, having just gained the 
power conferred by the ballot box, are immediately required to submit to constraints on that 
power, with domestic constitutional courts and regional human rights courts the core enforcers 
of those constraints. It must be a hard pill to swallow for those with newly-won political power. 
The iterative relationship between democracy and constitutionalism is perhaps hardest 
to grasp in the democratisation setting, in comparison to stable authoritarian and full liberal 
democratic settings. Mark Tushnet, elaborating his conception of ‘authoritarian 
constitutionalism’, 155  suggests that, rather than understanding constitutionalism through a 
binary opposition of authoritarianism and democracy, it is best thought of as a spectrum, with 
authoritarianism at one end and liberal constitutionalism at the other, and various “middle 
points” between the two extremes. While he applies this notion to analyse the stable 
‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ of Singapore–which was previously viewed as a ‘transitional’ 
third wave regime, and is now considered a distinct regime type–it has a clear application to 
states which are undergoing an ongoing democratisation process.  
Reflecting the truth that electoral democracy does not equate to full liberal democracy, 
fully-fledged liberal constitutionalism does not spring up overnight, but develops over time. It 
might be thought, then, that a new democracy in a successful ongoing democratisation process 
will move along the constitutionalism spectrum throughout the process, inching toward 
consolidation and, thereafter, toward the end-point of liberal constitutionalism. Less successful 
democratisation processes would find adherence to constitutionalism stalling at a certain point, 
or, in the case of authoritarian regression, sliding back down the spectrum. Indeed, Vicki 
Jackson, noting the tendency in third wave constitutional settlements underpinning the 
transition to democracy to leave difficult constitutional matters to the future, speaks of the 
result as an “incremental constitutionalism”, which requires extensive gap-filling usually to be 
resolved by a constitutional court.156 As such, the root constitutive power of the documentary 
constitution is attenuated, with the court becoming a supplemental constituting force of sorts. 
In the democratisation context we are therefore dealing, not with two relatively stable 
entities–democracy and constitutionalism–but rather, a context in which both are in flux, and 
where their iterative relationship can be difficult to chart with ease. Rather than the terms 
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‘constitutional democracy’ or a ‘constitutionalism of democracy’, 157  we might speak of a 
‘democratisation constitutionalism’. The hallmark of this variant of constitutionalism is an 
inordinate pace of change, in an unstable socio-political setting, as compared to the relative 
stability of a long-established democracy or authoritarian regime. Chapter Three elaborates on 
this point.  
 
5.4 DEMOCRATISATION AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
The above discussion, of  course, relates solely to the domestic context. No discussion of  
democratisation in contemporary states can be complete without some appreciation of  the 
role of  governance systems beyond the state. The most remarkable development in the post-
war era is the emergence of  governance systems that transcend the established distinction 
between state-based governance and, outside the state, international law as the means to 
govern relations between states.  
The global story–and the focus of  an expanding literature–concerns the ongoing 
diminution of  the nation-state as privileged and core producer of  law, to a reality featuring a 
variety of  jurisgenerative processes that transcend the state, and in which numerous non-state 
centres of  gravity exist for the elaboration of  legal frameworks. 158  A ‘cosmopolitan 
enthusiasm’159 has taken hold, beginning in earnest in the post-war era but gathering pace 
alongside the democratisation processes of  the ‘third wave’ and beyond, with talk of  the 
‘internationalisation’ of  constitutional law at the domestic level, and at the same time, the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of  international law.160  
Nowhere is this more obvious than in Europe, with a “post-national constellation”161  
comprising not only the regional order based on the European Convention on Human Rights, 
but also the EU. The European experience has driven a particular scholarly narrative which 
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tends to emphasise the diminution of  the state as the core site of  governance power, and the 
‘salami slicing’ of  sovereignty across different arenas. The development of  the EU and the 
European Convention system have, in general, tended to prise open the ‘black box’ of  the 
domestic legal order to a much greater extent than traditional international law, with its limited 
tools of  ius cogens, treaties and conventions. Although these regional orders on rare occasions 
clash with overarching international law norms,162 the predominant effect has been to enhance 
the penetration of  international law in the domestic context by building on existing 
international agreements, amplifying the binding effect of  international norms, and requiring 
greater interaction with international courts.  
As far as courts are concerned, the development of  meaningful regional governance may 
be viewed as tending to enhance ‘cosmopolitan enthusiasm’, by providing a bounded 
geographical space in which a sense of  identification and connection, through shared norms 
or aspirations, can develop; not only through formal legal means such as treaties and inter-
court cooperation, but also through regional judicial associations, conferences and meetings. 
 
Europe as a global outlier 
 
However, it is important not to overstate the extent to which the European experience has 
been replicated in other regions. This cosmopolitan enthusiasm is not monolithic or entirely 
linear; some states cling closer to the idea of  state sovereignty than others, and for some, such 
as Maarti Koskenniemi, international constitutionalism remains simply “something of  a game 
for intellectuals from the middle powers”.163 Despite a proliferation of  regional integration 
projects in both Latin America and Africa, their development in both regions is often viewed 
as hampered by an enduring focus on state sovereignty, more jealously guarded than in Europe, 
and a tendency to stymie any effective pooling of  sovereignty or action that would trammel 
the freedom of  national governments to act.164  
The pronounced diminution of  the state in Europe is thus exceptional when set in the 
global context. In other world regions, while similar ‘supranational’ language is often used to 
describe regional integration projects such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and the 
African Union, dilution of  the state’s centrality is far less evident, in the absence of  any true 
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equivalent of  the supranational order of  the EU. Although the principle of  pooling sovereignty 
and creating a supranational legal order is conceded, the bodies in these regions still operate 
largely on intergovernmental lines–or even more narrowly in the case of  MERCOSUR–along 
‘interpresidential’ lines. We see the form, but little of  the substance, of  a truly ‘supranational’ 
legal order equivalent to that of  the EU.165  
The configurations of  post-national governance differ from region to region. Instead of  
the twin regional pillars of  a pan-regional economic community and a human rights system, 
seen in Europe, in Africa both pillars are fused in the African Union, albeit alongside a number 
of  sub-regional orders such as the Southern African Development Community, the East 
African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS), 
as well as the Arab League to the north. In Latin America the closest equivalent of  the Council 
of  Europe is the Organization of  American States (OAS), of  which the Inter-American human 
rights system forms part. The OAS has, however, long been viewed in many states as an 
instrument of  US hegemony;166 hence the proliferation of  rival integration projects since the 
1990s in particular; the leader being the Union of  South American States (UNASUR). If  
successful, UNASUR, which is effectively an integration agreement between the Andean 
Community and MERCOSUR enshrined in a Constitutive Treaty of  2008, would integrate all 
hispanophone states and Brazil in South America.  
Thus, in Latin America and Africa regional human rights regimes remain the core 
spheres in which anything like a ‘supranational’ legal order–namely, one which tends to have a 
greater impact than international law more generally–has been shaped (or, in the case of  Africa, 
is slowly emerging). Even then, the gulf  between the EU and these other regimes gives one 
pause to ascribe the term ‘supranational’ at all. This point is picked up again in Chapter Three. 
 
Regional constitutionalism and democratisation  
 
That said, it is clear that all regions display some form of pan-regional constitutionalism–or 
perhaps more accurately, a plural legal order167–with the regional human rights court at its heart. 
As we will see in Chapter Two, the development of these courts, and the systems of which 
they are part, is intimately related to post-war democratisation processes. In Europe the 
development of a quasi-constitutional regional order formed part of the German 
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redemocratisation project, with the ‘European roof’ of the European Community and Council 
of Europe providing added security against any reversion to authoritarian rule. In Latin 
America, the regional human rights system came into its own due to the wave of 
democratisation that swept across the region in the 1980s. In Africa, the significant challenges 
to the development of the regional human rights system are rooted in the much more halting 
and problematic regional development of democratic rule, which remains a minority system 
on that continent. 
Walker observes that the incompleteness of both democracy and constitutionalism, and 
the resultant tensions in their iterative relationship, are even more acute in the case of 
constitutionalism transcending the state: 
Constitutionalism as a basic orientation and mobile set of techniques remains a necessary 
support for and supplement to democracy in the global age – and this supportive connection to 
democracy provides constitutionalism’s abiding justification. Yet the emerging postnational 
constitutionalism, like state-centred constitutionalism before it, remains contingent upon non-
democratic considerations…so reinforcing constitutionalism’s abiding normative and 
sociological vulnerability.168 
A sharp new distinction, he notes, has emerged between “two opposing singular 
conceptions – between those who adhere to democracy’s centrality to constitutionalism but 
doubt its viability in the postnational domain and those who would make a virtue out of 
constitutionalism’s independence from democracy.”169 Walker argues that both conceptions 
fail to acknowledge that democracy and constitutionalism lie in an inescapable state of “mutual 
inextricability and mutual tension”, which underlies ceaseless efforts to reconcile the two while 
simultaneously rendering such efforts futile.170 
As we will see in Chapters Three and Four, the distinction between these opposing 
conceptions comes to the fore in new democracies in somewhat different ways than it presents 
itself in mature democracies. The greater prominence of international law as a force shaping 
new democratic constitutions in the ‘third wave’ of democratisation and the formal status 
accorded to international human rights law in these constitutions can blur what ‘counts’ as 
domestic or international law, or even what counts as constitutional or democratic. We see the 
influence of the European Convention on Human Rights on bills of rights in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as in Africa and the Caribbean.171 We see domestic constitutions and 
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courts fusing international human rights law and constitutional law in a so-called ‘block of 
constitutionality’ (bloque de constitucionalidad)172 in Latin America. We also see a ‘creeping 
monism’173 in various African common law courts, in formally dualist systems, through the use 
of international human rights treaties to interpret domestic constitutional law.  
The perceived deficiencies of domestic legal orders in new democracies, and especially 
those of domestic courts, can create a greater functional role for international law–particularly, 
the case-law of regional human rights–to serve as an additional ‘gap-filling’ mechanism. As we 
will see in Chapters Three and Four, in some cases, this involves domestic courts invoking 
international law to bolster assertive decisions. In others, it involves regional human rights 
courts adopting unusually robust positions. We see such courts addressing systemic problems 
in a respondent state rather than merely addressing the individual case before it (as in Europe). 
We see them adopting doctrines that seek to oblige domestic courts and other State actors to 
closely follow regional case-law (as in Latin America). We also see them cutting across exercises 
of constituent power, not only by finding constitutional provisions incompatible with the 
regional human rights instrument, and invalidating laws upheld by parliament and referendums, 
but also by intervening in constitutional amendment processes (with the latter two seen to 
greatest effect in Africa and Latin America). These developments are examined in more detail 
in Chapter Three. 
 
5.5 DEFINING KEY TERMS 
 
For the sake of clarity, in the coming chapters the following terminology is employed. First, 
the terms ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ are to be understood as defined at pp.27-28 and p.41 
above. The terms ‘new democracy’ and ‘third wave democracy’ are used to describe any polity 
that has undergone a transition to electoral democracy after 1974. The term ‘mature democracy’ 
denotes any polity that achieved electoral democracy in the period before 1974, and which has 
not suffered full authoritarian reversal in the past 40 years. The latter term thus includes, for 
example, India, which experienced repressive rule under Indira Ghandi who ruled by decree 
from 1975 to 1977, but excludes Turkey, which suffered a full coup d’état in 1980).  
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The Emergence of Courts as    
Democratisation Technology, 1945-2015 
 
  
Since the Second World War, rights and review have been crucial to nearly all successful 
transitions from authoritarian regimes to constitutional democracy […]. Indeed, it appears 
that the more successful any transition has been, the more likely one is to find an effective 
constitutional or supreme court at the heart of it (Japan may be the most important exception). 
Alec Stone, 2012174  
 
[T]he prevalence of constitutional courts indicates at least a tacit recognition that judicial 
review may indeed be indispensible [sic] to establishing a functioning constitutional 
democracy. 
Samuel Issacharoff, 2011175 
 
[The European Court of Human Rights] has been a vital part of European democratic 
consolidation and integration for over half a century… 
James Sweeney, 2013176 
 
[T]he Inter-American Court's far-reaching exercise of authority in the field of amnesties and 
the broad interpretation of its own mandate seem to further democratization in various Latin 
American countries.  
Nina Binder, 2011177 
 
[The Inter-American Court of Human Rights] has turned out to be very important for the 
strengthening of democracy and the improvement of human rights in the Americas.  
Diego García-Sayan, 2012178 
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A          T THE END OF CHAPTER ONE WE DISCUSSED the emergence in the post-war 
era of a new paradigm of post-war constitutional democracy. This departs from a minimal 
procedural conception of democracy based on electoral arrangements alone, to embrace 
counter-majoritarian elements such as expansive rights protection, and with a court as the 
central enforcer of such elements. It also noted the emergence of a post-national regional 
constitutionalism, or plural legal order, centred on the activity of regional human rights courts, 
which add an additional counter-majoritarian mechanism to democratic governance in many 
contemporary states, including a large number of new democracies. This chapter narrates the 
historical development of this paradigm, and its allocation of a central role to courts.  
It is argued here that the notion that any court, whether domestic or international, can 
play a central role in achieving a consolidated democratic order following authoritarian rule 
can be most clearly traced to the reassertion of democratic rule in West Germany after the 
Nazi era. Notwithstanding the totemic status of the US Supreme Court, it was in post-war 
Germany that a new form of constitutional democracy first emerged, with a novel 
constitutional court accorded a more explicit governance role than that of the US court, and 
which witnessed a far swifter rise to prominence in the constitutional order than the latter’s 
stately rise to constitutional centrality over the course of at least a century.179 The German 
experience not only laid a template for adjudication at the domestic level in new democracies, 
but also helped to pave the way for assertive adjudication by courts at the regional level, with 
the Inter-American Court as the first true ‘democratisation court’ to emerge outside the state 
context.  
It is emphasised here that the widespread perception of the capacity of courts to act as 
‘democracy-builders’ or ‘democratisation technology’, rooted  in the post-war German 
experience, is based to some extent on false premises. It tends to elide the particularly 
propitious conditions for democratisation that prevailed in post-war Western Europe; 
conditions which, as we will see, have been largely absent in other regions.  
 
1 JUDICIAL DEMOCRATISATION: RISE OF THE POST-WAR 
PARADIGM, 1945-1975 
 
1945 is a well-recognised historical marker between a world where strong judicial review was 
a niche democratic governance mechanism and a world where it is dominant. Although such 
review had been introduced or adopted in various European and Latin American states in the 
 




nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the courts had been reluctant to make use of the 
power (e.g. Norway, Portugal), never got the chance to use it (e.g. Spain, Frankfurt), saw the 
power suspended with the onset of authoritarian rule (e.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia) or 
exercised it in a context of thin and testy acquiescence to judicial authority (e.g. Brazil, Costa 
Rica).180 Even in the American “cradle of constitutional adjudication”,181 where the Supreme 
Court’s 1803 judgment in Marbury v Madison182 had established its power to invalidate laws 
incompatible with the constitution, the Court’s role would not reach its current prominence 
until the 1960s.183   
Today strong judicial review is found in some 150 of the UN’s 190 Member States, 
across all world regions,184 due to its exponential adoption after World War II, especially by 
newly democratic states.185 As Law and Versteeg have noted:  
[S]ome 38% of all constitutional systems had constitutional review in 1951; by 2011, 83% of the 
world’s constitutions had given courts the power to supervise implementation of the 
constitution and to set aside legislation for constitutional incompatibility”186  
The idea that the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany provided the primary model 
for courts in new democracies of the post-war era is a commonplace, but the account usually 
begins and ends with the particular institutional innovations of that Court, with little focus on 
how the Court’s case-law was central to its being perceived as a model. 187 In addition, accounts 
tend to focus most often on the establishment of constitutional courts in post-Communist 
states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and isolated examples such as the South 
African, Colombian and Korean constitutional courts. This misses vital elements of the picture, 
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such as the influence of adoption of the German model in Southern Europe on its later 
adoption by Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states, and the different approaches taken in 
Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia.188 This Part thus attempts to provide these missing 
pieces of the narrative.   
 
1.1 EUROPE IN 1945: EXPECTATIONS OF TYRANNY IN THE ‘SAVAGE 
CONTINENT’ 
 
Strong judicial review became increasingly common in the immediate post-war era, established 
in the constitutions of new democracies as diverse as Japan (1947), Italy (1948), Germany 
(1949) and India (1949), and amplified in other states (e.g. Costa Rica in 1949). However, it 
was most clearly in Europe that this led to the emergence of a new paradigm of ‘constitutional 
democracy’ and a ‘new constitutionalism’, 189  which places emphasis on the individual, 
trammels the power of democratic majorities, and places a constitutional court at the centre of 
governance. It is one of the most extraordinary aspects of our age. In May 1945, surveying the 
now ‘savage continent’ of violent restlessness, mob rule, shattered infrastructure, famine, 
roaming slave labourers, communal revenge and the collapse in many communities of any faith 
in institutions of law and order, 190 Aldous Huxley could confidently predict the suspension of 
freedom across much of Europe: 
Personal liberty, presumably, will be gone from Continental Europe for at least a generation; for 
obviously the existing chaos cannot be controlled except by an iron tyranny … 191 
Yet, while oppression was to be the lot of many of those east of the ‘Iron Curtain’, new 
constitutional means of countering tyranny were being crafted in the West amidst the disorder.  
The judicial geography of the region quickly began to transform, with the Austrian 
Constitutional Court resuscitated in 1945; followed in relatively quick succession by the 
establishment of Kelsenian courts in Germany (1951) and Italy (1956). The emergence of these 
constitutional courts did not merely signal a return to, or an attempt to revive, the failed 
experiments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Richard Overy has observed, 
the German term for ‘rebuilding’ (Wiederaufbau) in the post-war setting was usurped by a 
concept of ‘new construction’ (Neufbau): the aim was not to restore Germany to its physical 
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state before the devastation of the Second World War, but to create something different.192 In 
perhaps a similar vein, these courts–especially those of Germany and Italy–represented a ‘new 
construction’ aimed at building a more effective and robust judicial power.  
 
1.2 A NEW LEGAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF 
GERMANY, 1951-1971 
 
A democratic experiment 
 
The return of the defeated German power to electoral democracy in 1946 constitutes one of 
the most exceptional democratic transitions of the post-war era. In the decimated territory 
occupied by the Western Allies a constitution of 1949 was shaped by exogenous forces, 
particularly the United States government, in what has been called a “revolution from the 
outside”.193 It was an unusual text. Not only was it viewed by the German leadership as a 
provisional document, merely a ‘Basic Law’ in the absence of a unified Germany,194 it also 
counted as an anti-fascist document to chart a radical departure from Nazi rule–“the counter-
constitution to the unwritten one upon which the Nazi regime had been based.”195 With the 
drafters viewing the Weimar polity as unworthy of recreation due to its failure to prevent Nazi 
rule,196 ‘new construction’ was the only option.  
The hallmark of the text was the limits it placed on the exercise of democratic 
majoritarian decision-making, beyond what had been attempted in any previous or foreign 
constitution. Thus, we encounter a marked focus on human dignity, a generous raft of 
individual rights, a number of ‘eternity clauses’ forbidding amendment of constitutional clauses 
enshrining the status of the new polity as a democratic federal republic based on the rule of 
law, human rights and the separation of powers, and specific mechanisms to allow for 
oversight of the political process, including not only impeachment of the president but control 
of political parties. 
Constitutionalism and the rule of law, conceived as separate from democratic 
governance under the Empire,197 subservient to majority rule in Weimar, and wholly prostrate 
before political power under the Third Reich, were now employed to serve, underpin and 
protect a particular type of democratic system. Ferrajoli’s sphere of ‘what cannot be decided’, 
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discussed in Chapter One, had expanded greatly, with majority rule constrained not only 
immediately but also intertemporally. In line with this innovative approach, a new judicial 
institution was inaugurated. 
 
A reconstructed judicial power 
 
In contrast to the Basic Law as a whole, the Federal Constitutional Court, established in 1951 
and based in Karlsruhe, was an endogenous creation with the roots of strong judicial review 
running deep into German constitutional history–although the US Supreme Court was also an 
influence.198 To carry out its role as guardian of the new constitutional pact the Court was 
endowed with unprecedented powers to review legislation and State action, combining two 
powers previously kept separate: the ‘political’ power of the Weimar Republic’s Staatsgerichthof 
to adjudicate on inter-branch and federal-state constitutional conflicts; and the ‘judicial’ power 
to review legislation for compatibility with the constitution. 199  As well as adjudicating 
constitutional disputes between the principal organs of the federal state and between the 
federation and the states, the Court could be called on to settle constitutional questions in 
concrete cases, to perform abstract review of the constitutionality of federal or state law, and 
held the exclusive power to ban, for unconstitutionality, political parties opposed to the “free 
and democratic order”. Legislation in 1951 further enhanced the Court’s position in the 
democratic dispensation by introducing a mechanism to allow direct petitions by individuals 
to the Court to claim infringement of basic rights by the State.  
The Court was thrust into a prominent role from its first decision, ruling in 1951 on the 
constitutional validity of internal reshaping of the new German polity in a challenge to the 
merging of the Länder Baden and Württemburg. 200  Setting aside a federal law as 
unconstitutional, the Court strongly asserted the binding nature of its judgment on all organs 
of the state, including the parliament. At times likened to the US Supreme Court’s foundational 
projection and articulation of constitutional supremacy in Marbury,201 the German court had, 
it must be said, a stronger textual basis for adopting this stance than its American counterpart. 
This markedly different constitutional context precluded the Court from fully embracing 
‘passive virtues’–as advocated by the American theorist Alexander Bickel–to avoid certain 
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political questions. The Court viewed its duty as hearing all complaints brought before it, to 
achieve constitutional clarity and uphold the rule of law.202  
That said, the Court generally exercised significant restraint, delaying judgments on 
difficult political questions in the hope that they would be resolved by other means, refraining 
from addressing tangential constitutional questions in cases before it, interpreting legislation 
in a manner conforming to the Basic Law where possible, and emphasising that it would not 
substitute its judgment on sound policy for that of the legislature.203 The Court met and 
overcame its “most dangerous and searching test” early on, required between 1952 and 1954 
to display nimble footwork, delaying tactics and remarkable solidarity in the face of significant 
manipulation and pressure placed on it to provide a constitutional imprimatur to the 
government’s wish to ratify the European Defence Community Treaty with France–a plan 
which was ultimately only quashed by the French parliament.204 
 
Pioneering post-authoritarian adjudication 
 
Still being described as a “democratic experiment” in 1964,205 by 1976 the 27-year-old West 
German state was being described as an “unshakeable democracy”,206 with the Court credited 
as having played a central part in this achievement through a succession of landmark judgments.  
Since the very first analyses of the Court’s case-law in the English language, the main 
aim has been to explain the Court’s role to American audiences, with the institution presented 
first as an heir, and later as a peer, of the more venerable US Supreme Court.207 Donald 
Kommers’ systematic presentation of the Court’s jurisprudence in 1989–the first in the English 
language–revealed a wide-ranging case-law addressing the nature of the new constitutional 
system, an interpretive framework based on the unity of the constitution, the nature of the 
separation of powers and the federal design, the scope of the fundamental rights and economic 
liberties in the text, and the electoral system; mirroring whole swathes of US constitutional 
jurisprudence but also diverging from that jurisprudence in places.208 However, presented 
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thematically rather than chronologically, and at all times with the US audience in mind, this 
vade mecum can tend to obscure the often stark dissimilarities between the Karslruhe court’s 
early post-war case-law and US jurisprudence. If we focus on the first two decades of the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s operation (1951-1971) these come to the fore.  
The experience of the Nazi era hangs over many of the Court’s key early decisions. In 
some cases the Court was required to address this legacy directly, such as its 1957 decision on 
the constitutionality of limited lustration measures, upholding a law excluding former Gestapo 
officials the benefits of reestablishment in the civil service. 209  Perhaps the most vexed 
question–and one regarding which American jurisprudence was of little assistance–concerned 
the status of Nazi-era law. In 1968, the Court was confronted with a case210 concerning the 
legal effect on inheritance proceedings of an ordinance which had stripped the deceased of 
German citizenship, issued under the Reich Citizenship Act 1935, designed to deprive certain 
classes of persons (e.g. Jews) of citizenship. In its judgment the Court made a clear distinction 
between unrecht (‘false law’) versus recht (‘true law’): the former had to be expunged from the 
legal order; the latter remained valid and helped to maintain and nourish an image of German 
legal continuity in which arbitrary Nazi rule had been an aberration.211 In the instant case, the 
Court held the ordinance to be such an intolerable contradiction to justice that it must be 
deemed retroactively invalid. The decision was an extreme instance of the Court’s notable shift 
from the traditional German positivistic approach to constitutional interpretation in favour of 
a more ‘American’ pragmatic approach of reading the constitution “against a background of 
social facts”.212 
The recent experience of authoritarianism also informed the Court’s highly protective 
approach to civil and political rights central to democratic governance. In the Lüth213 case of 
1958, concerning the prosecution of a Jewish official, Eric Lüth, for urging the public to 
boycott a new film by a Nazi-era director, the Court interpreted the free speech guarantee 
(Article 5) of the Basic Law in an expansive manner, setting down a general rule prohibiting 
content-based restrictions on the exercise of free speech if the freedom was to take its rightful 
place in the new democracy. 214  Although the constitutional provision itself, as Donald 
Kommers has noted, provided “little basis for elevating speech into an absolute value capable 
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of trumping other personal interests protected by the [Basic Law],” 215  the Court, by 
interpreting both the right and restrictions under the rubric of a principle of free speech, 
significantly attenuated the effect of the qualifications by identifying a constitutional 
‘restriction on restrictions’. 
This expansive approach was mirrored in other judgments, such as the Court’s 
invalidation in 1961216 of a law seeking to confer a monopoly on the regulation of television 
services to the Federation; a matter the government viewed as vital to counter the liberal nature 
of existing television services. With, as Witteman notes, “the totalitarian misuse of German 
media for Nazi propaganda purposes still fresh in the national memory”,217 the Court delivered 
“an extended lecture on political morality to the Adenauer regime”218 emphasising the need to 
respect the competences of the Länder as well as free speech. Though received with 
consternation in government circles, describing it as a “false” decision amid warnings of 
“Justitiar democracy”, the Adenauer regime nevertheless submitted to it.219   
However, the Court at every turn also emphasised that the individual freedom enshrined 
in the Basic Law was subject to a certain conception of the community as resting on moral 
values and principles such as fraternity, social discipline and practical reasonableness: ‘civilised’ 
behaviour, one might say. Principled limits on civil and political liberties included the concept 
of ‘militant democracy’, which restricted political advocacy in line with the Basic Law’s 
numerous injunctions to uphold the “free democratic basic order”, the most extreme 
expression being the Court’s power to ban political parties opposed to that order. The Court 
did so on only two occasions, banning the Socialist Reich Party in 1952 and the Communist 
Party in 1956. In these cases, the sensibilities of Allied Powers, Cold-War divisions and the 
desire to confirm West Germany’s commitment to democracy are viewed as colouring the 
judgments; factors with which the US Supreme Court did not have to contend.220  
The Court showed itself at its most active in shaping the electoral system with the aim 
of ensuring a genuinely representative political system, through what Kommers has called a 
“jurisprudence of democracy”.221 Key decisions granted political parties the power to defend 
their institutional rights before the Court in a similar manner to other State organs,222 struck 
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down restrictive candidacy laws,223 and upheld a law setting a 5% threshold of votes cast for 
parties to sit in parliament, to ensure “orderly” governance in an electoral system characterised 
by diffuse voting patterns; an outcome informed by the instability inflicted on Weimar’s 
parliamentary system by splinter parties.224  
Keeping in mind that the Court had few models for its role, it evinced a marked ability 
to judge the needs of the fledgling democratic order and an ability to not only reconcile the 
countervailing tensions between majoritarian democracy and the enhanced constitutional 
constraints established to rein in antidemocratic forces, but also to mediate the recent past and 
the present. In its jurisprudence the Court created a new constitutional grammar and 
methodology for adjudication in the democratisation context–slowly developing its 
proportionality doctrine, for instance, to place greater constraints on government. It carved 
out a role that, though not without controversy, placed the Court as an accepted central actor 
in democratic governance. Perhaps the Court’s most powerful achievement is that it expanded, 
in the post-war constitutional imagination, the limits of what a court could do and achieve, 
setting down a template for adjudication that has been replicated, to varying degrees, by 
constitutional courts in in new democracies.  
 
1.3 THE GERMAN COURT AS PRIMUS INTER PARES 
 
Although the Austrian and Italian constitutional courts also became fixtures in democratic 
governance in the early post-war period, the German constitutional court came to overshadow 
its sister-courts.  
The Italian court, for instance, enjoyed less expansive review powers and had no 
mechanism for receiving individual complaints: petitions were the sole preserve of the state, 
regional governments and ordinary judges. It began operating in 1956, significantly later than 
the adoption of the new constitution in 1948, due to fears among political parties concerning 
its possible effect on politics, and was stymied by the opposition of the ordinary courts, jealous 
of the new institution.225 It also operated in a very different political context: unlike the ‘zero 
hour’ narrative of the return to democratic rule in West Germany, emphasising total rupture 
with the authoritarian period, the dominant narrative in Italy was one of continuity: Italy had 
not lost the war; a “legitimating fiction” aided by the Italian Constitutional Court’s piecemeal 
invalidation of fascist laws.226 That said, the Court was viewed by the 1970s as having done 
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more than parliament to rid the legal order of fascist elements, striking down laws as early as 
1956, which allowed unlimited pre-trial detention, and vindicating the right to free speech. The 
Court also established from its first judgment the binding character of all constitutional norms, 
strengthening the normative force of constitutional law in a state with a tradition of ‘legislative’ 
constitutions.227 From 1970 the Court was also required to shape constitutional rules governing 
popular referendums, thereby overseeing the most naked expression of majoritarian rule and–
in various instances–blocking and circumscribing popular initiatives.228  
The Austrian Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence–particularly its fundamental rights 
jurisprudence–proved less expansive, with its main role focused on federal-state disputes,229 
while the model of judicial review in post-war France, restricted to abstract review of Bills, 
accorded a less central role to the courts and was emulated in only a small number of former 
French colonies.230 
From the vantage point of the present it is, of course, all too easy to settle into a Whig 
narrative of Germany’s post-war experience as somehow pre-ordained, with the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany explicitly designed to guide the new polity from its disastrous 
past and to construct an enviably robust democratic system, laying a path for others to follow. 
However, as Kommers and Miller have observed, from the outset it could not have been 
predicted that the Court would come to occupy a central role in West Germany’s project to 
create a new form of constitutional democracy: 
Few realized at the time that the Constitutional Court would play a vital role in shaping the 
politics and public philosophy of postwar Germany. Fewer still anticipated the Court’s evolution 
into one of the world’s most powerful and influential tribunals, serving as a model, alongside the 
U.S. Supreme Court, for other liberal democracies attracted by the prospect of placing 
fundamental law under the protection of independent courts of justice.231 
While the Court was the target of governmental and scholarly fulmination in its earlier 
years, it is worth emphasising that democratisation in the new West German polity benefited 
from some remarkable factors: direct oversight by Allied powers in the early years; the presence 
of significant numbers of US troops for decades; a clear commitment to democratic 
governance by the main political forces; a functioning competitive electoral system; a “rapid 
and robust economic revival”;232 a strong desire to rehabilitate the state in the international 
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arena; a project to build a European trading bloc with neighbouring democracies; and a legal 
tradition that had long placed binding law at the very centre of governance. All of this 
smoothed the path for the Federal Constitutional Court to assume an assertive role. 
 
2 GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF THE POST-WAR PARADIGM, 1974-2015 
 
How, then, did the German model become a global model for court-centric democratisation? 
For the first three post-war decades the rest of continental Europe continued to labour under 
undemocratic rule. 1974 brought Portugal’s Carnation Revolution, kickstarting the so-called 
‘third wave’ of democratisation’, bringing transitions to electoral democracy in other southern 
European states (Spain and Greece), Latin America and Asia, Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), Russia and various African states from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In each transition, 
strong judicial review was introduced, revived or strengthened, with the marked focus on 
human dignity and individual rights in Germany’s Basic Law one of the main referents as each 
state sought to achieve its own ‘unshakeable’ democracy.233 Indeed, one of the hallmarks of 
post-war constitutional law worldwide is the significant influence of the institutional form of 
Germany’s Constitutional Court, which, as Ginsburg notes, is “arguably the most influential 
court outside the U.S. in terms of its institutional structure and jurisprudence.”234 In many 
cases the institutional model of the Court was directly emulated (e.g. in Spain, South Korea, 
many CEE states and Russia235) or indirectly replicated (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand, taking the 
South Korean Court as a template236). 
 
The logic of diffusion 
 
To the outsider’s eye, the logic of this diffusion appeared to assume that, if a strong 
constitutionalism capable of suppressing excesses of majoritarian power had led to successful 
democratisation in Germany, a similar or even more expansive approach would yield 
democratic dividends for the fragile new regimes. ‘Thicker’ constitutions and more powerful 
constitutional courts were simply equated with the achievement of a ‘thicker’ democracy, 
especially in climates where faith in political actors remained low. Detailed rules for the 
operation of State organs and long bills of rights became common, often accompanied by 
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social and economic rights (though not always fully justiciable), and eternity clauses; all placing 
a greater interpretative and governance burden on the constitutional court.237 
Scholarship has tended to focus on reasons for establishing Kelsenian courts in new 
democracies, with the reform of supreme courts largely ignored. Lawyers will offer functional 
reasons, such as the need for legal certainty and efficiency in a new constitutional order.238 A 
“powerful confluence of forces”239 is presented as supporting the establishment of such a body. 
The need for a court untainted by links to the previous authoritarian regime. Concerns that 
existing supreme courts will not act to support nascent democratic institutions and values. The 
need for a more efficient method of ascertaining the constitutionality of laws and State action 
(by permitting such matters to be addressed at first instance rather than on appeal). A superior 
capacity to address political questions. The need to insulate the ordinary judiciary from 
politicisation. There is also the symbolic importance of more clearly indicating that the state is 
committed to the rule of law and rupture with the authoritarian past.240 As a form of legal 
technology it has captured the imagination and esteem of scholars, constitution-makers and 
policymakers like no other. 
Political scientists such as Tom Ginsburg speak more of fundamental drivers for the 
establishment of Kelsenian courts, with the dominant thesis being ‘political insurance’.241 
Espoused by scholars from various fields, 242 it suggests that where the degree of power among 
political actors is uncertain they tend to pursue institutional configurations which disperse 
power and to construct bulwarks against the abuse of executive or state power in the new 
democratic regime, thereby insuring against the loss of power, both immediate (especially for 
authoritarian actors in the initial transition) and in the future (through electoral losses and 
rotations of power) by entrenching the constitutional bargain struck in the move from 
authoritarian to democratic rule.243 Indeed, Issacharoff goes so far as to deem these courts as 
“integral structural parts of the moment of original constitutional creation”, which imposes a 
duty on such courts, not to simply ‘guard’ the original pact, but to “reinforce the functioning 
of democracy more broadly” 244  and, as discussed in Chapter One, an ‘incremental 
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constitutionalism’, dependent on the court to resolve matters deliberately fudged in the initial 
pact. 
As a global trend, Ginsburg and Versteeg assert that the insurance thesis has the most 
significant explanatory value when compared to other theories, which suggest a post-war 
rights-based popular demand for limiting majoritarian democracy (‘ideational’ theory), the 
need for such an institution in federal states (‘multi-level governance’ theory), or the emulation 
or adoption of constitutional models through the influence of foreign legal systems, the desire 
to attract foreign investment or to gain acceptance or legitimacy on the international stage 
(‘diffusion’ theory). 245  However, the methodology of their analysis is debatable in places. 
Regarding diffusion theories, for instance, while they focus on shared colonisers, shared 
language, shared religion and geographic proximity through shared borders,246 it takes little 
effort to think of examples of diffusion where none of these factors are present. An example 
is the influence of the German constitutional court on the establishment of a Kelsenian court 
in South Korea. Some scholars suggest, simply, that political actors believe that they will be 
able to control the new institution.247 Under Galligan and Versteeg’s view of a constitution as 
a useful coordinating mechanism to ensure effective government,248 a constitutional court may 
simply be viewed as central to its success in this regard. 
In all likelihood it has been a complex admixture of all of the motives canvassed above, 
in differing proportions from state to state, which has led to the prevalence of constitutional 
courts worldwide in the new democracies of the post-war era. The global adoption of strong 
judicial review from the 1970s onward–and Kelsenian courts in particular–appears to have 
satisfied not only the specific objectives canvassed above, such as political insurance and legal 
certainty, but also sociocultural narratives of democratic rectitude or normality, justice, rights 
awareness, modernity, civilisation, liberalism, Europeanness and Westernness. Until the late 
1980s decisions to adopt such a legal technology were taken within the ideological battleground 
of the Cold War. By contrast, in the historical window after 1989 its adoption reflected the 
presentation of a suite of liberal democratic norms as not simply the best, but the only choice 
for polities emerging from authoritarian rule. As one group of scholars put it: 
Why have constitutional courts become so popular? The appeal is partly practical. Many 
countries have come to see judicial review as a mechanism for protecting democracy and 
human rights. The appeal is also political: In an era when appeals to many other forms of 
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political legitimacy, such as communism and organic statism, have lost their attraction, the 
forms of constitutional democracy have become common currency. 249 
In CEE in particular, Lach and Sadurski suggest the dominant mood was to avoid 
experiments, with the slogan of a ‘return to normalcy’ indicating that “a ‘normal’ democratic 
system incorporates a concentrated, centralised and abstract judicial review best exemplified 
by German, Italian, Spanish and other (but not all) continental European constitutional courts.” 
As one of the last regions of the ‘third wave’ and with all states aspiring to membership of the 
EU, Kelsenian courts came to be viewed, not only as an engine of democratisation, but an 
emblem of democratic rule. As Lázló Sólyom observed in 2003, the “very existence” of such 
courts  
obviously served as a ‘trade mark’, or as a proof, of the democratic character of the respective 
country…250 
However, even here, an often overlooked factor in the CEE account is the strong influence of 
the Spanish experience. As Ackerman has noted: 
Spain’s successful adaptation of the German constitutional model in its own transition from 
Francoism gave German solutions substantial influence in later transitions.251  
A mix of many of these reasons will also be present in states that eschew the 
establishment of a Kelsenian court but nevertheless place a renewed focus on strong judicial 
review by an existing supreme court. Indeed, looking across the democratic world outside 
Europe, despite rare geographical clusters of Kelsenian courts (e.g. in East Asia), third wave 
democracies today contain twice as many supreme courts as Kelsenian courts (see Table 2.1).  
 











Portugal   X   
Spain   X   
Greece X    
 
249 Kommers, Finn & Jacobsohn (n202) p.24. 
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Central and Eastern Europe (and Russia) 
Bulgaria   X  
Croatia   X  
Czech Rep.   X  
Estonia  X   X 
Hungary    X  
Lithuania   X  
Latvia   X  
Poland   X (1981) X  
Romania    X  
Slovakia   X  
Slovenia   X  
Russia*   X  
South America 
Argentina X    
Bolivia X  X   
Brazil  X*    
Chile X X (1981)   
Colombia X  X   
Ecuador X  X   
Guyana X    
Paraguay X   X 
Peru X X (1980) X (1996)**  
Suriname   X  
Uruguay X    
Venezuela X   X 
Central America 
Belize X    
Costa Rica X   X 
El Salvador X   X 
Guatemala   X   
Honduras X   X 
Mexico X    
South and Southeast Asia 
Bangladesh X    
East Timor X    
India X    
Nepal   X***    
Philippines X    
East Asia 
Indonesia   X  
Japan X    
Mongolia   X  
South Korea   X  
Taiwan X    
Thailand  X    
Africa 
Benin   X  
Botswana X    
Guinea-Bissau X    
Kenya X    




Liberia X    
Malawi X    
Mauritius X    
Namibia X    
Niger   X  
Senegal   X  
Sierra Leone   X  
South Africa   X  
Middle East and North Africa 
Tunisia   X  
*  Russia and Thailand are no longer considered electoral democracies (due to a lack of meaningful electoral 
competition in the former and the 2014 military coup d’état in the latter) but are included here because they feature 
prominently in the literature. 
** A ‘new’ constitutional court was established in Peru under the new constitution of 1993. 
*** Nepal is considering the establishment of a Kelsenian court in its new constitution 
 





All of these new and reformed courts have tended to be endowed with similar powers to the 
German and US courts, with the precise nature of those powers often dictated by institutional 
form (principally, whether a court is a Kelsenian constitutional court or a US-style supreme 
court). In many cases, third wave courts have been endowed with enhanced formal powers, 
compared to even the German constitutional court; such as the power to address not only the 
validity of enacted legislation, but also failure to legislate, or ‘legislative omission’ (e.g. Hungary), 
to decide on the capacity of elected leaders to hold office (e.g. Mozambique), to act as first 
instance quasi-criminal trial courts for political corruption (e.g. Brazil) and the power to assess 
the constitutionality of international treaties (e.g. Tunisia). Combined with generally thicker 
constitutional texts, this has tended to place a greater adjudicative and governance burden on 
the court.  
Overall, the literature tends to indicate that constitutional courts in the ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation have been freighted with tasks and expectations, expected to carry out ‘heavy 
lifting’ in the process of ‘consolidating’ democracy, which is to be achieved as quickly as 
possible. Common concrete tasks include vindicating fundamental rights; adjudicating on 
inter-branch (and often centre-periphery) disputes; monitoring the legislative process as virtual 
‘third chambers’ of parliament; addressing transitional justice questions, such as the validity of 
trials of former regime officials; invalidating unconstitutional and authoritarian-era laws; and, 
in some cases, addressing the very constitutionality of constitutional amendments.253 Less 
tangible roles suggested by various scholars include: delivering on the transformational 
 




promises of the new constitution;254 fostering a new legal and political culture wedded to 
democratic constitutionalism;255 providing a focal point for “a new rhetoric of state legitimacy, 
one based on respect for democratic values and rights”;256 and educating the citizenry on ideals 
of representative democratic government, thereby ensuring the informed citizenry on which 
the principle of popular sovereignty rests.257  
The sheer weight of expectation on a court at the dawn of the democratic project is 
underscored by the contemporary Tunisian experience. The first decision in May 2014 of an 
interim body established to provide limited a priori review of bills (pending the establishment 
of a new constitutional court under the democratic constitution of 2014 with wider powers), 
in which it upheld a widely-criticised Bill on electoral law, has provoked a torrent of criticism. 
In particular, the body’s refusal to decide on the constitutionality of a provision prohibiting 
members of the military and security forces from voting, thus leaving the provision intact, has 
been characterised as a denial of justice, a “political decision”, as missing a “historic 
opportunity of paramount importance for law and civilization”, and as already discrediting the 
new institution.258 
Looking at the burgeoning scholarship on the operation of constitutional courts in new 
democracies across the world against Table 2.1 above,259 it is clear there are gaps in our 
knowledge, concerning constitutional courts in the new democracies of Africa and the Middle 
East in particular.260 However, from the existing scholarship and other sources, such as the 
Venice Commission constitutional case-law database, we can at least say with confidence that 
courts worldwide appear to do what we would expect: control the constitutionality of laws; 
vindicate individual rights; and act as arbiter in constitutional disputes between State powers–
although courts display different emphases in their jurisprudence.  
It is also evident that, in a similar manner to their counterparts in mature democracies, 
the range of matters on which courts are called to adjudicate has become increasingly vast, 
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255 See, e.g. D Grimm, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy’ in D Fairgrieve (ed.), Judicial Review 
in International Perspective, Vol. 2 (Kluwer Law International, 2000) p.142: “The independent judiciary may 
protect them by helping gradually to develop among citizens and legislators liberty-protecting habits based 
in part upon their expectation that liberty-infringing laws will turn out not to be laws.” 
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encompassing social and economic rights (including justiciable rights in a small minority of 
states), the constitutionality of convictions for crimes against humanity, macroeconomic policy, 
foreign policy–and even, in Kenya, the constitutionality of the trial of Jesus Christ.261 It is of 
course, far easier to assess whether a court has carried out specific concrete tasks (e.g. 
adjudicating on separation of powers conflicts) than the more nebulous tasks, such as 
educating the citizenry as to the proper functioning of democratic governance. Verifying such 
a claim which would require sophisticated sociological enquiry, beyond anything currently 
found in the literature. 
The German influence on the case-law of third wave courts is seen in everything from 
the virtually global adoption of some form of proportionality review, to the approach of courts 
in new European constitutional courts to EU law,262 to the principle of ‘social minimum’ in 
Colombian jurisprudence, which sets a base-line for a dignified existence in the framework of 
a social state, to the Brazilian Supreme Court’s approach to authoritarian-era laws.263 Although 
German and US jurisprudence has been the most influential, ‘third wave’ courts have also been 
significantly influenced by British and Indian traditions, especially in the common law systems 
of Africa. We see, for instance, the influence of the Indian Supreme Court’s ‘basic structure’ 
doctrine,264 which asserts the Court’s power to assess the validity of constitutional amendments, 
in the jurisprudence of the Colombian, Belizean and Tanzanian courts,265 although even that 
doctrine was inspired by the work of the German scholar Dietrich Conrad.266  
 
The reality of third wave courts 
 
When we consider the marked influence of the post-war German experience, what is most 
striking is the extent to which so few third wave courts have carried out their work in contexts 
similar to that of post-war West Germany.  
Few other post-authoritarian states adopted a ‘zero hour’ narrative and commitment to 
democratic rule rivalling the Bonn republic, and a minority of third wave states at transition–
chiefly those of Latin America–had, like post-war Germany, some prior experience of 
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democratic rule and significant experience of constitutional review, or like Hungary at least a 
strong culture of legalism.  Indeed, so alien is the constitutional court to Mongolian legal 
culture that its name (Tsets) was borrowed from the word for a judge in traditional wrestling.267 
In a significant number of African states, the legal inheritance from colonial rule included a 
focus on parliamentary, rather than judicial, supremacy and, by the time the ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation had begun, most states had already experienced a failure of democratisation 
and constitutional renewal. As the editors of Democratization and the Judiciary note, African 
states with the exception of South Africa 
gained independence in the early 1960s, with similar constitutions that attempted – but failed – 
to curb the centralization of political power and the emergence of a single-party state.268  
Thus, the perceived umbilical link between strong judicial review and democracy is 
different from region to region. Whereas such review represented a promise for the future in 
the third wave democracies of CEE and East Asia, in the states of Southern Europe, South 
America and Africa (and indeed some CEE states) it often represented a promise broken and 
made anew with the return to democratic rule.  In many states, that promise, whether new or 
remade, is widely viewed as broken again. Although various third wave states have achieved 
‘consolidated’ democracy’ as defined in Chapter One, such as Southern European states, 
numerous CEE states (e.g. Slovenia), South American states (e.g. Brazil) and South Korea, in 
many cases democratic development has stalled, stagnated or gone into reverse, with watchful 
eyes on democratic decay in states such as Hungary, Argentina, South Africa and Romania. 
The hoped-for result of judicialising the democratisation process in many third wave 
states–a democracy at least comparable to that of Germany in the 1970s–has not transpired in 
most states. Lach and Sadurski’s observation that constitutional adjudication in the CEE 
region has been “a mixed bag of undoubtedly courageous and democracy-strengthening 
decisions as well as of decisions which seem like a set-back to these values”269 can be applied 
to other regions. In Latin America, although there is a sense that “there have been remarkable 
advances in the consolidation of the rule of law and constitutionalism”;270 there remains a 
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palpable air of disappointment that judges are not “blazing the way to robust constitutional 
democracy in the way many hoped they might.”271  
It is true that in some cases, the activity of the constitutional court has actively hindered 
democratisation. The Mongolian Constitutional Court is a case in point: its ill-considered 
interpretation of the Constitution in the 1990s, preventing sitting members of parliament from 
being nominated to cabinet positions, was a needless decision which provoked a constitutional 
crisis and seriously damaged the legitimacy and standing of that Court.272 An unlucky few, like 
the Argentine Supreme Court, were cowed by successive purges in the democratic era, resulting 
in ‘captured courts’ with little willingness to defy an overweening executive until the electoral 
tide appeared to be turning.273 In Brazil, the Federal Supreme Court’s active engagement in 
economic matters, due to the ‘constitutionalisation’ of economic and fiscal policy under the 
1988 Constitution, is viewed as having had a negative impact on economic development since 
the transition to democracy in 1985, 274 which may have adversely affected democratisation 
itself.  
However, deficient democratic progress is not, in general, a failure of most constitutional 
courts, which have had to contend with a mixture of diverse issues not faced by the Karlsruhe 
Court. These include: a lack of electoral competition; a highly deficient party system and/or 
enduring executive dominance; badly-drafted or excessively long constitutions; often difficult 
economic transitions (whether moving from the planned economies of post-Communist states 
or the import substitution model of Latin America); and enduring military power into the 
democratic era. This has made for volatile politics and a more difficult institutional setting for 
the courts. The hand-wringing of post-war German politicians in the face of judicial 
assertiveness is replaced by overt attacks in many states against strong review, such as threats 
to trammel the court’s jurisdiction, or more subtle, but persistent, forms of resistance aimed 
at reducing public support for courts and even judges’ psychological resilience.275 It has been 
suggested that the incapacity of judges to constrain political actors in Tanzania and Zambia is 
tied to legal culture, the institutional framework and resource constraints within which courts 
operate, and a lack of public legitimacy.276  
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International oversight and political pressure by organisations such as the Council of 
Europe, OAS and UN–as well as regional human rights courts–has not provided a particularly 
strong bulwark against democratic backsliding in many states, and cannot compare to the 
occupation of post-war Germany by US troops: when the German constitutional court issued 
its first judgment in 1951, some 75,000 US soldiers still remained on German soil and would 
stay in large numbers for the following decades.277 All these factors have significantly dented 
the capacity of courts to meet the initial bullish expectation that they would underpin 
successful democratisation processes.  
 
2.2 DEMOCRATISATION TECHNOLOGY 2.0: PUSHING THE TECHNOLOGY 
PAST ITS LIMITS 
 
Perversely, it is those contexts that render effective constitutional adjudication most difficult 
that have often led to even greater expectations of the courts to deliver on the democratic 
promises of the constitution where other State actors are deemed not equal (or committed) to 
the task. Courts have tended to approach their difficult institutional circumstances in different 
ways: through general quiescence, which prevents attacks; or restraint and strategic deference, 
which allows for progressive institution-building. In a small number of third wave states the 
political context of the democratisation process has led courts to assume adjudicative postures 
exceeding those of even the most assertive courts in mature democracies (the US, Germany 
and India).    
 
Hungary: The Court as Opposition and Voice of the Constitution  
 
The failure of modern parliaments to act as a check on government has been offered as a 
justification of the German Constitutional Court’s role in post-war West Germany. 278  In 
Hungary, the Constitutional Court established under the wholesale revisions to the 
Communist-era constitution in 1989, adopted by the outgoing Communist parliament, found 
itself in a context where the competences of the executive and a unicameral parliament were 
intertwined, in a unitary state with a limited presidency, with the result that the Court came to 
act as the sole institutional check on government action.279 Armed with greater powers and 
accessibility than most constitutional courts, including the ability to act of its own motion and 
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an open petition system, the ‘first’ Court under President Lászlo Sólyom quickly became 
known in the 1990s for being “one of the most activist in the world”,280 or less neutrally, as 
“unusually aggressive” in dictating to the legislature and executive.281  
The Court struck down almost one-third of the laws challenged before it between 1990 
and 1996, including new laws as well as holdovers from the Communist era (dwarfing the tally 
of the German constitutional court);282 set out detailed instructions to the legislature for writing 
laws in cases of ‘legislative omission’; ordered parliament to pass new rules on its own 
procedures;283 and generally, as Kim Lane Scheppele suggests, “left relatively little room for 
politics”. Indeed, Justice Sólyom often spoke extrajudicially as though he were personally the 
“mouthpiece” of the Constitution, not merely presiding over the Court as ‘guardian of the 
Constitution’.284 The subject of much scholarly interest almost from its inception, with renewal 
of its membership in the latter half of the 1990s the Court became significantly less assertive 
and, under the current conservative government, not only had its jurisdictional wings 
significantly clipped under the new Basic Law of 2012, but a constitutional amendment of 
March 2013 annulled all its decisions prior to that date.285 
 
Colombia: The Court as Sole Guardian of a Disowned Constitution  
 
The Colombian Constitutional Court was established in 1992 under a 1991 Constitution that, 
as Uprimny recounts, was the product of a very particular political and constitutional moment, 
with a constitutional convention including many of the societal actors traditionally excluded 
from the political process; former guerrillas, indigenous communities and religious minorities–
as well as representatives of the traditionally dominant Liberal and Conservative parties, who 
constituted just 60 per cent of the convention members. The result was a text which sought to 
broaden participation in political life, to form the basis for social justice, and to enhance 
protection of human rights, with a rich seam of both civil and political, and social and 
economic rights. The text accorded a central role to the Court to put the new text into effect.286  
With the political context quickly shifting back to old habits of exclusion and 
overweening presidential power, the Court was left as the sole State institution committed to 
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the constitution and adopted an assertive stance from the earliest days of its operation, aimed 
at remedying the defects of Colombian society in a context where exclusionary politics and 
ordinary political channels were unable to deliver many societal goods, including peace, 
inclusion, equality and fairness. Aided by a very open petition system, the Court quickly 
amassed a voluminous jurisprudence curtailing the presidential power to declare states of 
emergency, vindicating fundamental rights (including social and economic rights, indigenous 
peoples’ rights and collective rights), defending congressional autonomy from the 
encroachment of presidential power, and involving itself in economic governance, such as the 
implementation of the minimum wage.287  
In particular, faced with a raft of justiciable social and economic rights, the 
Constitutional Court has elaborated a particularly sophisticated, principled and robust 
jurisprudence in this area. It has frequently ordered State agencies to help impoverished 
individuals, by providing medical treatment such as eye operations and AIDS medication, to 
provide state subsidies wrongfully denied by administrative actors, and occasionally extending 
its judgments to all persons in the same position as the claimant by recognising an 
‘unconstitutional state of affairs’, with examples including ordering the State to adopt an action 
plan to address structural inadequacies in the prison system and upholding the State’s duty to 
guarantee access to education and adequate housing.288  
As in Hungary, the Court’s case-law has prompted serious political backlash,289 although 
threats against its jurisdiction and powers have not become a reality. 
 
South Africa: The Court as Defender of the ‘Deep Principle’ of Democracy 
 
Much ink has been spilled on the role of the South African Constitutional Court in that state’s 
unusual transition and democratisation process. Its most remarkable role may have been that 
of reviewing the final constitution drafted by a constituent assembly as against the principles 
in the draft constitution, and its refusal to certify the original text despite its adoption by 86 per 
cent of the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly. 290  It quickly cemented its 
reputation for assertiveness with decisions holding the death penalty to be unconstitutional, 
ordering the enactment of laws on same-sex marriage in line with the Constitution, and 
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upholding prisoners’ voting rights. 291  However, it has been criticised for upholding the 
constitutionality of a ban on ‘floor-crossing’ by politicians (i.e., defecting to another party while 
retaining one’s seat), which was viewed as a prerequisite to fragmenting the ANC’s dominance 
and ensuring meaningful multi-party competition,292 and for taking a less robust approach to 
upholding social and economic rights than other courts, such as the Colombian court discussed 
above.293 
The Court has also explored in depth the meaning of ‘constitutional democracy’ in light 
of the final constitution of 1996, which, as Theunis Roux suggests, explicitly envisages 
democracy not merely as a system of governance, but a value system based not only on ‘the 
will of the people’ but the principle that ‘every citizen is protected by law’. Human dignity, 
equality, freedom and individual rights, repeatedly proclaimed within the text, are viewed not 
as subtracting from the democratic principle, but rather, lying in ‘constructive tension’ with 
majority rule.294 The Court has indicated its rejection of any winner-takes-all conception of 
majority rule and emphasised the need for a deliberative democracy where the minority as well 
as the majority are included in public decision-making; to an extent on occasions that indicates 
this ‘deep principle’ of democracy could be used to achieve virtually any result.295  
In a climate of growing hostility toward the Court within the ruling African National 
Congress (ANC), the government announced a review of the Court’s powers in 2012, which 
has not yet led to any concrete reforms but has placed the Court in a more precarious position 
in the political order. 296 
 
3 RISE OF THE EUROPEAN AND INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS COURTS, 1948-2015 
 
How do regional human rights courts fit into the historical picture sketched so far in this 
chapter? Like the Federal Constitutional Court, both the European and Inter-American human 
rights courts are post-war creations, forming part of regional rights protection systems that 
stand as reactions to the depredations of undemocratic rule. The European Court was 
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established in 1959, ten years after the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 and 
adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950. The Inter-
American Court was established in 1978, thirty years after the creation of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in 1948 and proclamation of the American Declaration of Human 
Rights (ADHR) the same year.  
The African system, which is discussed in the following Part, is a more recent appearance, 
mooted as early as 1961297 but only taking root in 1981 with adoption of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU; now 
the African Union, AU). Like the Inter-American system, significant foot-dragging by political 
actors has tended to delay institutional evolution: the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights was established in 1987, followed almost 20 years later by an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which began functioning in 2006 (eight years after adoption of 
its founding protocol). 
 





















In a similar manner to the inflated perception of domestic constitutional courts as democracy-
builders, the role of regional courts in supporting democratisation has often been overstated. 
For instance, James Sweeney’s assertion that the European Court of Human Rights “has been 
a vital part of European democratic consolidation and integration for over half a century”,298 
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tends to suggest that this court was engaged in significant activity at the regional level parallel 
to the developing role of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany at the domestic level. 
In reality, the European Court was virtually dormant until the 1970s: in the terms of 
‘consolidation’ as defined in Chapter One it was a peripheral actor in any European 
democratisation process until the 1990s, when post-Communist states came under its 
jurisdiction. The only fully active regional court in any part of the world was the EU’s Court 
of Justice, which hit its stride in the early 1960s but had, for instance, little hand in rights 
protection until the 1970s.299   
As we will see, the Inter-American Court was the first regional human rights court to 
play a key part in any democratisation process, and remains the quintessential ‘democratisation 
court’ at the regional level worldwide. This Part recounts the emergence of the European Court 
as a new form of legal technology and the slow development of its role, contrasting this with 
the Inter-American Court, which, in a like manner to the German Court at the domestic level, 
rapidly pioneered a new form of jurisprudence in reaction to its political context, which built 
on the European approach but departs from it in significant ways. It finishes by briefly 
discussing the diffusion of this model to Africa and the Arab region, and the ‘replication 
failures’ in those contexts.  
 
3.1 THE CRUCIBLE: EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ‘DOUBLE REVIEW’, 1948-1998 
 
The European Court of Human Rights constitutes one of the boldest ‘new constructions’ of 
the immediate post-war era. With the exception of the Central American Court of Justice 
which came before it,300 it was an entirely new legal technology, with jurisdiction over sovereign 
states, preceding establishment of the European Court of Justice by five years. 
 
A contested creation 
 
As Ed Bates and others have recounted, the Court has been dogged by contestation since its 
genesis.301 The non-governmental European Movement’s early plans, from 1948 onwards, 
envisaged significant regional supervision of democratic states in Europe, including a right of 
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individual petition to both a commission and a court of human rights, and with the commission 
empowered (but only by decision of a two-thirds majority) to conduct an enquiry into 
allegations of human rights abuses in the territory of the affected state.  
However, these proposals were significantly attenuated in the final text of the 
Convention, due to concerns among the Member States of the Council of Europe regarding 
judicial activism and the potential impact on state sovereignty. The right of individual petition 
to both organs, and State submission to the jurisdiction of the Court, were made optional; the 
commission’s powers were reduced to a primary aim of seeking a friendly settlement between 
the parties to a disagreement and forwarding an opinion to the Committee of Ministers (the 
executive arm of the Council of Europe) where no settlement could be reached. Establishment 
of the Court itself was made subject to a declaration by a minimum of eight states (of ten 
original signatories) recognising its compulsory jurisdiction.302  
The latter move was thought by many to postpone indefinitely the creation of a court 
for human rights, but it merely delayed it by nine years. Even then, the Court’s role was entirely 
contingent on Commission activation, which, where it found a State violation of a Convention 
right, could refer the matter for a political decision by the Committee of Ministers, or a judicial 
decision by the Court–and only where the State(s) concerned had accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  
 
Linking rights protection and democratic rule 
 
Mirroring to some extent the constitutional developments in Germany and Italy, from the 
outset the linkage between rights protection and democratic rule was clear in the emerging 
regional framework. The ‘Message to Europeans’ drafted by the Swiss federalist, Denis de 
Rougemont, and adopted by some 800 participants at the final session of the Congress of 
Europe held in The Hague in May 1948, referred to what might be considered core elements 
of democracy: 
We desire a Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression 
as well as the right to form a political opposition… 
From its creation in 1950, membership of the Council of Europe, and adherence to the 
European Convention, was predicated on democratic governance. All 10 founding Member 
 





States were under democratic rule,303 and the Statute of the Council of Europe strongly links 
respect for human rights with democracy. For instance, its preamble states:  
[The signatory governments] …Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values 
which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, 
political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of al l genuine democracy…304 
In the significant disagreement concerning the creation of a court (or the need for any 
regional supervision organs more generally) both sides invoked democratic arguments. 
Addressing opposition to the creation of a court before a meeting of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, former French minister Pierre-Henri Teitgen laid 
out the fundamental need for such an institution: 
Many of our colleagues have pointed out that our countries are democratic and are deeply 
impregnated with a sense of freedom; they believe in morality and in a natural law. . . .Why is it 
necessary to build such a system? . . . 
Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one day. Evil progresses cunningly, with a 
minority operating, as it were, to remove the levers of control. One by one, freedoms are 
suppressed, in one sphere after another. Public opinion and the entire national conscience are 
asphyxiated. And then, when everything is in order, the “Fiihrer” is installed and the evolution 
continues even to the oven of the crematorium. 
It is necessary to intervene before it is too late. A conscience must exist somewhere which 
will sound the alarm to the minds of a nation menaced by this progressive corruption, to warn 
them of the peril and to show them that they are progressing down a long road which leads far, 
sometimes even to Buchenwald or Dachau. 
An international Court, within the Council of Europe, and a system of supervision and 
guarantees could be the conscience of which we all have need, and of which other countries 
have perhaps a special need. 305 
Teitgen not only viewed an international human rights convention with a supervisory 
court as a ‘canary in the mineshaft’ regarding authoritarian degeneration, but also as a potential 
‘bill of rights’ for that slim sickle-shaped region of Western Europe where democratic rule 
persisted; and as a beacon to those trapped behind the new iron curtain. Yet, at the time of its 
adoption, the ECHR was apparently commonly viewed as merely giving legal voice to a 
collective political pact against totalitarianism, though the text reflected the ambivalence of its 
contested purpose.306 It is important to recall that, in 1950, robust judicial oversight even at 
the domestic level remained an odd proposition. The constitutional courts of Germany and 
Italy had yet to be established (and were not expected to assume as central a role in governance 
as they did), the revived Austrian constitutional court was creating few waves, and the entire 
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notion of strong judicial review was somewhat alien (if not repugnant) to the British and 
French. 















1959-1998: An underused technology 
 
The perception of the ECHR as merely a political pact, and a strongly professed faith in 
domestic institutions for protecting rights, was reflected in the slow rate of submission to the 
Court’s jurisdiction, dulling its impact for a generation. The Court was not established until 
1959 and until Italy’s recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction in 1973, West Germany and the 
United Kingdom were the only large Western European states subject to its oversight. Even 
then, strong British resistance to submitting to the Court was overcome in 1966 solely on 
policy advice that it would have little impact on British law.307 The Convention system was 
often viewed from London as geared toward the continental states whose democratic 
processes had failed so significantly in the inter-war period;308 a perception that has continued 
through subsequent decades.309  
The European Court’s democratisation burden was light for the first four decades of 
operation. In contrast to the voluminous jurisprudence produced by the domestic 
constitutional courts in Karlsruhe and Rome by the mid-1970s, the court in Strasbourg had 
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issued very few decisions, with its annual judgments only breaching single figures in 1981.310 
The Court, unlike the more active Commission, was an exotic technology: like a 1960s 
supercomputer: few knew how to use it, and even fewer could see its potential uses. In addition, 
cases before both organs tended to concern ‘fine tuning’ matters unrelated to construction of 
the essentials of a democratic order, such as linguistic parity between Belgium’s two 
communities,311 sex education,312 legal aid313 and the rights of illegitimate children.314 It is only 
in the late 1970s, with the Court’s foundational decisions on free speech in Sunday Times v UK315 
and the Handyside v UK,316 that something akin to a ‘constitutional’ jurisprudence addressing 
one of the essentials of democratic governance hove into view. Yet, even here, the respondent 
state concerned was a mature, stable democracy, rendering these judgments concerning 
democratic quality rather than consolidation of democracy; akin to the constitutional ‘fine-
tuning’ role played by constitutional courts in mature democracies. The Court’s engagement 
with the early ‘third wave’ democracies of Spain, Portugal and Greece was also minimal; seen 
in rare cases such as Guincho v Portugal,317 in which the Court held a firm line that it could not 
accept as a justification for excessively lengthy civil judicial proceedings the difficulties of 
overhauling a judicial system in the context of democratic restoration. 
Indeed, it is arguable that prospective membership of the European Economic 
Community (EEC, now EU) did much more to keep democratisation on track in the new 
democracies than any intervention of the ECHR organs, given that both states applied to join 
in the middle of, or shortly after, the transition to electoral democracy; finally acceding in 1986. 
It may also be argued that the integrative jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg, and its growing partnership with national courts from the 1960s onwards, did 
more to acclimatise European states and their constitutional courts to regional judicial power 
than the case-law of the Court in Strasbourg, inaugurating a ‘new normal’ where sovereignty 
and judicial supremacy could increasingly be viewed as shared, rather than a zero sum game.318 
In the Convention system, by the 1980s three key doctrines had been developed, which 
would shape the Court’s later approach to the new democracies of post-Soviet Europe. First, 
‘evolutive interpretation’, by which the Court interprets the Convention dynamically ‘in light 
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of present-day conditions’, allowed for progressively expansive readings of the rights protected 
under the Convention. Second, the principle that Convention rights should be ‘practical and 
effective’, which precludes states from relying on the existence of purely formal rights 
guarantees in domestic law. Third is the ‘margin of appreciation doctrine’, by which the Court 
calibrates the extent to which a State is to be afforded discretion on a rights matter, with the 
determination often based on the extent to which there is European consensus on the matter, 
as divined by the Court. These would be later joined by the doctrine of res interpretata; meaning 
that State obligations are based not only on the Convention, but on the Convention as 
interpreted by the Court, which places greater constraints on State organs to remain 
Convention-complaint.319  
The European Court’s jurisprudence shows it, like many domestic constitutional courts, 
to be an ‘heir’ of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. Its development of a 
proportionality test was influenced by the German proportionality doctrine.320 Perhaps more 
strikingly, the European Court has also adopted its own version of the German doctrine of 
‘militant democracy’.321 
 
3.2 THE LYNCHPIN: THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A 
QUINTESSENTIAL DEMOCRATISATION COURT, 1978-2015 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights presents a counter-point to the experience of the 
European Court: where the latter slowly grew into its role, focusing on ‘fine-tuning’ the 
constitutional orders of stable democracies, the former was required early in its operation to 
carry a very significant democratisation burden, in a regional context that placed greater 
responsibility at its door. It was established in an entirely different historical and political 
setting where democratic rule had become an exception to almost universal authoritarian 
governance, where democracy itself was a more contested currency, and where no functional 
equivalent of the EU existed as a normative anchor for democratisation processes–which still 
remains the case, despite various pretenders to the ‘supranational’ crown in the region, 
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A post-war system without a post-war narrative 
 
While serious human rights violations are woven into the entire tapestry of American history, 
the Americas had not been affected by the Second World War in the same way as the Old 
World: the United States had lost many sons, but the Western Hemisphere was spared the 
killing fields, pogroms and continent-wide savagery visited upon Europe. Establishment of the 
Inter-American system was therefore not–or at least, to a lesser extent than the European 
system–a red line in the sand, starting from zero with the promise ‘never again’. Rather, it 
presented a comparatively moderate institutional advance, inspired in part by developments at 
the global level, with the establishment of the United Nations and adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but largely building on a long history of incremental 
regional advances on human rights dating to the mid-nineteenth century.323 
The development of post-war linkages between rights protection and democratic 
governance are rather less linear in Latin America than in Western Europe. Although the 1948 
OAS Charter proclaimed that American solidarity is based on “the effective exercise of 
representative democracy”324 and made a rather fleeting textual reference to human rights,325 
like the immediate post-war European context there were few stable or longstanding 
democracies among its founding 21 Member States; the United States being perhaps the only 
state which could convincingly claim the title.326 The remaining 20 states, all located in Latin 
America, consisted of a mix of regimes, including starkly non-democratic regimes (e.g. 
Paraguay), a variety of underdeveloped and new democracies (e.g. Argentina, Cuba), recently 
restored democracies (e.g. Brazil, Uruguay), a democracy emerging from civil war (Costa Rica) 
and two very precarious democracies (Peru and Venezuela suffered coups mere months after 
the Charter’s adoption).  
However, unlike the ECHR system, which generally evolved in a context of progressive 
democratic development in the post-war period (with the signal exceptions of the coups d’état 
in Greece and Turkey between 1960 and 1980), for the first 30 years of the Inter-American 
system’s development successful democratisation processes were in short supply, with Costa 
Rica being the rare exception among the Latin American states. As Gordon Mace puts it, the 
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Inter-American system developed in fits and starts, mainly during “windows of opportunity” 
afforded by periods of democratisation or redemocratisation in the region.327  
The principal landmarks are adoption of the American Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948), establishment of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1959), conferral 
on the Commission of the power to receive individual complaints (1965), enhancement of the 
Commission’s standing as guarantor of the ADHR and recognition of the ADHR as a yardstick 
against which the activities of all OAS Members could be judged (1970);328 adoption of the 
ACHR (‘Pact of San José’), modelled on the ECHR and its institutional structure, as well as 
the ADHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1969); and, 
finally, establishment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as provided for by the 
ACHR (1978).  
These institutional developments were often reactions to, or progress despite, 
authoritarian rule. The background to the Commission’s establishment and the drafting of the 
ACHR and its institutional machinery in 1959 was political unrest in the Dominican Republic 
under the Trujillo dictatorship, which underscored the link between human rights violations 
and anti-democratic regimes, and encouraged the OAS Member States to “shed their apathy 
towards human rights problems and ... to shape a regional system for their protection.”329 
Although most states had freely elected governments and espoused a nominal commitment to 
constitutional democracy at the time the ACHR was under negotiation in the 1960s, at the 
time of the Convention’s adoption in 1978 and establishment of the American Court of 
Human Rights in 1979, almost every state in South America, bar Costa Rica, was still under 
authoritarian rule or weak civilian governments under military tutelage.330 In this light, the 
ACHR’s emphasis on democratic government, and requirements that restrictions to certain 
rights must be “necessary in a democratic society”331 did not fully reflect the reality of the 
Americas at that time.  
A particularly grim and systematic escalation of atrocities across Latin America in the 
1970s–including torture and forced disappearances under Operation Condor, 332  an 
internationally coordinated clandestine campaign of political repression and terror aimed at 
 
327 G Mace, ‘Sixty Years of Protecting Human Rights in the Americas’ Quebec Journal of International Law 
1 (2011) at 2. 
328 Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967, which entered into force in 1970.  
329 RK Goldman, ‘History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights’ 31 Human Rights Quarterly 856 (2009) at 861. 
330 Ibid., at 872. 
331 See e.g. Articles 15 (right of assembly), 16 (freedom of association) and 17 (freedom of movement and 
residence). 




eradicating Communist opposition, as well as massacres of indigenous peoples in various 
states–lent a greater moral and political urgency to the Inter-American system, and, later, a 
firmer conviction that democratic governance, which had previously been viewed askance by 
left and right wing alike in the region, is the surest political system for the protection of human 
rights. In South America, 1978 is viewed as the year the succession of democratic transitions 
across the region began,333 with every state in the region having emerged from military rule by 
1989.   
 
1978 Onward: The Court’s democratisation burden 
 
The strong, and largely sustained, wave of redemocratisation in South America in the 1980s 
enabled the OAS, and the Inter-American human rights organs more specifically, to take a 
more coherent and consistent stance on democratisation and the protection of human rights. 
This began as early as 1979, with resolutions of the OAS not only condemning the human 
rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua (based, it should be noted, on a country 
report by the Inter-American Commission) but also, for the very first time, declaring the 
incumbent government to be illegitimate.334  This political context opened a wider space for 
the Inter-American Commission and Court to manoeuvre, transforming their role from 
mitigating the worst excesses of authoritarian regimes to providing a normative lodestar to 
fledgling democracies. However, for Central America armed conflict and accompanying 
atrocities required intensive engagement by the Inter-American system into the 1990s.335   
The Court initially had very limited impact on democratisation processes throughout the 
1980s, issuing solely advisory opinions until its first judgment in a contentious case in 1988.336 
Acceptance of its jurisdiction was, like that of the European Court, a relatively slow process, 
with eight states accepting its jurisdiction by 1985, 12 by 1990, and the current 20 member 
states by 2000.337 Thus, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, the Court handed down at most 
a handful of merits decisions in contentious cases each year, and, in many years during this 
period, no more than a single decision.338 Indeed, the number of merits decisions per year did 
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not hit double digits until as recently as 2004, and since then, the annual number tends to vary 
between approximately 10 and 20 decisions.339  
 





















That said, the Court quickly built up a significant jurisprudence at a much more rapid 
pace than its Strasbourg counterpart. Unlike the European Court, it faced from the beginning 
a mixture of new democracies and authoritarian states, all featuring severe (and in the new 
democracies, often ongoing) human rights violations as it carved out its adjudicative role. Thus, 
while it followed European doctrine in taking an ‘evolutive’ approach to interpretation of the 
American Convention and a ‘practical effectiveness’ doctrine, it eschewed anything like a 
margin of appreciation doctrine, and has tended toward a ‘monist’ approach in its approach to 
serious human rights violations–seen to most powerful effect in Barrios Altos v Peru340 in 2001, 
concerning the State’s responsibility for a massacre perpetrated by a military death squad. 
Overall, it has tended to accord a relatively low level of deference to states; most clearly in its 
‘control of conventionality’ doctrine, which requires all state actors, including courts, to adhere 
to its jurisprudence. It has thus tended to take a more generally assertive stance than the 
European Court, on matters including the validity of amnesty laws, State failure to investigate 
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and prosecute serious rights violations, and criminal defamation laws. This is explored in more 
depth in Chapters Three and Four.  
 
A qualified success 
 
The Inter-American Court has enjoyed some signal achievements. Its case-law has led to the 
repeal or restricted application of amnesty laws across the region, thus addressing impunity for 
authoritarian-era rights violations and allowing crimes such as forced disappearance to be 
investigated. Strict criminal defamation laws have also been repealed or amended,341 and the 
right to freedom of information has been written into law across Latin America, spurred by 
jurisprudence from San José.342 The often highly judicialised processes of domestic democratic 
consolidation processes in the region (e.g. Colombia, Uruguay) appear to have a hand in 
increasing acceptance of its role,  
However, unlike the high level of compliance with European Court judgments, 
compliance with the Inter-American Court’s judgments, though slowly improving, remains 
low by comparison. Compliance remains particularly lacking regarding the Court’s orders for 
reparations beyond compensation, especially where a State is ordered to investigate or 
prosecute a rights violation.343 It also faces significant resistance by numerous states, especially 
the neo-Bolivarian leftist regimes in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia.344 In addition, democratic 
backsliding has at times had a direct impact: the Court suffered significant setbacks in 2012 
and 2014 when Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, respectively, left its jurisdiction by 
denouncing the ACHR; moves spurred by the domestic constitutional court in each case in 
response to adverse rulings from the regional court.  
The Court has also not been immune to missteps. For instance, it has been said that its 
strict amnesty jurisprudence is “currently holding the Colombian peace process hostage” by 
limiting the room for manoeuvre in negotiations aimed at ending a half-century of violent 
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conflict in that state.345 In addition, the attenuation of its strong position against criminal 
defamation in a recent case against Argentina,346 for which little reason is provided in the 
judgment, is viewed as a sign of internal tensions in the Court, with the decision the result of 
a bare majority of four of the seven justices: 
The Mémoli decision is undoubtedly a setback and a wake up call about the divisions within the 
Court. It also shows the need of the Court to regain its legitimacy and reputation as a protector 
of freedom of expression, so necessary in our region today.347 
 
3.3 LATIN-AMERICANISATION: AMPLIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT’S DEMOCRATISATION ROLE FROM 1998 ONWARD 
 
While the Inter-American Court was slowly carving out its role in the 1990s, the European 
Court’s role was mutating. Already by 1990, the Court’s prominence in European governance 
had increased significantly, with all Western European states recognising the right of individual 
petition and submitting to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Commission’s and Court’s 
jurisprudential output from the 1980s onward had seen a marked increase, touching on 
virtually any matter of policy or law in the contracting States. Corporal punishment in British 
schools, laws sanctioning homosexual acts in Northern Ireland, libel laws in Austria and 
planning laws on expropriation in Sweden were all deemed violations of the Convention.348 
Increasingly confident characterisation of the Convention and Court as ‘constitutional’ entities 
in the 1990s, the long-diminished decision-making role of the Committee of Ministers, and the 
system’s burgeoning case-load led to Protocol No.11 to the ECHR. This dissolved the 
European Commission, established a ‘new’ permanent court as the sole adjudicative organ of 
the system, and rendered individual petition compulsory: the system had become a wholly 
judicial affair. 
Central to this reform, too, was the Court’s expanded geographical jurisdiction, as states 
across the post-Communist world transitioned to democracy from the late 1980s and 
submitted to its jurisdiction between 1992-1998, it moved from a virtually exclusive focus on 
‘fine tuning’ Western European democracies to engaging with democratisation processes in 
Central and Eastern Europe. As Peter Leuprecht has observed (in a highly critical vein), the 
democratic accession criteria of the Council of Europe were diluted to ease accession of these 
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states after the fall of the Soviet Union,349 thus transforming the Council’s role–and, as a result, 
that of the European Court of Human Rights–from primarily the defence of democracy to 
supporting democratisation . Scholars speak of the “Latin Americanization” 350 of the Court’s 
docket during this period. The Court was required to address much more severe human rights 
violations in Russia’s crushing of separatists in Chechnya, and torture in Turkey (which 
recognised the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1990). The specific history of post-
Communist states has faced the Court with lustration measures in a number of states, the 
Berlin Wall cases concerning prosecution of East German border guards, amnesty laws, 
restriction of electoral rights, and significant restrictions on the rights to free speech and 
freedom of assembly in censorious political systems accustomed to monopolies on public 
discourse.351 
As Sadurski has noted, the need to address systemic deficiencies in the newer State 
Parties has moved the Court to a “quasi-constitutional” role, epitomised in its issuing of ‘pilot 
judgments’ aimed at addressing structural problems.352 We see a move from what Steven Greer 
would call ‘individual justice’ to ‘constitutional justice’.353 Further, as Sweeney observes, the 
challenges presented by the new states have left the Court in a difficult position, and 
constrained by the doctrinal legacy of its earlier case-law. It seeks to maintain the human rights 
standards built since the 1970s and to pay homage to the principle of the universality of human 
rights. However, it increasingly finds itself according states a margin of appreciation to allow 
greater restrictions of rights in service of democratisation aims (what Sweeney would view as 
‘transitional justice’ aims)–such as the dismantling of Communist governance structures and 
diminishing the power of political actors from the old order.354 This lies in stark contrast to its 
less flexible approach toward earlier ‘third wave’ democracies in Southern Europe.  
Overall, the verdict on the European Court’s contribution to the consolidation of post-
Communist democracies is mixed. The Court has softened the excesses of new democratic 
governments in property restitution and lustration programmes, by emphasising rights 
protection and the need for adequate standards of procedural justice. 355  However, its 
vindication of free speech has been inconsistent–at times placing undue emphasis on the social 
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sting of statements implying collaboration with the Communist-era regime for instance.356  
Case-law on access to the electoral system is also viewed as uneven, with the Court’s 
methodology for approaching the balance between the alleged threat posed by parties to the 
democratic order and the openness of the electoral arena seeming rather opaque.357 
The Court has also been strongly criticised for adopting inflexible positions in certain 
cases. In particular, its judgment in Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina , which held 
aspects of the consociational democratic arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina to violate 
the right to equality under the European Convention, has been decried as misguided, badly 
reasoned and potentially threatening, not only the democratisation process, but the fragile 
peace which has been in place for little over a decade.358 In the context of its impossible case-
load, the overall quality of the Court’s judgments is viewed by some as decreasing,359 and 
ensuring compliance with its decisions, especially ‘pilot judgments’ aimed at structural 
deficiencies in states, has become a challenge.360 This has all affected its capacity to ‘build’ 
democracies in post-Communist Europe. 
 
4 THE DIFFUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS, 2006-PRESENT 
 
The past decade has seen the establishment of a regional human rights court for the African 
Union (AU), and in late 2014, the announcement that another regional human rights court will 
be established for the 21 member states of the Arab League.361 The full motives for installing 
these courts are not easy to discern, but in these developments we see a move from the 
contestation in Europe regarding the democratisation role of a regional court and the 
considered ambivalence to such a court in Latin America, to an even more problematic 
scenario where a commitment to regional supervision, at the political level, often appears 
wafer-thin, if not entirely driven by pragmatic motives to present a veneer of democratisation. 
Of course, one can also characterise the development of the European and Inter-American 
human rights systems as propelled by similar motivations: a European desire to reclaim global 
moral superiority after the degradation of World War II, and a Latin American desire to project 
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359 See in particular chs. 26–28 of N Huls, M Adams & J Bomhoff (eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ 
Rulings. Judicial Deliberations and Beyond (TMC Asser Press, 2009) 
360 B Rainey, E Wicks & C Ovey (eds.), Jacobs, White and Ovey: the European Convention on Human Rights 
(OUP, 2014) p.64. 
361 Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. 
Syria’s membership of the League was suspended in 2011 in response to its brutal response to pro-democracy 




a more democratic regional image, each supported by a tutelary stable democracy (the UK and 
US respectively) and vocal civil society campaigns. However, in Africa and the Arab world the 
gap between rhetoric and reality often appears wider.362  
 
4.1  THE UNDERSTUDY: THE AFRICAN COURT’S OPERATION IN A HOSTILE 
CLIMATE, 2006-2015 
 
As Makua wa Mutua has emphasised, the African human rights system emerged at a time when, 
having fought colonial rule partly on the basis of rights arguments, African states found 
themselves under increasing scrutiny as human rights discourse was universalised in the 1970s, 
due to the emergence of brutal dictatorships across the region in the 1960s: 
The [African] leadership had to reclaim international legitimacy and salvage its image. In 1979, 
shaken by these perceptions, the OAU Summit in Monrovia, Liberia, appointed a committee of 
experts to prepare a draft of an African human rights charter. It was ironic that virtually none of 
the men, the Heads of State and Government, were freely and fairly elected. Without exception, 
they presided over highly repressive states. It was virtually the same club of dictators who 
adopted the African Charter in Nairobi, Kenya in 1981. Thus was born the African human rights 
system.363 
The African Commission, created as a stand-alone institution in 1987, and faced with 
almost universally undemocratic regimes, 364  found little room to manoeuvre from its 
establishment, adopting a more deferential posture than its counterparts in other regions, 
through a focus on ‘positive dialogue’, inconsistent use of provisional measures and reluctance 
to follow up its decisions.365 That said, it has at times adopted assertive postures concerning 
matters such as the use of secret military trials, free speech, the right to fair trial and due process 
and the ousting of judicial jurisdiction, although it has not addressed gross and systematic 
violations with any vigour.366  
Largely at the urging of academics and NGOs,367 the AU adopted a protocol in 1998 to 
establish an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, ratified eight years later, and with 
the Court finally established in 2006. Although the Court came into being in a rather more 
democratic climate, with a number of new electoral democracies appearing in the 1990s 
(including Benin, Namibia, Malawi, Mali, South Africa and Tanzania) its operation is more 
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restricted than the other two regional human rights courts. Cases can be brought before the 
Court by the Commission, a State or an African inter-governmental organisation. However, 
there has been little appetite to do so, with the Commission the sole petitioner to date, and 
even then referring only two cases before 2012.368 The Court has the power to allow individuals 
and NGOs to petition it directly, where a State has made an optional declaration recognising 
such petitions. However, the vast majority of States have not done so; a factor viewed as 
significantly limiting the scope of the Court’s material jurisdiction, and leading to a six-year 
wait for its first merits decision in a contentious case.369 Thus, unlike the European Court’s 
impact in the CEE region or the Inter-American Court in Latin America, has had no hand in 
the first 15 years of democratisation processes.  
 

















Unlike the African Commission, which has been viewed as a quiescent organ, the Court–
drawing significant inspiration from case-law of its European and Inter-American 
counterparts–has adopted a strident tone in a number of its judgments to date, although it has 
encountered difficulty in ensuring enforcement. In the Court’s first merits judgment, 
Tanganyika Law Society v Tanzania370 the Court unanimously found the State’s constitutional 
ban on independent candidacy in elections a violation of the African Charter, having adopted 
the same general interpretive approach as the European and Inter-American Courts, and like 
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the latter, having eschewed any margin of appreciation doctrine. However, the Court’s 
judgment has been met with considerable resistance by the Tanzanian authorities.371 In March 
and December 2014, the Court found two violations of the Charter in cases against Burkina 
Faso. In Zongo v Burkina Faso372 the Court found the State in violation of rights to judicial 
protection and free speech for failing to investigate and prosecute the killers of a journalist and 
his companions in 1998. In Konaté v Burkina Faso373 the Court unanimously ruled a 12-month 
sentence of imprisonment for criminal defamation imposed on the applicant, a journalist, in 
2012 for having accused a public prosecutor of corruption a violation of the right to freedom 
of expression in the African Charter. The judgment has raised hopes for reform of criminal 
defamation laws across Africa,374 but this remains to be seen.  
Significantly, the Court is operating in a region where a number of other assertive 
regional adjudicative bodies have suffered very significant political backlash. This is starkly 
underscored by the fate of the Tribunal of the 15-member Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).375 Established in 1992, it was effectively ‘dismantled’ in 2012 due to 
political backlash–spearheaded by Tanzania, a democratic state–against its strong stances on 
human rights;376 a fate reminiscent of the Hungarian constitutional court discussed above. 
Other sub-regional courts, such as the East African Court of Justice, have met similar 
resistance when they have attempted to address human rights violations and electoral 
matters.377 It also does not augur well for the planned (though as yet far from likely378) merger 
of the Court with the AU’s African Court of Justice to create an African Court of Justice of 
Justice and Human Rights; with talk of further expanding the new court’s remit to international 
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criminal jurisdiction.379 We encounter an increasing rhetoric of rights review and judicialisation 
without any accompanying willingness to submit to such review. 
 
4.2  THE NEW ARAB HUMAN RIGHTS COURT: A POTEMKIN TRIBUNAL? 
 
None of this augurs well for the recently announced Arab Court of Human Rights. If the 
perception of the European Court as a key actor in democratisation is somewhat mistaken, the 
impact of the Inter-American Court is easily overstated, and the African Court has struggled 
to make itself heard in a region with a high proportion of non-democratic regimes, what hope 
is there for a similar court in the Arab region, dominated by non-democratic regimes, riven by 
enmities and tilting increasingly toward war? In the context of the Arab League, we see a move 
from contestation to farce. 
The majority of analysis in English remains reportage rather than scholarship, but it 
conveys the views of leading international lawyers. Condemned by the Egyptian international 
lawyer Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni as a “Potemkin Tribunal,380 the Court would be based in 
Bahrain–a state, it has been noted, “where the ruling family commands seriously abusive 
security forces and dominates a highly politicized justice system”–allegedly part of a public 
relations exercise by that state to convince the international community that it is committed to 
political reform.381 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has opined that the Statute 
of the Court does not establish a “genuine human rights court”.382 The Court is envisaged to 
operate largely on a state-to-state basis, with no provision made for petitions by individuals or 
NGOs, potential for government interference with judicial appointments, insufficient 
protections for applicants and witnesses, and an absence of enforcement mechanisms.  
The Court would be tasked with interpreting the Arab Charter of Human Rights, 
adopted by the League in 2004,383 which is not only problematic in content, but whose reported 
manner of adoption alone gives cause for considerable pessimism. As Rebecca Lowe recounts: 
Indeed, it was only due to misbehaviour by former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi at the 2005 
LAS summit in Tunis that the statute got passed at all, he [Bassiouni] reveals. 
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‘The Saudi King, chairing, said it was a no smoking room, and Gaddafi promptly leaned 
back in his chair and continued to puff arrogantly on his cigarette like a child and a madman. 
Mubarak leaned over and said something to him, and he just blew smoke over his head in 
response. The meeting then broke up – and in the end we only had five minutes to discuss the 
Charter. So it was swiftly approved, despite nobody knowing anything about it.’384 
 












5 CONCLUSION: THE PERCEPTION AND REALITY OF COURTS AS 
DEMOCRACY-BUILDERS 
 
It is clear from the above that, despite the global spread of courts as a legal technology to assist 
in the achievement of a functioning or consolidated democracy after authoritarian rule, in 
many states the expectations placed on courts have been unrealistic and impossible to meet. 
Instead of a global commonwealth of ‘little Germanies’ we see a starker picture: compared to 
the perceived security of German democracy and its constitutional court some twenty years 
after transition, courts in many third-wave democracies two decades post-transition are under 
siege. 2012 was an annus horribilis, with the Hungarian and South African experiences joined 
by death threats against Romanian constitutional court judges in the midst of a political power 
struggle,385 and, at the regional level, the dismantling of the SADC’s Tribunal in Africa. The 
‘back-up’ supervisory role of regional human rights courts has not prevented significant 
democratic decay and authoritarian reversals in states such as Hungary and Venezuela, contrary 
to some verdicts about their capacities. Buyse and Hamilton, concerning the European Court, 
have offered: 
With all its flaws and limitations, the work of the European Court…engenders a renewed belief 
in legal processes as opposed to violent armed struggle or revolution, while at the same time 
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Indeed, when Stone Sweet, as quoted at the outset, opines that “the more successful any 
transition has been, the more likely one is to find an effective constitutional or supreme court 
at the heart of it”, there is a clear risk of mistaking correlation for causality. Most successful 
post-war democratisation processes have occurred in post-war Europe, where similarly 
propitious conditions existed for an accretion of judicial governance power. One can easily 
invert Stone Sweet’s statement to hold, correctly, that rights and review have also been central 
to most unsuccessful democratisation processes. Judicialisation–the ostensible transfer of 
governance power to courts–should therefore not be equated with democratisation: it can just 
as easily reflect a very problematic trajectory as democratic progress falters. Lawyers, in 
particular, can easily fall into the trap of exaggerating the importance of legal institutions. There 
has at times been a failure to distinguish what is legally and constitutionally innovative–of 
interest to lawyers–from the empirical question of whether courts have been as central to 
successful democratisation processes as they are often portrayed. 
The limits of courts in the third wave era have, of course, been noted by other scholars. 
A decade ago Irwin Stotzky opined: 
In the past three decades of democratic transition, the judiciary has had rather limited success in 
promoting democratic reform. … [D]emocratic change cannot be created in a vacuum. All parts 
of the public and private sectors must work together on these problems. So far that has not 
happened.387 
Similar statements have been made concerning regional courts. James Sweeney, for instance, 
notes: 
It is…worth remembering that, as only one element of the Council of Europe, itself an external 
factor in each state’s transitional process, the impact of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence on the ultimate success or otherwise of the Contracting Parties’ transition should 
be kept in perspective.388 
This is not to say that these courts do not play valuable roles in democratisation 
processes; simply that these roles appear to be more limited than is often claimed. The next 
chapter attempts to conceptualise more clearly the different roles that courts at both levels play 
in constructing the essentials of a democratic order, how both levels interact, and how they 
impact on other actors in the democratisation context. 
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‘Democratisation Jurisprudence’:         
Framing Courts’ Democracy-Building Roles  
 
 
The times were difficult, there were gangsters, poverty, crisis... Yet there was an odd 
phenomenon, which is perhaps fully comprehensible only to the lucky ones who have personal 
experience of that era. It was this extraordinary expectation, zeal, anxiety mixed with enthusiasm, 
coupled with quests, scruples and a desire to act. A singular and unique atmosphere. Decisions 
had to be taken promptly, no one had been properly prepared for such a job. Despite the vacuum 
of experience and knowledge, defying the atmosphere of tangible political tensions, everyone was 
still trying to do his or her best. 
Chief Justice of Estonia Rait Maruste, 2009389 
 
Judges in the international arena are, in some senses, freer to make law, and…are not obliged to 
follow their earlier decisions. National law, particularly in a common law system that has been 
around for seven hundred years, is highly detailed, complex and well developed. There is an 
enormous body of precedent to call on and a great deal of written material. In national law there 
are also huge and complex statutes that make it relatively difficult to argue that there are any 
gaps in the law. 
Garry Sturgess & Philip Chubb, 1988390 
 
         HAT DO COURTS ACTUALLY DO to ‘build’ democracy in a post-authoritarian 
state? In Chapter Two we examined the perception of courts as drivers of, or even 
indispensable to, successful democratisation, arguing that this perception can be easily 
overstated. It is nevertheless clear that the courts at each level do play a role in buttressing 
democratic consolidation in post-authoritarian states. Part of the perception problem analysed 
in Chapter Two stems from the fact that the roles carried out by constitutional courts and 
regional human rights courts in new democracies has been under-conceptualised, with the 
 
389 R Maruste, ‘The Outset of Constitutional Judicial Review’ in G Suumann (ed.), 15 Years of Constitutional 
Review in the Supreme Court of Estonia (Supreme Court of Estonia, 2009) p.13. 




result that it is difficult to frame their adjudicative role in supporting (or, in some cases, 
hindering) the democratisation process.  
This chapter therefore seeks to conceptualise the roles that both constitutional courts 
and regional human rights courts play in respect to democratisation processes, through an 
organising concept of ‘democratisation jurisprudence’. The aim is to carve out a clear 
framework for analysing the courts’ roles, and how they interact, intertwine and impact on one 
another. The first Part sets out the overall context of the enquiry, the second and third Parts 
conceptualise the roles of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts respectively, 
the fourth Part explores the interrelationship between the courts at each level, and the final 
Part briefly considers the overall systemic complexity in which inter-court interaction takes 
place.  
The term ‘jurisprudence’ is used advisedly here. Like other jurisprudences, such as 
‘political jurisprudence’ or ‘transitional jurisprudence’, democratisation jurisprudence is not a 
full-blown theory of law, but something closer to what Conrado Hubner Mendes calls a 
“middle-level” approach. It rests a number of rungs below legal theory on Sartori’s “ladder of 
abstraction”, but a number of rungs above scholarship that analyses the most important 
decisions of a specific court in a new democracy without elaborating any overarching analytical 
framework.391 However, unlike Mendes’ normative theory concerning the deliberative role of 
constitutional courts, this is a theoretical framework grounded in a deep understanding of the 
empirical reality, presented in Chapter Two and the comparative case-study in Chapter Four. 
 
1 DEMOCRACY-BUILDING: A UNIQUE JUDICIAL TASK 
 
The vista facing courts in a new democracy is a challenging one. Paraphrasing Chief Justice 
Maruste, quoted at the outset, the times are always difficult, there are always hostile forces and 
economic uncertainty. Evidently, his description of the Estonian Supreme Court tackling their 
task in the early 1990s is not universal. As we have seen in Chapter Two, not all courts set out 
on their democratisation journey with vim; not all courts begin with a vacuum of experience; 
nor do all judges do their best. However, this quotation captures, to some extent, the very 
different context of constitutional adjudication in a state that has just transitioned to electoral 
democracy, compared to a mature democracy.  
Looking at the second quotation above, referring to the centuries-old English common 
law system, we see the stark difference in a new democracy: there is usually a new or revised 
constitution, with which significant elements of the pre-existing law is inconsistent, often in a 
 




legal order that has been distorted, stultified or shrunken during authoritarian rule. In a sense, 
it places constitutional courts in a position akin to their international counterparts, as Sturgess 
and Chubb put it: “freer to make law, and…not obliged to follow their earlier decisions.” In 
some cases, the position is reversed: the regional human rights court pre-dates the state’s 
transition to democracy, and has a significant corpus of jurisprudence compared to a newly 
established, or reformed, constitutional court–especially the tabula rasa faced by a Kelsenian 
court. The position could not be further from what Stephen Tierney has called “the resilient 
gradualism of British constitutional change”.392 
 
1.1 THE ‘NEW NORMAL’: ADJUDICATION IN A CLUTTERED LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE 
 
It is important to emphasise that states which have transitioned to democracy during the ‘third 
wave’ of democratisation have faced a far more cluttered normative landscape than the Federal 
Constitutional Court did when it began operating in 1951 (or, for that matter, the Italian or 
Austrian constitutional courts). Notwithstanding the presence of a foreign power on German 
soil, the German court had significant autonomy to elaborate its own lines of jurisprudence 
and to seek tailor-made solutions to the new state’s post-war challenges. Competing sources 
of law and jurisprudence outside the state had yet to develop. The international human rights 
architecture was in its infancy: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was only 
three years old when the German Court issued its ground-breaking first judgment; while the 
UN’s two international covenants on human rights393 did not enter into force until 1976, by 
which time West German democracy had become viewed as “unshakeable”.394 The European 
Court of Human Rights had yet to hit its stride–and did not deliver a judgment in a case against 
Germany until 1975 (some six other applications having been ruled inadmissible). 395 The 
highest domestic courts in post-colonial Africa of the 1960s similarly operated in a context 
where the state remained the privileged producer of law and domestic jurisprudence had scant 
international competition: the African Commission on Human Rights, for instance, was not 
established until 1987. As discussed in Chapter Two, the European Court played a peripheral 
part in the democratisation processes of Spain and Portugal from the mid-1970s onwards. 
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Constitutional courts in later democratisation processes have faced a more complex 
configuration, consisting of multiple sites of constitutional authority at the state, regional and 
global levels, in which regional human rights in particular have become core producers of case-
law. Decision-making by global bodies, such as the UN’s Human Rights Committee, charged 
with supervision of compliance with the ICCPR, has also become more prominent. Although 
this complexity is faced by courts in all democracies–new, developing and mature alike–it gains 
particular prominence in the democratisation context. As discussed in Chapter One, 
international law and jurisprudence tends to provide a way of filling gaps in the new domestic 
legal order, by aiding courts in interpretation of the domestic constitution and offering 
solutions to distinctive legal problems faced in new democracies. At times, international 
organs–especially regional human rights courts–seek to impose their preferred solutions on 
new democracies, seemingly on the basis that such states (and their courts) cannot be trusted 
to find their own solutions.    
 
1.2 MONISM, DUALISM AND THE CORE ROLE OF COURTS 
 
Domestic courts are not, however, merely passive recipients of  international norms. Rather, 
they play a central role in mediating the extent to which the new democratic legal order is 
constructed from international and foreign materials. The concepts of  monism, which 
conceives of  domestic and international law as fused and accords hierarchical superiority to 
the latter, and dualism, which conceives of  domestic and international law as occupying 
separate, if  interacting, spheres, remain central to any conceptualisation of  the interface 
between national and international legal orders. However, they require some finessing here. 
Various scholars emphasise that domestic courts remain core mechanisms for 
coordinating relationships between state and non-state sites of  legal authority. Nijman and 
Nollkaemper, for instance, though accepting that various factors cut across the explanatory 
power of  either monism or dualism in today’s world, such as the development of  “common 
values” and the “de-formalization of  international law”, nonetheless conclude that the impact 
of  international law remains subject to the actions of  domestic actors. 396  While national 
legislatures were once the primary fulcrum in this process, they note that executives and courts 
have come to play increasingly prominent roles as ‘gatekeepers’ for the reception of  
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international law. 397  Rather than a radical new monism, they argue, like others, 398  for the 
existence of  a “global legal pluralism”, referring to  
diverse State and non-State and mixed legal regimes created by a diversity of  communities [and] 
embedded in a community of  principles, [which] allow co-existence and co-operation between 
multiple legal systems.399  
Evidently, the co-existence of  these legal systems is not always entirely harmonious, and 
much depends on the manner in which courts at both the domestic and regional contexts 
navigate their roles. Nico Krisch, for instance, has explored the manner in which constitutional 
courts and regional courts in Western Europe interact, not as a ‘constitutional’ order with a 
clear hierarchy, but as a plural legal order characterised by heterarchy, in which judicial strategy 
and judicial politics across the system divide allow the overall system to function without undue 
friction.400   
We return to this in considering interaction between constitutional courts and regional 
human rights courts toward the end of  this chapter. First, the differing roles of  the courts at 
each level will be sketched out. To orient ourselves through the discussion that follows, it is 
useful to keep in mind the fundamental dividing line between the courts at each level is that 
constitutional courts are inescapably embedded within a single democratisation process, 
whereas a regional human rights court is external to any one democratisation process. This 
factor strongly shapes their diverging roles. 
 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: BUILDING DEMOCRACY FROM 
WITHIN THE STATE 
 
We clearly have a wealth of raw data and viewpoints about the roles of constitutional courts 
in new democracies. We have seen in Chapter Two that these courts are empowered to carry 
out a wide range of functions, from adjudicating separation of powers disputes to addressing 
legislative omission. We have seen that, empirically, the roles of constitutional courts in new 
democracies worldwide run the gamut from peripheral actors to central, even dominant, actors 
in governance.  
In Chapter Five we will discuss at some length a number of normative arguments 
concerning the role courts should play in supporting democratisation. Wojciech Sadurski and 
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Alec Stone Sweet suggest that rights protection is one of the main roles a court can play. Tom 
Ginsburg, Roberto Gargarella and Samuel Issacharoff add a second role of constraining the 
State. Gargarella’s concept of ‘democratic justice’ suggests, more specifically, two key roles of 
guarding against, first, the gradual establishment of restrictions on basic civil and political rights, 
such as the rights to freedom of expression and fair trial, and second, the executive’s tendency 
to amplify its powers and distort or overcome democratic controls.401 Issacharoff suggests that 
the court’s role should be “to reinforce the functioning of democracy more broadly” by filling 
gaps in the governance structure: for example, by adjudicating on impeachment processes and 
the openness of electoral competition.402 Others, such as Daniela Bonilla Maldonado, Kim 
Lane Scheppele and Manuel Cespeda-Espinosa see courts as capable of an even broader 
governance role that addresses economic governance, socio-economic inequality and even 
constraining state violence.403  
However, none of these scholars quite captures the peculiar nature and context of 
adjudication in states undergoing democratisation processes, nor do they provide a framework 
for better understanding the role of constitutional courts in constructing the minima of a 
democratic constitutional order. This section, therefore, aims to take a step back from the 
existing scholarship to sketch the outlines of ‘democratisation jurisprudence’ as an organising 
concept for an analytical framework applicable to a wide variety of constitutional courts, across 
geographical regions, based on key insights in the literature. 
 
2.1 THE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATISATION  
 
In attempting to capture the different context of democratisation compared to that of a mature 
democracy, it is worthwhile considering the constitutional context, the political context and 
the institutional context in which a constitutional court operates.  
 
The constitutional context   
 
Scholarship in transitional justice, comparative constitutional law and democratisation studies 
underlines that, in stark contrast to the ‘evolutionary’ constitutions of polities such as the UK 
and New Zealand, new constitutions in states transitioning from authoritarian rule inevitably 
refer to the legacy of the past. They therefore aim not only at ‘entrenching’ new rules but also 
at ‘disentrenching’ the previous order, with a particular focus on constraining state power and 
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illiberal tendencies.404 That said, the extent to which a true constitutional break from the past 
is achieved depends on the manner of transition (e.g. whether managed by authoritarian powers, 
the result of revolution, whether short or protracted) and the constitutional drafting process,405 
both of which shape the product–the constitution itself.  
A key insight from the ‘judicial politics’ literature is of relevance here:  
Policy-making by courts…occurs when the case involves choice and judgement, when judges 
are called upon to select from among competing rules, interpret new ones, or act in the absence 
of clearly articulated executive, legislative or constitutional norms. (…) Of necessity, 
judges…make policy when they ‘write on a clean slate’, in addressing a new legal question or 
interpreting a new rule.406 
This observation gains added force in the context of democratisation, where 
constitutional courts are typically required to interpret new constitutions and put flesh on the 
bare skeleton of the constitutional text. Faced with the “silences, gaps and abeyances”407 of the 
new constitutional text, constitutional courts in new democracies must make fundamental 
choices regarding constitutional meaning. As mentioned above, unlike their counterparts in 
long-established democracies, courts in new democracies are usually much less constrained by 
any pre-existing corpus of jurisprudence and have a freer hand not only to interpret the 
constitution, but to shape the constitutional regime as a whole. The requirement placed on 
courts in new democracies to engage in wholesale constitutional construction and 
interpretation is therefore a far cry from the general role of constitutional ‘fine-tuning’ carried 
out by courts in long-established democracies, on the basis of substantial pre-existing 
jurisprudence. 
In addition, the constitutional settlement often contains features that are not found in a 
mature democracy. It has been observed that most ‘third wave’ democratic transitions contain 
countermajoritarian elements designed to calibrate a balance of power between the old and 
new regime. As discussed in Chapter Two, constitutional courts can be one such element, 
alongside bills of rights, eternity clauses and other mechanisms. Others, which are more 
peculiar to post-authoritarian polities, include restrictions on electoral competition (e.g. by 
preserving legislative seats for members of the old regime or providing for legislative 
appointments more generally), power-sharing mechanisms (e.g. providing for a multi-member 
executive presidency), and restrictions on the prosecution of former regime members for rights 
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abuses (e.g. amnesty laws).408 These elements need not be part of the formal constitutional text. 
As we will see in Chapter Four, the constitutional pact underpinning Brazil’s transition from 
military to civilian rule included not only the constitution of 1988, but also a pre-constitutional 
amnesty law of 1979, which formed the basis for a negotiated relinquishment of power by the 
military junta. Here, we get a sense of constitutions, not simply as statements of democratic 
values or coordinating mechanisms, but, in Galligan and Versteeg’s words, as at least partly the 
product of “haphazard bargains, raw power play, and the political agenda of self-interested 
elites.”409 
 
The political context   
 
Evidently, courts in the democratisation setting operate in an entirely different political context 
to a long-established, stable democracy of the kind now found in regions such as Western 
Europe, North America and Australasia. A new democracy is a democracy only in the relatively 
minimal sense of elected government, a democratic constitution and State institutions 
organised along liberal democratic principles (e.g. the separation of powers), but which do not 
necessarily all espouse a strong commitment to those principles. New democracies often 
contain significant political actors (e.g. an ousted communist party, military forces), which are 
opposed, whether expressly or not, to the new democratic order. In addition, as Denis Galligan 
notes, the State’s administrative machinery may be wedded to authoritarian modes of 
governance, prioritising efficiency, effectiveness and secrecy over rights protection and 
transparency, and, as a self-contained autonomous normative order, may evince resistance to 
legal efforts to render it more mindful of such values.410 Even political actors ostensibly 
committed to democratic rule have different conceptions of what is permissible in a system of 
democratic governance: the tension between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ conceptions of democracy once 
again plays a central part. In many cases, the balance of power between the old and new regime 
is not always clear, which can exert a significant constraint on the new regime’s freedom to 
manoeuvre. 
Concerns regarding the separation of powers–i.e., a functional division of State power; 
what Martinez terms a “horizontal structuring” 411 –are also often heightened in new 
democracies. While there is no one model, and certainly no ‘perfect’ model, for a separation 
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of powers, 412  some have argued that greater activity by constitutional courts in mature 
democracies is warranted given the increasing imbalance of power between parliaments and 
executives since the mid-twentieth century, 413  not only in presidential systems but also 
parliamentary systems. In new democracies the justification often gains added currency where 
the attempt is to rebalance a system that previously hoarded political power at one site. 
Whether power was wielded by a markedly strong ‘hyperpresidential’ executive, a Communist 
politburo, a military junta or one-party rule, such systems tend to leave strong traces in the 
political organisation and culture of the new democratic order; or even continue into the new 
order, with ‘hyperpresidential’ systems and the domination of single parties a common feature 
in the new democracies of the third wave.  
It is important here to emphasise that, in the contemporary world, those seeking to 
subvert democracy are not, generally, wearing jackboots. They come wearing suits, speaking 
the language of constitutionalism and democracy. Many elected leaders in third wave 
democracies have attempted (and sometimes succeeded) in achieving a sophisticated hollowing 
out of constitutional structures which aim at constraining power, holding it to account, and 
preventing its misuse: what David Landau calls “abusive constitutionalism.”414 The subjugation 
of the Hungarian constitutional court by procedurally perfect constitutional means in 2012, 
discussed in Chapter Two, is a prime example.  
Abusive constitutionalism brings to the fore the critical problem of constraining 
constituent power, and the challenge this poses for courts. Regarding constitutional 
amendment, Landau, Issacharoff and others have observed that attempts by regimes from 
Colombia to India to change the constitutional rules in their favour have been struck down by 
courts. The clearest doctrinal approach is the Indian Supreme Court’s ‘basic structure’ doctrine, 
asserting the power to assess the compatibility of amendments with the basic structure of 
Indian democracy.415 Moves by regimes to make new, less democratic, constitutions in order 
to entrench their power (as seen in Venezuela) are much harder to address: the constitutional 
court, as a ‘constituted’ organ under the existing constitution, has little power to constrain such 
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activity; or can justify refusal to intervene on the basis that the matter concerns an exercise of 
constituent power.416  
 
The institutional context    
 
As Chapter Two made clear, constitutional courts are not simply agents of democratisation, 
but also subjects of democratisation. They are expected to carry out a very extensive role when 
they are, typically, at their weakest. The court not only has to engage in the construction of a 
new constitutional order, often negotiating a hostile political matrix as it does so, but also must 
in a sense construct itself, by deciding on key matters such as the acceptable scope of 
constitutional review, procedure before the court and the binding nature of its decisions. This 
is especially true of a new Kelsenian court established under the democratic constitution, but 
even supreme courts which transcend the old and new order face the challenge of re-making 
their role in the new dispensation. A complicating factor is that courts are often also subject 
to institutional shaping by the other governmental branches (not always with malicious intent). 
The successive amplification of the Brazilian Supreme Court’s powers in the 1990s and the 
diminution of the Hungarian Constitutional Court in 2012 are two clear examples of a relatively 
benign and a hostile institutional intervention. 
The reality is that unusually assertive courts, such as the Hungarian, South African and 
Colombian courts discussed in Chapter Two, are a minority. The majority of constitutional 
courts in the post-war era have evinced an initial timidity in carrying out their role, but have 
gradually found their feet, building their authority in increments and slowly finding a niche in 
the democratic order, whether central or peripheral. Judicial politics scholars, using game 
theory and other behavioural models, indicate the strategies employed by such courts to pursue 
both ‘institution-building’ and ‘capacity-building’ in the early years of a new democracy–from 
Latvia to South Africa to South Korea we get a sense of similar tactics being employed and 
similar challenges faced: courts, faced with a hostile institutional matrix and often weak public 
support, pick their battles very carefully.417  
No matter how they develop, it is worth emphasising that these courts, embedded as 
they are in the domestic constitutional context, cannot work outside that context, and this 
shapes their approach to their role. It is also worth stressing that, unlike the other branches of 
government, they are reactive institutions in the sense that they can only address matters that 
are brought before them. This, of course, also applies to regional human rights courts. 
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2.2 THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF DOMESTIC DEMOCRATISATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
It is necessary to admit from the outset that any attempt to identify the core role of a 
constitutional court in achieving the essentials of a constitutional democracy will be at least 
minimally normative, involving selections as to what is considered most important. 
Nevertheless, perhaps a defensible approach is to seek what distinguishes democratisation 
jurisprudence from constitutional jurisprudence in a mature democracy, by conceiving of it as 
a creature of time, tempo, context, content and methodology. 
 
Time      
 
It may appear evident, but it is worth stating that the heartland of domestic democratisation 
jurisprudence will be found in the earlier years following the transition to electoral democracy; 
a rough estimate might be the first 20 years. It might be likened to an irregularly spaced 
chromatic scale, with a flurry of notes played at one end, tapering off to a point where the 
pitches are spaced wide apart, and used to play an occasional note.  
 
Tempo     
 
The concept of democratisation jurisprudence in no way denies the fact that constitutional 
courts in mature democracies hand down decisions of fundamental importance to the polity, 
concerning the electoral system, separation of powers issues, and so on. The US Supreme 
Court, for instance, will soon hear a case, Evenwel v Abbott, concerning the constitutional 
meaning of ‘one man, one vote’, which could transform the political power of different voting 
districts.418 However, these tend to be rare decisions, punctuating the general role of the court 
in ‘fine-tuning’ the constitutional order. This is in stark contrast to constitutional courts in new 
democracies, where, due to the presence of a new constitutional text, decisions concerning the 
very fundaments of the constitutional order are made on a frequent basis. To use a metaphor 
common to democratisation theory and transitional justice scholarship,419 the court in a new 
democracy is required to simultaneously build and navigate the ship, whereas its counterpart 
in an established democracy is generally required to simply navigate the ship, making minor, 
and occasionally major, modifications as it sails. It is important to stress that institutional 
design can play a part in the immediacy with which the Court can act to address deficiencies 
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in the legal order: a system with a supreme court may require matters to wend their way through 
the appeals process before final adjudication by that court; a Kelsenian court, by contrast, is 
usually able to address matters relatively quickly. 
 
Context      
 
We canvassed above the main differences between the context of a mature democracy and a 
new democracy by reference to the constitutional context, political context and institutional 
context. It is worth recalling from Chapter One the more basic point that the context of a new 
democracy is paradigmatically characterised by an inordinate pace of change, relative to a 
mature democracy, across multiple planes: political, economic, social and–most importantly 
for our purposes–constitutional and legal. This period of intense flux differs from state to state, 
but persists for many years, even in what are commonly perceived as the shortest periods of 
‘consolidation’ (in the CEE states). Thus, whereas constitutional courts in long-established 
democracies are faced with issues of fundamental importance to the constitutional order 
infrequently, in an overall context of stability, constitutional courts in new democracies are 
faced frequently with questions which cut to the foundations of the constitutional order, in a 
context of overall instability.   
The level of transformation required in the new democracy depends, to a significant 
extent, on the regime that preceded it. Building democracy from the ashes of a short-lived 
military dictatorship that suspends the constitution and carries out its policies without writing 
them into law will require less intensive transformation than a longer-lived military regime 
which leaves a significant legacy of authoritarian law, including an authoritarian constitution. 
Building democracy in the aftermath of long-term totalitarian rule requires perhaps the most 
effort, requiring a drastic change not only in governance modalities, but in the entire economic, 
political and social ordering of society, the nature of the State and its relationship with the 
people. 
 
Content      
 
When one surveys the breadth of matters decided upon by constitutional courts in new 
democracies, it is clear that not all their decisions concern matters central to the construction 
of the essentials of a democratic constitutional order. A useful approach is to proceed from the 
insight that constitutions in new democracies have both an entrenchment and disentrenchment 
function, discussed above, and the observation in Chapter One that constitutional courts are 




of what Vicki Jackson calls ‘incremental constitutionalism’. The court is, in this way, required 
to not only ‘entrench’ the new constitution and to construct a new constitutional order, but to 
‘disentrench’ the pre-existing constitutional order. Its role therefore has both constructive and 
destructive aspects. 
Recalling that a court’s democracy-building task lies in constructing the essentials of a 
democratic order, a number of points are clear as regards entrenchment of the new 
constitution. Not everything a court does in entrenching the new order is central to that task. 
It is important to emphasise here the distinction made in Chapter One between democracy 
and justice, and that the framework for ‘consolidation of democracy’ elaborated in that chapter 
requires relatively minimal democratic structures to be in place for a democracy to be 
considered consolidated. A democracy is consolidated if it provides basic protection to 
expressive, associative and information rights, undergirding a functioning and inclusive system 
of electoral competition. These rights are counted, time and again, across scholarship, legal 
instruments and policy documents, as core democratic rights.420 Of course, as Walker notes, 
“even within these core categories, hard questions arise about how far we should go.”421  
It is not possible here to resolve that question. It is perhaps more helpful to approach 
the matter in a negative sense. The court will not succeed in its task as democracy-builder if it 
fails to vindicate core democratic rights and to elaborate expansive interpretations of their 
scope; subject to their delimitation where used as a means to subvert others’ rights or seek to 
threaten, in a real sense, the existence of the democratic order. The court will fail in its task if 
it allows arbitrary or disproportionate restrictions on access to the electoral arena; such as an 
unjustifiably high electoral threshold to gain representation in parliament. The court will fail in 
its task if it does not robustly address potential re-emergence of authoritarianism, including, in 
particular, attempts to accrete power at one site and to subvert the functional division of State 
power.  
Taken together with the protection of core democratic rights, the court’s task might be 
characterised as assisting in the construction of a democratic public sphere; that is, a significant 
zone of freedom for individual citizens, civil society organisations and political actors to engage 
in meaningful deliberation concerning key questions and challenges for the democratic 
community. This includes the ability to hold those in power accountable for their decisions, 
without fear of reprisal. Evidently, this framework excludes many other rights; including social 
and economic rights. Recalling again the distinction between democracy and justice, while 
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protection of core democratic rights are incompatible with authoritarian government, 
historical and contemporary states show that social and economic rights can be accorded 
extensive protection in undemocratic regimes (e.g. the right to health in Cuba). 
As regards disentrenchment of the prior regime, four key functions might be suggested. 
First, the court must articulate the relationship, and the extent of rupture, between the new 
constitutional order and the old. A focus on legal continuity can diminish the impact of the 
new constitution, while a focus on rupture tends to permit the court to take more robust 
stances to protect and develop the new democratic order.  
Second, the court must address the validity of law carried over from the previous regime. 
With the adoption of a new democratic constitution in a post-authoritarian state the legal 
system becomes a normative chimera overnight. The new or revised constitution sets out a 
framework which, typically, asserts the democratic nature of the state, affirms a separation of 
powers, and enshrines fundamental rights guarantees; a sort of blueprint for the new 
democratic order which the court must somehow bring to life. Yet, invariably, a significant 
residuum of repressive laws remains in place from the previous regime, which are antithetical 
to any democratic system, accompanied often by repressive attitudes among democratically 
elected actors, who may–and often do–view such laws as useful. Representing a particularly 
problematic example of Luigi Ferrajoli’s conflict between “the constitutional ought and the 
legislative is”,422 the status to be accorded to such laws, and in particular, the way in which 
incompatible pre-constitutional laws might be addressed, is a central question which has to be 
faced early in the life of a post-authoritarian regime; one which is not faced by courts in mature 
democracies. Addressing authoritarian-era law evidently does not imply its wholesale 
deracination or extirpation, or a rejection of all prior law. Such an approach would be 
impossible without bringing the ship of state to a halt. Rather, it necessitates a reordering, a 
re-evaluation and, occasionally, a rejection of certain elements. The use of presidential decrees 
to legislate, for example, might still be allowed, but subjected to much stricter parameters than 
under the previous authoritarian regime.  
Third, the court must address transitional justice questions; which often focus on the 
constitutionality of prosecutions against actors from the previous regime and ‘legacy’ cases 
concerning fundamental rights violations committed under the previous regime. This, in 
particular, places a court in the precarious position of judging the balance of power between 
the old and new orders. 
 




Finally, while engaging in entrenchment and disentrenchment, the court must mediate 
its own role and place in the new democratic order, in a context where a true division of state 
power is nascent and fragile. Landmark decisions delineating the court’s jurisdiction would be 
included–for example, the elaboration of a ‘political questions’ doctrine (whether explicit or 
not). Case-law concerning constitutional crises, such as impeachment or an impasse between 
political powers, would also be key. 
 
Methodology   
 
There has been much discussion in recent years of the global citation by constitutional courts 
of their peers’ jurisprudence in other states, as well as the decisions of international courts and 
adjudicative bodies. Courts will look outside their own system to discover common principles 
of law, address gaps and ambiguities, to refer to solutions that have worked in other states, to 
dispel local fears concerning the consequences of a particular solution to a legal problem, or 
when the law before the court finds its roots in international law.423 In new democracies the 
characteristic deficiencies and innovations in the new legal system drive courts toward greater 
reliance on external case-law.  
First, Johanna Kalb argues that constitutional courts in new democracies engage in 
‘strategic’ citation of the case-law of foreign constitutional courts and international courts 
(especially regional human rights courts) to bolster their adjudicative role.424 This is seen in the 
comparative case-study in Chapter Four, with references to both foreign and international 
jurisprudence in key case-law of the Brazilian Supreme Court and the Tanzanian superior 
courts, for instance. Cosmopolitan ‘enthusiasm’, viewed in this way, is underpinned by highly 
instrumentalist motives. Drawing on external jurisprudence allows the court to place its 
decisions in a wider context and, to some extent, transcend its problematic of ‘embeddedness’ 
in the domestic order, by tethering itself to transnational norms and perspectives, and 
emphasising that its decisions are not arbitrary or self-serving. 
Second, such citation serves the functional purpose of seeking solutions in the absence 
of a pre-existing corpus of case-law. Compared to the constitutional courts of post-war 
Western Europe, the courts of the third wave of democratisation have been able to draw on a 
considerable ‘acquis jurisprudentiel’ from courts operating in previous (or ongoing) 
democratisation processes. This is seen, for instance, in Brazilian judges’ reference to German, 
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Italian and Spanish case-law in addressing the status of authoritarian-era law in the new 
constitutional order, in the case-study presented in Chapter Four.  Institutional form can be 
key in this regard. Unlike Kelsenian courts, which are generally limited to ‘space travel’ through 
comparative analysis of foreign and international jurisprudence, supreme courts retained into 
the democratic era can also engage in ‘time travel’ by drawing on previous decisions of the 
court. This can have a significant impact on the mode and robustness of ‘democratisation 
jurisprudence’; as seen in the Brazilian case-study in Chapter Four.  
Third, the strong influence of international law on the content of ‘third wave’ 
constitutions, and the status attached to international law in those constitutions, tends toward 
a reflexive reliance on international law when interpreting the new constitution. It is 
particularly evident in references to international law for the purpose of providing a form of 
legal continuity when negotiating the move from one legal order to another. An example is 
Korbely v Hungary425 concerning the prosecution of military officers who took part in quelling 
the Hungarian uprising of 1956. A law permitting such prosecutions was held to be valid 
insofar as they would be based on violation of the prohibition of crimes against humanity in 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which form the core of international humanitarian law, rather 
than the creation of a retroactive crime in domestic law.426 
 
2.3 THE SHAPE OF DOMESTIC DEMOCRATISATION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
On the basis of the literature as a whole, democratisation jurisprudence might therefore be 
viewed as involving eight core strains of activity, which may be characterised as falling within 
three inter-related dimensions: 
 
(i) Facilitating the Creation of a Democratic Public Sphere 
1. Upholding core democratic rights 
2. Shaping an inclusive electoral system 
3. Curbing the re-emergence of authoritarianism 
 
(ii) Mediating the Shift from an Undemocratic to Democratic Order 
4. Articulating the relationship between the old and new constitutional 
order 
5. Addressing/eliminating authoritarian legislation 
6. Addressing key transitional justice questions 
 
(iii) Carving out a Role for the Court in the New Democratic Order 
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7. Delineating the Court’s jurisdiction 
8. Addressing crises 
 
A number of clarifications are required here. First, these tasks are not viewed as 
autonomous and hermetically sealed categories. For example, within the first dimension, 
striking down a law seeking to repress public protests would not only fall under category (1) 
concerning core democratic rights, but also category (3) by curbing the emergence of 
authoritarianism. There is also no strict separation across the dimensions, broadly reflecting 
the fact that the roles of entrenchment and disentrenchment are intertwined. As we will see in 
Chapter Four, for instance, addressing violations of the separation of powers can entail the 
entrenchment function of articulating the nature of that separation in the democratic 
constitution, alongside the disentrenchment function of articulating the relationship between 
the old and the new constitutional order.   
Second, this is a maximal list. Not all constitutional courts in new democracies would 
fulfil all of these tasks; and, certainly, the jurisprudence of different courts would contain 
different emphases on different categories. For instance, where the new democratic 
government moves to repeal the worst authoritarian laws, this saves the court from having to 
address challenges to those laws. In addition, the presence and openness of an individual 
complaint procedure would tend to affect the number of rights challenges. The presence of a 
supreme electoral court will reduce the constitutional court’s ability to shape the rules of the 
electoral system. However, the framework appears sufficiently flexible to accommodate such 
differences.  
Third, there is no suggestion here that the constitutional court in a new democracy is 
entirely self-aware in the elaboration of its democratisation jurisprudence. However, an 
awareness of the particular context of democratisation may be discerned in some decisions, 
based on close textual analysis.  
Fourth, as indicated in Chapter Two, democratisation jurisprudence can hamper as well 
as help democratisation, and the framework permits such instances to be more clearly 
identified. 
Fifth, there is no suggestion that the framework elaborated above can be considered 
definitive. Indeed, given the problematic and prismatic nature of democratisation and 
democracy, discussed in Chapter One, no doubt the framework is open on all flanks to 
criticism: its exclusion of social and economic rights, for example; or its inability to precisely 




Finally, in selecting the democratisation jurisprudence of any given constitutional court, 
a strong tension between what can be generalised and what is context-specific has to be 
accommodated: veering unduly towards the former would lead to an excessively stylised, 
ahistorical account of the democratisation case-law of a given court, sacrificing resonance with 
reality for analytical clarity or neatness. Veering too far towards the latter would leave simply 
a single-state account, of limited application to other states. 
 
2.4 THE IMPACT OF DESIGN 
 
As discussed briefly in the Introduction, constitutional courts in new democracies exhibit 
considerable diversity. Key factors affecting a constitutional court’s effectiveness include: (i) 
the nature of the constitutional text (e.g. length, indeterminacy, legitimacy); (ii) the structure of 
the court, its membership, even its location; (iii) guarantees of judicial independence; (iv) the 
mechanisms of review (abstract, concrete, a priori and/or a posteriori); (v) the effect of 
constitutional court decisions (whether advisory, inter partes or erga omnes); and (vi) the court’s 
ability to control its docket.427 These can all have powerful path dependent effects on the 
court’s ability to positively impact on the democratisation process. 
The nature of the powers and jurisdiction granted to a court appear to be particularly 
important: Lach and Sadurski, for example, count the competence to review legislation as the 
most crucial power of the courts428 and also identify “a clear correlation between the existence 
of an activist and powerful constitutional court and the availability of a direct complaint 
procedure”,429 with the very open access to the Hungarian and Colombian constitutional 
courts viewed as a factor in their unusually assertive jurisprudence.430 Certain powers are 
viewed as having undesirable results; for example, the power of abstract review of the 
constitutionality of Bills can tend to ‘politicise’ the court’s work, requiring it to effectively act 
as a third legislative chamber when opposition politicians seek review to frustrate the 
government’s legislative agenda–as seen in Romania, among other states.431 By contrast, the 
range of powers accorded to a court does not appear to be a particularly important factor.432      
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Although Kelsenian courts may carry certain advantages, it is not possible to state simply 
that they are superior to supreme courts as a form of ‘democratisation technology’. Supreme 
courts often avail of procedural rules to give priority to constitutional issues, and many 
Kelsenian courts have no direct complaint procedure for individuals. Matters such as tenure 
affect the shape of jurisprudence in a new democracy. Supreme court judges tend to enjoy life 
tenure, whereas Kelsenian court judges often have fixed-term limits, leading to more frequent 
changes in court membership and heightened capacity for jurisprudential shifts.433 Ultimately, 
even with the best selection methods, guarantees of judicial independence and funding, there 
is no predicting what a court will do in the new democratic setting.  
 
3 REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS: BUILDING DEMOCRACY 
FROM OUTSIDE 
 
Regional human rights evidently approach the deficiencies of a new democracy from an 
entirely different perspective and institutional setting, as compared to domestic constitutional 
courts. The most fundamental is, of course, that such courts are external to the state and do 
not derive their claim to power from the constitution. This section attempts to capture the key 
differences.  
 
3.1 REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS: KELSENIAN COURTS WRIT LARGE? 
 
Since the 1990s regional human rights courts have increasingly been likened by scholars to 
domestic constitutional courts, differentiating them from classic international courts, which 
operate solely within the realm of international law, such as the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). 434   Alec Stone Sweet, for instance, has vigorously argued the case for viewing the 
European Court of Human Rights as a ‘constitutional court’ of sorts, on the basis that the 
scope of the Court’s authority is comparable to that of domestic constitutional courts and its 
use of similar techniques and methodologies to such courts. This is in a context where the 
European Convention has been ‘constitutionalised’ through the combined effect of Protocol 
11 and the incorporation of the Convention in the legal orders of the Contracting Parties, with 
the Strasbourg Court accorded dominance of the Convention system.435 Stone Sweet sums up 
his argument as “if a duck-like creature looks, walks and quacks like a duck, then…even if it is 
 
433 See, e.g., Scheppele’s treatment of the less activist Hungarian constitutional court after the departure of 
President Sólyom:‘The New Hungarian’ (n25).  
434 Although even that court is discussed in constitutional terms: see, e.g., MSM Amr, The Role of the 
International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 
p.317. 
435 A Stone Sweet, ‘On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court of Human Rights as 




not really a duck, I am going to call it one.”436 He is not alone: actors within the Court have 
described it as a “quasi-constitutional court for the whole of Europe”,437 and the same language 
is also used in reference to the Inter-American and African human rights courts: Néstor Pedro 
Sagües, for instance, describes the Court in San José as “a supranational human rights 
constitutional court.”438 
It is true that regional human rights courts resemble domestic constitutional courts 
(particularly Kelsenian courts) in many ways. They are the final interpreters of a text that forms 
the foundation of a normative order; adjudicate on a wide range of matters key to domestic 
social and political orders; order relief for wronged parties; and in doing so constrain the 
exercise of political power–the very essence of constitutional law. They can also perform 
symbolic functions: Buyse and Hamilton, for instance, assert in the European context that 
accession to regional organisations and ratification of treaties such as the European 
Convention system serve “symbolic and legal markers which reflect key steps in a transition 
process” (which they use in the ‘loose’ sense of transitional justice).439  
Indeed, the likeness to constitutional courts is in some ways most striking as regards the 
Inter-American Court, given its seven-member membership structure (compared to the 
European Court’s sprawling membership); its more developed advisory role compared to the 
European Court; its power to engage in abstract a priori review of national laws (albeit rarely 
used); and the absence of any ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, which allows the European 
Court to accord states a measure of discretion regarding rights protection. It also evinces a 
tendency towards a ‘monist’ approach concerning serious rights violations; and a tendency to 
order states to take specific remedial steps, unlike the European Court, which tends to leave a 
freer hand to states. The European Court’s approach has led some, such as Andreas Føllesdal, 
to argue that its review function constitutes ‘weak’ review.440 However, this is a minority view. 
Although European Court judgments do open up a form of ‘dialogue’ between the errant State 
and the Court as regards implementation, the Court retains the ‘final say’ as to the validity of 
laws as against the European Convention, which is the hallmark of strong judicial review, as 
defined in the Introduction. 
 
436 Ibid., p.5. 
437 See, e.g., L Garlicki, ‘Judicial Deliberations: The Strasbourg Perspective’ in Huls, Adams & Bonhoff 
(n359) pp.390-391. 
438 NP Sagües, ‘Obligaciones Internacionales y Control de Convencionalidad’ 8 Estudios Constitucionales 
117 (2010) at 126; cited in O Ruiz-Chiriboga, ‘The Conventionality Control: Examples of (Un)Successful 
Experiences in Latin America’ 3 Inter-American & European Human Rights Journal 200 (2010) at 205. 
439 Buyse & Hamilton (n28) p.287. 




Ultimately, as observed by Roel de Lange, any international human rights court in truth 
occupies an odd half-way house between a standard international court and a domestic 
constitutional court: it certainly has some of the functions and attributes of the latter, but has 
“a totally different jurisdiction [and] a totally different ‘mission’”.441 Regional human rights 
courts are not simply constitutional courts covering a larger territorial area. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the Council of Europe, the OAS and the African Union cannot be likened to 
federal entities, unlike the quasi-federal nature of the European Union. As even Stone Sweet 
acknowledges, the European Court does not possess the formal power to invalidate legal 
acts;442 nor do the other two regional courts.  
More crucially, the remit of such courts extends to the protection of human rights alone. 
While this positions them at the centre of many disputes at the domestic level, and is a function 
of the utmost importance, it does not fully mirror the wider remit of domestic constitutional 
courts, which are tasked also with addressing, inter alia, separation of powers disputes (both 
inter-branch and centre-periphery) and ensuring the coherence of the entire constitutional 
order, often by striking difficult balances between constitutional principles and rights, or the 
exigencies of the overall political setting and rights protection. An international convention on 
human rights, no matter how much we squint, is not equivalent to a domestic constitution.  
Rather than focusing on Stone Sweet’s ducks, then, it might be more useful to conceive 
of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts as resembling Lapiths and Centaurs: 
while both look the same when viewed from certain angles, a fuller view reveals many glaring 
dissimilarities.  
 
3.2 THE DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIONAL DEMOCRAT-
ISATION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
In considering the distinguishing features of regional democratisation jurisprudence in light of 





Unlike a domestic constitutional court, which ordinarily can only begin its democratisation 
jurisprudence after the transition to electoral democracy, a regional human rights court’s 
democratisation jurisprudence will often transcend multiple transition processes and will often 
 
441 R de Lange, ‘Judicial Deliberations, Legitimacy and Human Rights Adjudication’ in Huls, Adams & 
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be required to adjudicate in a regional context containing both democratic and non-democratic 
states (see Fig. 3.1 below). Unlike the domestic context, a regional court’s democratisation 
jurisprudence is potentially not time-barred: if even one state in the system is under 
authoritarian rule or in the early decades of a democratisation process, this will affect the 




Allied to the above, the frequency of a regional human rights court’s democratisation 
jurisprudence will depend on the regional context; in particular, the democratisation 
trajectories of the states subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. For instance, a preponderance of 
mature democracies, or at least consolidated democracies, in the region subject to the court 
would lead to a reduced frequency; with the converse also true. It is worthwhile emphasising 
here, too, that the mission of a regional human rights court and access rules–particularly the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies–mean that there is a considerable time-lag in its 
interventions. It is unlike a human rights commission, for instance, which can address matters 
almost contemporaneously. An example is the Inter-American Commission’s report on rights 
protection in Peru, following an on-site visit in 1998, which played a part in Alberto Fujimori’s 
decision to resign as president, having seized power through an ‘auto-golpe’ or self-coup in 
1992.443 
 
Context    
 
Recalling discussion above of the constitutional, political and institutional context in which 
domestic constitutional courts operate, the context faced by a regional human rights court is 
arguably more complex. The political context involves not only overlapping planes of 
transformation (e.g. economic, political, legal) at the domestic level, but varying levels and 
paces of change, across multiple sites. Each of the regional human rights courts has jurisdiction 
over both democratic and non-democratic states (see Fig. 3.1 below). This strongly influences 
the type of cases that come before each court and, in turn, the shape of its jurisprudence. The 
mix of regimes drives jurisprudence in certain directions: a preponderance of new democracies 
in Latin America tends toward closer supervision by the regional court; a mix of mature and 
new democracies in Europe requires a difficult balancing act; and a majority of undemocratic 
regimes coupled with a minority of new democracies in Africa places the African Court in a 
difficult position.  
 




The territorial jurisdiction of the court and the cultural homogeneity of the region is also 
a factor. The European Court has the most extensive geographic spread, stretching across an 
extremely diverse set of nations from Iceland to Russia, and with all new democracies in the 
region party to the system. The Inter-American Court operates in the most homogenous 
region, being, in essence, a human rights tribunal for Central and South America, with only 
one non-democratic state (Haiti) under its purview. 444  The African Court has the least 
contiguous jurisdictional territory, confined to pockets in the west, south and east of the 
continent, containing new democracies as diverse as South Africa and Ghana, and a variety of 
troubled non-democracies, including Burundi, Mali and Nigeria. 
Unlike a constitutional court, which is involved in the wholesale construction of the 
constitutional order, a regional human rights court’s role is at once both narrower and broader; 
addressing solely rights issues in each domestic order, but in the process shaping a region-wide 
normative system regarding common problems. A constitutional court can tailor its decisions 
to the domestic context, and can modify its approach as democratisation progresses (or 
otherwise). By contrast, a regional human rights court must, in its case-law, speak first to the 
respondent State, but also more widely to a community of 20 or more states. It has, in this way, 
less room to manoeuvre for taking a deferential approach to the particularities of a given State, 
lest this set a precedent that would hamper the Court in addressing other States in the future. 
As Sturgess and Chubb so aptly put it: “[International courts] have to tread a much thinner 
line through many more places.”445 
In addition, whereas a domestic constitutional court builds its democratisation 
jurisprudence in relation to one bounded political community, a regional court has a 
differential impact across its region, depending on the point at which a new democracy submits 
to its jurisdiction, the number of cases brought before the court, and the capacity and 
inclination of civil society actors to use petitions as an avenue for achieving political reform 
and justice. The independence and quality of the domestic constitutional court’s case-law will 
also affect the number of petitions brought to the regional level. 
In the Latin American context, for instance, a quantitative analysis of the Inter-American 
Court’s case-law reveals that some states have appeared much more regularly before the Court 
than others. While Peru and Venezuela have have had many appearances before the Court (34 
and 16 merits decisions respectively), most states have been before the Court a lot less 
 
444 The Court currently has jurisdiction over 20 of the 35 OAS Member States. Some states have ratified the 
ACHR but not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction (e.g. Jamaica), and an important minority, including the 
United States and Canada and many Caribbean states, have not ratified the Convention at all. The only 
Caribbean adherents are the Dominican Republic and Barbados. 




frequently, with many the subject of a mere handful of merits judgments. While the ‘top five’ 
states (Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and Ecuador) have had cases before the Court 
fairly consistently over the past two decades or so, a number of states have experienced long 
periods between appearances (e.g. Haiti, Suriname) and the two hegemons of Latin America, 
Brazil and Mexico, have been notable latecomers to the Court; Brazil in 2006, and Mexico in 
2008.446  
At the institutional level, regional human rights courts face both advantages and 
disadvantages in comparison to domestic constitutional courts. On the one hand, they tend to 
encounter, if anything, more intense accusations concerning a lack of democratic legitimacy447 
and their separation from any single democratisation process renders it difficult for the court 
to assess the ‘democratisation needs’ and particularities of a given state–to ‘judge’ 
democratisation, in the words of our title.  
On the other hand, being an external actor brings distinct advantages. It allows the court 
to remain separate from the upheaval found in a new democracy. Unlike a supreme court 
retained after a democratic transition it is not tainted by prior operation within the non-
democratic regime. Also, unlike a domestic court, its externality allows it to transcend the 
normative straitjacket of a constitutional court, as guardian and constituted power of the 
constitution. It thus has a freer hand to recommend amendments to the domestic constitution 
and, crucially, to address dubious constitutional amendment processes under the practice of 
‘abusive constitutionalism’. 
Externality is evidently not immunity from hostile reactions. Regional human rights 
courts can be vulnerable to damaging institutional shaping, with recurrent challenges to the 
African and Inter-American courts448 and the fate of the SADC Tribunal, discussed in Chapter 
Two, redolent of similar attacks at the domestic level.  
 
Content     
 
In section 2.2 above we conceptualised the content of domestic democratisation jurisprudence 
as relating to eight core interrelated strains of activity, across three broad dimensions: 
development of a democratic public sphere; mediating the shift from an undemocratic to a 
democratic regime; and carving out a role for itself in the new democratic order. The 
 
446 This quantitative analysis is based on all decisions of the Court in contentious cases since 1988, listed on 
its website at: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/jurisprudencia>.  





democratisation jurisprudence of regional human rights courts may also be viewed within these 
three dimensions.  
However, the institutional setting of a regional court fundamentally changes the way in 
which it approaches these tasks, its capacity to effect change on the ground, and the 
justifications it provides for its role. It does not operate to entrench an entirely new 
constitutional order, or to act as a central mediator between the old and new constitutional 
order in any given state as a domestic court does, but rather at elaborating a pan-regional 
minimum standard of rights protection. There is no one constitutional order that must be 
disentrenched, and so the court must mediate a relationship between its international ‘bill of 
rights’ and multiple pre-existing authoritarian constitutional orders, which have no direct 
relationship to the bill of rights. Unlike a new democratic constitution in a post-authoritarian 
setting, the human rights convention is not a successor to the old constitution but an external 
and alternative normative source.  
Regarding institution-building, the Court (depending on its vintage) will have to 
delineate its jurisdiction, decide on its procedure, and negotiate how it views its role in the 
system, which is dependent on how it views the claims of state sovereignty, its relationship 
with other bodies (if any) in the system, and its institutional security in the region. Certain 
doctrinal developments, such as the European Court’s margin of appreciation doctrine, can 
have a significant impact on the Court’s jurisprudence, providing greater flexibility as well as 
inconsistency. The eschewal of such a doctrine by the other courts, in turn, renders it more 
difficult to provide tailor-made solutions for the various states subject to their jurisdiction. 
How a regional court addresses crises–institutional, political or constitutional–is also 
important. The European Court’s unmanageable workload has been one factor driving its 
move to ‘constitutional’ rather than ‘individual’ justice through the pilot judgment procedure, 
discussed in Chapter Two. It has also been required to bring considerable political delicacy to 
bear on the political attacks against its jurisdiction, from states such as the UK and the 
Netherlands, in order to retain the authority to tackle problems in new democracies. The Inter-
American Court has had to navigate attempts to escape its jurisdiction in cases before it for 
judgment (e.g. by Peru in the 1990s449), explicit and indirect challenges against its authority by 
domestic courts (e.g. Brazilian and Venezuelan courts) and attempts by political actors to 
subordinate the Inter-American human rights protection system through ostensible reform; a 
regional variant of the abusive constitutionalism seen at the state level.450 The African Court’s 
 





unexpectedly strident tone in its first judgment in 2013 may be related to the political cowing 
of the SADC Tribunal and East African Court of Justice in 2012–as a more prominent court, 
there would be a higher political cost in dismantling it. 
 
Methodology    
 
In a similar manner to the drivers of a particular adjudicative methodology at the domestic 
level, at the regional level human rights courts refer to the jurisprudence of other regional 
human rights courts and international adjudicative bodies (e.g. the Human Rights Committee, 
the International Labour Committee) as a ‘gap-filling’ mechanism, to bolster the force of their 
decisions and as a way of interacting with the wider normative order of international law.451 As 
well as space travel, human rights courts in the Inter-American and African systems can also 
engage in time travel to a limited extent, by drawing on what is often a considerable corpus of 
decisions by the regional commission on human rights. For example, the Inter-American 
Court’s tendency toward a monist approach echoes the Inter-American Commission’s 
development of a ‘Fourth Instance’ doctrine, leaving no deference to states when serious 
human rights violations are under consideration.452   
Regional human rights courts also draw on domestic constitutional law: sometimes 
explicitly, such as the European Court’s development of a German-style doctrine of ‘militant 
democracy’, mentioned in Chapter Two; sometimes more obliquely, such as the Inter-
American Court’s move toward a US-style doctine of ‘actual malice’, which sets a high standard 











451 This is not to suggest that they always agree: Sweeney (n28), for example, at p.108 notes divergence 
between the European Court and the Human Rights Committee concerning property restitution schemes in 
post-Communist Europe.  
452 See Rodríguez-Pinzón (n28).  
453 See E Carter, ‘Actual Malice in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 18 Communication Law and 















7. Costa Rica 
8. Dominican Rep. 
9. Ecuador 






























































































12. Burkina Faso 
13. Burundi 
14. Côte d'Ivoire 
15. Gabon 















































































































3.3 THE  IMPACT OF DESIGN 
 
Like constitutional courts, a number of design factors affect the operation and effectiveness 
of regional human rights courts.  
 
Membership and powers 
 
The European Court’s 47 judges and institutional configuration of chambers renders its 
jurisprudence less stable and predictable than the much smaller panels in the Inter-American 
and African Court. The Inter-American Court has made much more significant use of its 
advisory powers than the other two courts (which are wider than those found in the European 
system), and has employed its reparations power expansively to encompass not just 
compensation and the amending of domestic law, but also the investigation of crime and 
symbolic acts such as the erection of monuments (although, as noted in Chapter Two, 
compliance with such orders is low). In addition, the European Court is the only court fully 
open to direct individual petitions: individuals may not petition the Inter-American Court 
directly and such petitions require a State declaration in the African system, which only a small 
minority of courts have made thus far. 
 
The nature of the regional bill of rights 
 
The human rights conventions in each region also betray significant differences of relevance 
here. The European Convention on Human Rights, as a creature of its time, focuses almost 
exclusively on civil and political rights and limits the grounds upon which specific rights can 
be restricted. Article 17 ECHR, which prohibits abuse of Convention rights to attack or 
destroy the rights of others, has also proven useful to the Court in a number of cases; allowing 
it to deny protection to extreme right-wing views, for instance.454 The American Convention 
on Human Rights is drafted in light of bitter experience: for instance, Article 13 not only 
guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship but also prohibits “indirect” means 
of restricting the right; akin to an international echo of the German constitutional court’s 
principle of a ‘restriction on restrictions’, discussed in Chapter Two. The central African text, 
the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, contains open-ended ‘clawback’ clauses 
(e.g. “subject to law and order”, “within the law”), which allow states to restrict the Convention 
rights to the maximum extent permitted by domestic law.  
 




Each text also protects core democratic rights differently: the ECHR (Art. 15) permits 
derogation from all rights (except the right to life, prohibition on torture, slavery and unlawful 
punishment) and protects a basic right to regular elections in Protocol 1 to the Convention. 
Article 23 ACHR, by contrast, enshrines a non-derogable broader right to participate in 
government, including the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and vote, and 
emphasises that the Convention does not preclude the recognition of any right “inherent in 
the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government” 
(Art.29). The African Charter guarantees no electoral or democratic participation rights. 
However, since 2001 both the AU and the OAS have adopted separate charters–cited at the 
start of Chapter One–that commit states to a ‘thick’ form of democracy, including respect for 
rights, free and fair elections, the separation of powers and citizen participation in public affairs; 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter going as far as recognising a “right to democracy” 
(Art.1) and a State obligation to “promote and defend” it.455 
To a certain extent, the institutional differences among the courts and the lynchpin 
instruments they interpret are smoothed out by significant cross-fertilisation in their case-law, 
with each court cherry-picking from the jurisprudence of the other. The Inter-American and 
African Court’s free speech jurisprudence, for instance, draws heavily on European case-law,456 
while the African Court has mitigated the impact of ‘clawback’ clauses by adopting European-
style proportionality analysis. 457  In a similar manner to the domestic context, we see the 
elaboration of another form of ‘acquis jurisprudentiel’, elaborated by, and mutually enriched 
by, the court in each region. 
We now have a better sense of the different ways in which domestic and regional courts 
engage in democracy-building through democratisation jurisprudence. How, then, do the 
courts at both levels interact? 
 
4 HOW THE COURTS AT EACH LEVEL INTERACT 
 
Thus far, we have examined the democracy-building roles of the courts at each level separately. 
However, it is important to emphasise here that democratisation jurisprudence at the domestic 
and regional levels are inter-linked. The case-law of domestic constitutional courts may be 
thought to act as a primary source of normativity in the democratisation process, while the 
 
455 Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001; and African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 
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456 See, e.g., A Úbeda de Torres, ‘Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
A Comparison with the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights’ 10 Human Rights Brief 6 
(2003); and Konaté v Burkina Faso (n373). 




jurisprudence of regional human rights courts presents a secondary site of normativity. The 
latter impacts on the democratisation process and constitutional regime construction in a very 
different manner, depending on the openness of a given state, legal system and its 
constitutional court to regional oversight. Key here are the power and independence of the 
domestic constitutional court; the openness of that court to external jurisprudence; and even 
issues such as the familiarity of domestic judges with the regional human rights system. In 
some cases, however, the regional human rights court assumes the place of primary site of 
normativity; chiefly, where recourse to the domestic constitutional court concerning an alleged 
violation has been blocked or is not open. 
In other words, the majority of the new democratic constitutional order will generally 
be hammered out on the anvil of domestic court decisions; with the regional human rights 
court playing a subsidiary and supportive role. However, where domestic reliance on regional 
case-law in interpreting the constitutional text is pronounced, or where the domestic court is 
inaccessible or lacks independence, we see a more intense blurring of the boundaries between 
the two. As discussed in Chapter One, it can be hard to distinguish international law from 
constitutional law. Indeed, we might say that, in some domestic decisions we see international 
law as domestic constitutional law.  
There is, then, no strict separation of the two bodies of jurisprudence. In contrast to 
domestic democratisation jurisprudence, regional democratisation jurisprudence might be 
viewed as impacting in three ways, and is by turns alternative, internal and external to the core 
site of domestic case-law (these categories will become clearer in Chapter Four):  
 
(i) reception, whereby the constitutional court, voluntarily, in its own jurisprudence, 
affirms and applies norms elaborated by the international human rights court in 
its case-law; 
(ii) imposition, whereby the regional human rights court holds that a decision of a 
constitutional court, which is key to the democratisation process, has failed to 
vindicate one of the rights in the international human rights convention, or 
where it enjoins domestic courts to adhere to its jurisprudence more broadly; 
and 
(iii) interaction, whereby divergence in the case-law of a constitutional court and the 
international human rights court opens a space, a critical arena, of dialogic 
interaction in which the courts tussle for normative supremacy, or, if possible, 




4.1 INTER-LEVEL INTERACTION AS A COHERENT SYSTEM 
 
In existing scholarship the dominant portrayal of the relationship between constitutional 
courts and regional and human rights courts in new democracies is one based on partnership: 
a mixture of ‘reception’ and ‘interaction’ in the schema above. In Europe Peter Leuprecht has 
suggested:  
A fruitful dialogue has developed between the Strasbourg institutions and domestic courts 
whose respective case law mutually support and enrich each other. 
Scholars in Latin America have begun to go beyond the language of mere ‘dialogue’ by 
speaking of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts as a ‘structural coupling’ 
transcending their respective spheres and creating a transnational legal space. 458  Diego 
Rodríguez-Pinzón sees a “harmonic resonance” between national courts and the Inter-
American Court.459 Diego García-Sayan, similarly, suggests that the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisprudence has revitalised national judiciaries, strengthened the rule of law in various states, 
and (implicitly) democracy:460 
By accepting international standards and substantive criteria that place the rights of the individual 
at the forefront, domestic judicial systems are legitimizing and revitalizing their role and, thereby, 
that of the rule of law as a core value. 
... 
Increasingly, the highest courts of several countries of the region are taking inspiration from the 
Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence and supplementing, in a conceptual manner, their national 
circumstances with certain developments of the Inter-American Court. 
Abramovich notes that “decisions made by the organs of the [Inter-American] system 
in a particular case, in interpreting the treaties applicable to the conflict, have a heuristic value 
that transcends the victims affected in this process”.461 Certainly, it appears that the Court’s 
case-law provides not only a normative pathway for national courts to follow, legitimising bold 
decisions which they might otherwise be too timid to hand down, but a particular adjudicative 
framework which can be adopted in domestic cases which never reach the Inter-American 
system. We might characterise this aspect of the Court’s case law as a sort of ‘normative 
ellipsis’, as it provides a starting-point for national courts but leaves them to fill in the blanks 
 
458 See M Torelly, ‘Transnational Legal Process and Constitutional Engagement in Latin America: How do 
Domestic Constitutional Regimes deal with International Human Rights Law?’, Society of Legal Scholars 
(SLS) Second Graduate Conference on Latin American Law and Policy, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 7 
March 2014. 
459 Rodríguez-Pinzón (n28) p.257. 
460 García-Sayan, ‘Constitutionalism’ (n28) at 1836-1837, 1839. 
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that appear in cases before them. In doing so, it appears to strengthen the national courts’ roles 
in the construction of the democratic constitutional order. 
 
4.2 RESISTANCE, INCONSISTENCY AND DIFFERENTIAL DEFEFENCE 
 
However, some scholars are more careful in their characterisation. In Europe Sadurski speaks 
of  CEE courts and the European Court forming “de facto alliances” to pierce the veil of  the 
State – suggesting that partnership is context- and case-specific.462  The role of  domestic courts 
in acting as ‘gatekeepers’ in the reception of  international and regional law, and Krisch’s 
presentation of  a heterarchical plural legal order in Europe’s regional human rights system, 
discussed at the start of  this chapter, come to the fore here. Whereas talk of  regional orders 
as constitutional orders and structural couplings tends to reconceptualise regional judicial 
communities as something closer to a monist (geographically bounded) ‘international law-as-
federal order’, this picture of  frictionless partnership hides much nuance.  
‘Dialogue’ between the European Court of  Human Rights and domestic constitutional 
courts appears to be confined to a small number of  cases, and is limited to the courts of  
Germany and the UK having the confidence to question Strasbourg case-law.  These are merely 
two of  the forty-seven constitutional courts subject to the European Court’s jurisdiction, and 
are both located in mature democracies.463  In Latin America, the Inter-American Court’s 
‘control of  conventionality’ doctrine in particular leaves no room for domestic courts to follow 
alternative lines of  reasoning regarding certain matters (e.g. recognising the validity of  
domestic amnesty laws).464 In place of  any notion of  ‘dialogue’ or ‘normative ellipsis’, the 
Court under this doctrine simply requires constitutional courts to act as ‘marionettes’; not 
gatekeepers of  the domestic constitutional order, but foot soldiers of  the regional human 
rights order.  
Despite a prevailing presentation of harmonious partnership in the region, as discussed 
in Chapter Four we see significant resistance to the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence in 
judges’ decisions at the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, who generally avoid any citation of 
its case-law. In one of the core examples of a ‘structural coupling’, between the Inter-American 
Court and the Argentine Supreme Court, a rhetoric of submission is in fact accompanied by a 
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and Supranationalisation: Illiberal and Antidemocratic Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human 




praxis of inconsistent reception of the Court’s case-law.465 In Africa, reference to African 
Charter norms is rare466 and the African Court has not been in operation long enough to foster 
a relationship with courts at the national level. That said, both the Brazilian Supreme Court 
and various African courts evince a certain openness to international jurisprudence in general, 
including an increasing tendency to cite decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.467  
 
Differential deference based on democratic quality 
 
There is an emerging argument from various quarters for differential deference from regional 
human rights courts to constitutional courts, depending on their democratic credentials. Başak 
Çalı, for instance, argues that deference is warranted by the European Court of Human Rights 
to domestic courts, using the margin of appreciation doctrine, where there is more than one 
reasonable interpretation of Convention rights. However, he suggests that the Court should 
only accord such deference to ‘responsible’ domestic constitutional courts with a strong 
respect for the rule of law and international human rights norms, and which take Strasbourg 
jurisprudence seriously in interpreting fundamental rights. He cites by way of support the 
Strasbourg Court’s willingness to accord interpretive discretion to the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany in one case, but not to the Azeri domestic courts in another (although it 
has to be said the gravity of rights infringement in these cases is very different).468 It is unclear, 
in his analysis, where other new European democracies and their courts may lie.  
Similarly, certain scholars have begun making the case for the adoption of a margin of 
appreciation doctrine by the Inter-American Court, on the basis that its jurisdictional territory 
contains some states (e.g. Costa Rica) which have sufficient democratic credentials to be 
accorded a level of deference in how they order their affairs.469 It appears to be, like Çalı’s 
argument, a case for ‘differential deference’ from the regional human rights court. Of course, 
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from a regional court’s perspective, such an approach would have to be very carefully handled 
to avoid a hollowing out of its function, or unjustifiable inconsistency in its approach to 
different states. 
It is striking how these emerging positions, focusing on the democratic credentials of 
states, echo the debates in Europe in 1949 concerning establishment of a regional human rights 
court. As discussed in Chapter Two, the argument against such an institution then, as Pierre-
Henri Teitgen observed, was that the states to be supervised were “democratic and…deeply 
impregnated with a sense of freedom; they believe in morality and in a natural law”.470 To a 
certain extent, conflict between the domestic and regional orders is built into the very nature 
of regional oversight, and the democratic nature of the state will always play a part in calibrating 
the extent of regional oversight.  
Regional jurisprudence finding a violation of the regional bill of rights is often, though 
not always, an indirect criticism of the failings of the domestic constitutional court, or a 
recognition of its incapacity to adjudicate. Where the domestic court is unable to assert itself 
in the democratic order, due to political pressure for instance, the regional court can justify 
performing a ‘back-up’ function. It is where the domestic constitutional court enjoys sufficient 
independence and quality of decision-making that the picture is more problematic: where the 
regional court might see a hierarchical relationship, the domestic court may see a heterarchical 
relationship. Indeed, as the Brazilian context in Chapter Four demonstrates, increasing 
centrality for the domestic court in the political order can render it less, not more, receptive to 
the sharing of judicial space and constitutional supremacy. The choice between assertive and 
deferential adjudication at the domestic level has ramifications for case-law at the regional level, 
and vice versa. Assertive adjudication at both sites can become somewhat of a zero sum game, 
which can lead to debate regarding which level should have the final say. However, in this 
thesis the focus is on how this affects the overall effectiveness of courts as democracy-builders.  
 
5 THE WIDER CONTEXT: ADJUDICATION IN THREE-
DIMENSIONAL POLITICAL SPACE 
 
The above focus on the binary relationship between the courts at the regional and domestic 
level should not blind us to the reality that, even at only the judicial level, the level of interaction 
between courts is complex. We see domestic courts, in elaborating democratisation 
jurisprudence, referring to the case-law of not only foreign constitutional courts and the human 
rights court for their region, but also that of human rights courts in other regions. We see 
 




regional human rights courts referring to one another’s case-law, and drawing on domestic 
constitutional case-law. We might therefore characterise democratisation jurisprudence as the 
product of an epistemic community where norms emanating from courts in both mature and 
new democracies, as well as those elaborated by regional human rights courts, directly and 
directly influence case-law production at each judicial site. 
More widely, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, the elaboration of 
democratisation jurisprudence does not merely concern the relationships between judicial 
actors, but also an array of systemic actors at the domestic, regional and global levels, all of 
which have an impact on one another’s roles. The judicial epistemic community discussed 
above is thus merely one universe in a relational multiverse, where each judicial actor manages 
relationships with, and whose action is affected by, non-judicial actors. Kim Lane Scheppele 
talks of adjudication taking place in a ‘three-dimensional political space’. 471  She uses the 
metaphor to capture a more complex reality than the presentation of domestic and 
transnational courts’ relationships with one another as vertical, and relationships between 
domestic courts in different states as horizontal: 
Imagine playing chess on a three-dimensional chessboard where a piece from one level can 
knock out a piece from another or where a particularly important player can escape to another 
level for safety. Sometimes, moves on one level of the chessboard can be duplicated at other 
levels only after time passes. Sometimes moves on one level speed the moves on another. 
Transnational and national courts are both players in the game of transnational constitutionalism, 
but they do not exist simply in a hierarchical relationship to each other. They are somewhat 
differently positioned in this three-dimensional space with different sorts of opportunities for 
maneuver.472 
While Scheppele employs the metaphor to analyse the shifting and context-specific 
interrelationship between courts, political actors and law in the domestic, regional and global 
arenas concerning anti-terrorism law, it is useful here as a way of avoiding false binaries: i.e. 
representing relationships as simply court-court, parliament-court, State-court and so on.  
It is evidently impossible to do justice to the full complexity of the systemic context in 
which courts operate. However, three basic points may be made, which are of relevance to the 
role of courts as democracy-builders. First, the potential for clashing interpretations of law at 
the domestic and regional levels creates a certain opening for national governments to cherry-
pick between adherence to international and national law, while claiming fidelity to the rule of 
law. Second, openness in the domestic court to international law does not always stem from 
pure motives: in Argentina, for instance, reference to Inter-American jurisprudence has been 
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used as a way to circumvent constitutional provisions impeding government policy preferences, 
in a context where the Supreme Court has yet to shed its experience of successive purges by 
post-transition presidents. 473  Third, the number of actors on the chessboard, and their 
relationships to one another, have changed greatly in recent decades: key here are the shift in 
governance power from legislatures to executives, and the growing governance role of ‘the 
people’; not as a theoretical entity, but through mechanisms of direct democracy such as 
referendums.474  
The relationship between judicial power, political power and constituent power has 
therefore changed dramatically, compared to the post-war context in which the German 
Constitutional Court carved out its role.  
 
6 CONCLUSION: DIFFERENT ROLES, DIFFERENT IMPACTS 
 
In the Introduction the judicial stand-off between the Supreme Court of Brazil and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights was briefly discussed. This chapter has made the first step 
toward a deeper understanding of the overall context of that stand-off by conceptualising the 
divergent roles that constitutional courts and regional human rights courts play in new 
democracies, the differing levels of impact they tend to have on domestic democratisation 
processes, the nature of their interaction, and the complexity of the overall systemic context 
in which they interact. It has sought to underscore the signal difference between the courts at 
each level, of embeddedness and externality regarding the democratisation process. This 
fundamentally shapes the courts’ roles at each level, their capacity to act as a democracy-
builders, and their capacity to work in harmony toward that goal. In Chapter Four these 
observations are applied to Brazil as a case-study, which is ‘thickened’ by introducing 
comparative material from other jurisdictions in Latin America, Europe and Africa. 
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Democratisation Jurisprudence in Action: 




      N CHAPTER THREE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK was sketched out for 
analysing the roles of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts as ‘democracy-
builders’. This chapter utilises that framework to analyse the differing impacts of the Federal 
Supreme Court of Brazil and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Brazil’s 
democratisation process, with their divergence concerning Brazil’s Amnesty Law of 1979 a central 
point of focus. The aim is to provide concrete examples of how courts at each level operate as 
democracy-builders, how they interact, and how their interaction impacts on the democratisation 
process. This is then situated within the wider context of the post-war global model for court-
centric democratisation. Part One therefore presents the Brazilian experience, while Parts Two 
and Three provide a comparison to other states in the regional, Latin American context, and also 
to the inter-regional context, by reference to developments in Europe and Africa. This shows us 
how distinct patterns of judicial interaction recur across states and regions, and the involvement 
of different sites of constitutional authority in key cases before the courts. 
 
1 DEMOCRATISATION JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF BRAZIL SINCE 1988 
 
This section explores domestic democratisation jurisprudence by analysing the Federal Supreme 
Court of Brazil (hereinafter, ‘the Supreme Court’) since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985. The 
conceptual framework set out in Chapter Three should enable us to home in on what about the 
democratisation context has made jurisprudence in Brazil’s new democracy distinctive, as 
compared to the jurisprudence of a court in a mature democracy. First, the impact of the 




discussed. Highlighted here are the path dependent effects of Brazil’s democratic constitution of 
1988; a political context since 1988 marked by difficult economic transition, constitutional crisis 
and a desire for efficient governance; and the Court’s evolving view of its role in the new order, 
partly in reaction to institutional shaping by the political branches. Second, core examples from 
the Court’s democratisation jurisprudence since 1988 are analysed, to reveal its nature as a creature 
of time, tempo, context, content and methodology. The overall aim is to illuminate the way in 
which a constitutional court acts as a democracy-builder from within the state, before moving to 
discussion of external regional adjudication in the following Part.  
 
1.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
The constitutional, political and institutional contexts in which a court in a new democracy 
operates, discussed separately in Chapter Three, are addressed together here, revealing the ways in 
which they impact upon one another and have combined effects on the court’s role. 
First, a word about the overall context of Brazil’s transition to democracy in 1985. Brazil, 
like other new democracies of the third wave era, across world regions, defies any neat post-war 
narratives of total rupture between the old and new orders. The state has a complex relationship 
with democracy and constitutionalism, having oscillated between democratic and authoritarian rule 
throughout the twentieth century. Oligarchic government in the early decades was displaced by 
President Getúlio Vargas’ semi-fascist ‘New State’ (Estado Nôvo) (1930-1945), which blurred the 
lines between democratic government and authoritarianism. Vargas was initially accorded the 
presidency by the military following a coup d’état, ruling as dictator from 1937-1945, but governed 
again as constitutionally-elected president in the early 1950s (1951-1954)475 during the democratic 
period of 1945-1964.  
A further coup by the military in 1964, to combat what was viewed as encroaching 
Communist subversion, led to two decades of direct military rule and systematic repression that 
left 10,000 Brazilian citizens in a form of exile, over 500,000 individuals “arrested, banished, exiled, 
removed from public office, forced into retirement, prosecuted or indicted by the regime,”476 
almost 500 killed477 and hundreds ‘disappeared’ by the regime.478 Political ‘opening’ (abertura) 
beginning in 1974 initiated a markedly slow transition to civilian rule managed at all times by the 
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military,479 and underpinned in particular by a broad amnesty in the spirit of reconciliation–the 
Amnesty Law of 1979.  
 
The new democratic constitution of 1988 
 
The democratic constitution of 1988 was a new departure for Brazilian constitutional law, and 
would have profound effects on the Court’s democracy-building function. Representing a strong 
reaction against the historical and immediate experience of authoritarian rule and entrenched 
inequality and social injustice, the text lies squarely in the slipstream of the post-war ‘new 
constitutionalism’ discussed in Chapter Two, with a strong emphasis on human dignity (one of the 
constitution’s fundamental principles), democratic rule and a vast raft of fundamental rights, 
including fully justiciable social and economic rights. In addition, a number of ‘eternity clauses’ 
(cláusulas pétreas) prohibit amendment of constitutional provisions on rights, the federative form 
of State, direct, secret, universal and periodic voting, and the separation of powers.  
Due to factors including a maximalist drafting approach by Congress, a political context in 
which constitutional negotiations lacked “any sort of political trust and credibility” and the radically 
different ideological backgrounds of the framers (especially concerning economic and fiscal 
matters), the text constitutionalises a vast array of matters that ordinarily would be left to 
legislation; ‘hard-wires’ certain policy preferences into the Constitution to remove them from the 
political arena; and contains significant internal contradictions.480  The resulting text, with its “open 
texture, programmatic norms and indeterminate provisions”,481 “trivial details and unaffordable 
promises”,482 and dependence on ordinary legislation to put many of its provisions into effect, not 
only constitutionalised politics, but also set the scene for the ‘judicialisation of politics’.483 It is a 
good example of the ‘incremental constitutionalism’ discussed in Chapters One and Three. The 
constitutional pact, while seeking to bind all negotiators into the future with thick constraints, 
fudged a range of matters and left difficult issues to be resolved by the Supreme Court, as a 
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The tensions generated by institutional continuity 
 
Despite the language of rupture surrounding the constitution’s drafting, there was significant 
political and institutional continuity between the old and new orders: the presidential system was 
retained; the first democratic president after the 1985 elections belonged to a military party;484 and 
the option of a new Kelsenian constitutional court was eschewed in favour of retaining the existing 
Supreme Court. That said, the Court’s institutional place and powers were transformed. Its 
previously broad jurisdiction was reduced to almost exclusively constitutional matters, with other 
superior courts established to deal with non-constitutional matters.485 Its review powers were 
enhanced by expanding access to an existing abstract review mechanism (the Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality, or ADI), from the Attorney General alone, to a broad range of actors, 
including the President, Congress, state legislative assemblies, governors, political parties with 
congressional representation and the federal Bar Association. Having been an American-style 
supreme court for almost a century, the Court was remade as something much closer to a 
Kelsenian court. For individuals, however, the only access to the Court remained by appeal from 
the lower courts. 
The Court’s overall role under the new dispensation was a characteristically onerous one, 
emblematic of the expectations placed on constitutional courts in new democracies of the third 
wave era. The Court was expected to protect the gains of the new democratic order  
against any possible re-emergence of authoritarianism by upholding the Constitution and its 
principles [and to] embody this democratic reaction against the authoritarian past by strengthening 
and enforcing the democratic Constitution.486  
The Court had never enjoyed such centrality in the constitutional order. It had previously enjoyed 
some “political prominence” and periods of fertile jurisprudence during the First Republic (1891-
1937), and had displayed “moral courage” 487 during the military dictatorship of the 1960s before 
being brought to heel through a concerted campaign of intimidation, forced retirement of critical 
judges and court packing. However, it had been reduced to a peripheral state organ by the mid-
1980s before the 1988 Constitution pushed it firmly into the limelight, amplifying its role at the 
centre of the constitutional order as ‘guardian of the Constitution’488 
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The retention of the basic presidential framework that had existed under the old constitution 
(and all constitutions since the republican constitution of 1891) tended toward a continuity of 
modalities of governance as well as institutional form, which, coupled with the new powers granted 
to the Court had the clear potential to bring the executive and judicial powers into conflict. The 
constitutions enacted under military rule had maintained the appearance of a separation of powers 
while heavily centralising power in the executive,489 allowing the military executive a free rein to 
pursue policy preferences and to shape the social and economic orders through decree-laws. In a 
similar manner to the ‘authoritarian’ tendencies of administrative organs, discussed in Chapter 
Three, governance under the military juntas prized efficiency and effectiveness over competing 
values which would render governance more difficult; such as rights protection, deliberation 
among the representative organs, transparency and constitutional control by the judiciary. At root, 
the juntas had based their claims to rule on their being the sole State organ with the capacity to 
achieve progress in an ungovernable state; making much, for instance, of the ‘economic miracle’ 
(milagre econômico) their policies produced in Brazil in the period 1969-1973.490   
The new civilian governments after the transition to democracy in 1985 were faced with 
difficult economic straits and high expectations among the population for greater prosperity as 
well as greater freedom. Yet, the unwieldy and inconsistent 1988 Constitution quickly came to be 
viewed, in political circles, as a poor co-ordinating device for effective governance, with 
amendment of the long provisions on economic and fiscal matters becoming a “major orientation” 
in order to achieve the aim of effecting a full transition to a free market economy.491 In this context 
of economic, political and social transformation, and the pressing need for clarification of the 
outsized and rights-heavy constitutional text and the constitutional boundaries between the 
branches of government, political and civil society actors were strongly incentivised to bring 
actions before the Court.  
However, from the outset, the Court evinced caution and restraint concerning its new status 
and powers, stuck between its previous identity as a ‘judicial’ supreme court and its new form 
modelled on the more ‘political’ Kelsenian courts of Europe. It therefore generally avoided actions 
that might bring it into major conflict with the other branches. Characterising constitutional norms 
as having differing levels of “efficacy”, the Court was often able to transfer constitutional disputes 
back to the legislature.492 Unlike the Hungarian Constitutional Court of the 1990s, it made little 
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use of its new power to address legislative omission, which it restricted to a simple declaration that 
legislation was required to give effect to a constitutional provision. 493  Overall, it played a 
“limited”494 role in rights adjudication until the late 1990s.  
Kapiszewski attributes the Court’s general restraint to its institutional security and stability: 
a long history, no judicial purges since well before democratisation; meaningful guarantees of 
tenure and judicial independence; autonomy regarding budgetary matters; procedural continuity 
through the change of regime; a sense of the institution as separate from individual judges; and a 
professional ethos of collegiality.495 Others have suggested that the legacy of its suppression under 
military rule simply left the Court ill-equipped to fulfil its much more expansive role under the 
new constitution.496 The Court’s unmanageable docket, due largely to the absence of stare decisis 
and docket-control powers, must have also played a part–it exploded from under 10,000 annual 
cases before 1988 to approximately 100,000 cases a year by the mid-1990s. The Court even had, 
for a time, a drive-through window in the basement to process case filing.497  
 
‘Judicial activation’: How the Court was pushed into a more central role 
 
In many ways, the inflated constitution appeared to impede, rather than facilitate, the Court’s 
capacity to act as a democracy-builder. Vilhena Vieira, for instance, suggests that after an initial 
period of harmonising the pre-existing legal order with the standards in the new constitution, the 
Court from the early 1990s to the early 2000s was largely occupied with questions concerning 
economic governance.498  It was forced to squander precious institutional capital on assertive 
decisions which did little to address the key pathologies of the nascent democratic order. For 
instance, the Court’s suspension of various aspects of pension reform legislation in 1999 due to 
the law’s negative impact on the pension entitlements of retired public servants was a “serious 
blow” to the government’s compliance with budget targets agreed with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).499 The Court was even required to assert the power to assess the constitutionality of 
constitutional amendments–not, as in India or Colombia, in the context of amendments striking 
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at the democratic core of the constitution, but rather, in a context where such amendments had 
become the only way to legislate on many economic matters.500 
However, such upsets were rare. Due to a perception of the Supreme Court as a safer pair 
of hands, successive executives sought to quell activism in the lower courts by diminishing the 
importance of diffuse review and amplifying the Supreme Court’s review powers. 501  Changes to 
the Court’s institutional machinery introduced by constitutional reform in 1993, legislation in 1999 
and further constitutional reform in 2004, progressively added more competences to the Court: 
adding two new mechanisms for abstract review to expand the Court’s oversight role; permitting 
the Court to hold public hearings where clarification is required concerning complex matters502 
and to modulate the effect of findings of unconstitutionality; as well as amplifying the binding 
nature of the Court’s decisions. Along with a significant change in membership in the early 2000s, 
the general effect was to push the Court to assume a more generally assertive role. 503 In recent 
years, Brazilian scholars such as Oscar Vilhena Vieira have begun warning of the perils of 
‘supremocracy’, with the Court enjoying supremacy vis-à-vis not only other courts, but also as 
against other branches of government.504  
This is a far cry from the common discussion of the ‘judicialisation of politics’ through a 
narrative of self-empowerment, discussed in the Introduction to the thesis. In place of so-called 
judicial activism, we see what might be termed judicial activation. As we will see in the case-law 
analysis below, significant conflict within the Court surrounded the precise role the Court should 
play in the new order, and whether its new institutional form as a quasi-Kelsenian court changed 
its role. This clearly impacted not only on the Court’s role in supporting democratisation, but on 
the connected task of mediating its own place in the democratising order. 
 
1.2 THE COURT’S DEMOCRATISATION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Key points for navigating the case-law below 
 
Examining Brazilian Supreme Court jurisprudence in terms of time, tempo, context, content and 
methodology, it is clear that the first 20 years of the Court’s operation (1988-2008) constitute a 
fertile ground for the sort of democratisation jurisprudence we would expect to find. Indeed, the 
Court’s case-law since 1988 mirrors, in many ways, the German Constitutional Court’s post-war 
case-law explored in Chapter Two, with the constitutional status and validity of authoritarian-era 
 
500 Hübner Mendes, ‘Judicial Review’ (n491) at 456, citing ADI 926/1993 (1 September 1993). 
501 Zaiden Benvindo (n486) pp.95-108. 
502 Law 9.868/99. 
503 Zaiden Benvindo (n486) pp.95-108. 




laws, vindication of core civil liberties, separation of powers issues, and shaping of the electoral 
system together relating to the creation of a democratic public sphere and mediating the shift from 
the old to the new democratic order. Recalling Sadurski’s conclusion, cited in Chapter Two, that 
the case-law of constitutional courts in the CEE region has been a mixture of democracy-
enhancing and democracy-hindering decisions, we will see that the same can be said of the 
Brazilian Court.  
The context and content of each decision are inescapably intertwined. With the overall 
context faced by the Court, sketched above, in mind, the case-law analysis below focuses on the 
specific context of each case discussed, in order to divine more clearly the fundamental drivers of 
assertive and deferential decisions. The democratisation context tends to recalibrate how a court 
approaches certain questions, and how it views its role at different points. We also get a sense from 
the case-law below of the way in which democratisation decisions drive particular methodologies, 
to fill gaps and provide a justificatory basis for assertive decisions by situating decisions within a 
transnational ‘acquis jurisprudentiel’, as discussed in Chapter Three. 
The Supreme Court’s decision-making procedure has a number of features that make it a 
useful case-study. Although many constitutional courts allow dissenting opinions, the Brazilian 
court’s case-law is particularly revealing given that its adjudication takes place through a public 
seriatim procedure where judges provide their ‘votes’ in open court on the basis of a draft judgment 
by a rapporteur-judge, without having previously deliberated together to find common ground, 
with the result that is not possible to talk of a majority judgment, or per curiam decision. It therefore 
provides an interesting window into naked intra-Court contestation concerning democratisation 
and the Court’s proper role in supporting that process.  
Reinforcing the observations above regarding the role of political branches in pushing the 
Court to assume a more central role, the case-study below further underscores the limited 
explanatory power of the language of ‘judicial activism’ and ‘judicial restraint’. By contrast, scholars 
make a fundamental distinction between consequencialista and legalista judges on the Supreme 
Court.505 The former, often with more experience in politics, tend to be more open to factoring in 
the political or economic consequences of their decisions, and can be more supportive of the 
Court’s role in addressing political questions.506 The latter evince a tendency to focus on narrower 
legal-constitutional considerations in their judgments but, by holding firmer to the constitutional 
text, can show a greater willingness to invalidate legislation.507  
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For reasons of narrative coherence, the sections below address the Court’s mediation of the 
shift from an undemocratic to a democratic order first, before considering its shaping of a 
democratic public sphere; while acknowledging that these dimensions are interlinked. The section 
ends with discussion of the Amnesty Law Case of 2010, and finally a discussion of the way in 
which the Court has carved out a role for itself since 1988. This will provide a good basis for 
comparison with the Inter-American Court’s engagement with Brazil’s democratisation process in 
the following Part. 
 
Mediating the shift from an undemocratic to a democratic order  
 
Mediating the shift from the old to the new order is a complex task for any constitutional court in 
a new democracy. The new democratic constitution may add new rights, innovations such as 
eternity clauses and stronger review powers for a court as a central organ. However, in other 
respects the constitutional text may not depart radically from its predecessor. Elements of 
continuity are seen in the shift from authoritarian to democratic regimes across the world; even 
the shift from totalitarian rule in post-Communist Eurasia. In this sense, formal legal rupture with 
the previous regime is never total. This challenge is discussed here by reference to two key 
judgments: the The Provisional Measures Case, decided in 1990,508 and the The Prior Laws Case,509 
decided in 1992. 
The Provisional Measures Case concerned new rules in the 1988 Constitution aimed at 
restricting presidential law-making to exceptional cases. As discussed above, a key pathology of 
Brazilian governance under authoritarian rule had been the use of presidential decree-laws as the 
central law-making process.510 The new text therefore concentrated virtually all legislative power 
in Congress. The president’s power to issue decree-laws was subjected to congressional 
permission, and the issuance of so-called ‘provisional measures’ by the president was permitted 
solely in cases of ‘relevance and urgency’. While the use of decree-laws quickly fell away under the 
new constitutional regime, they were simply replaced by use of the provisional measures, in a 
context where the new constitutional arrangements appeared to render governance significantly 
more difficult.511 The president was required to submit such measures to Congress within thirty 
days, for their conversion into law, failing which the measure was to be deemed null and void ab 
initio. 512  This inverted the rules under the authoritarian constitution of 1969, which had 
characterised congressional silence as approval of the president’s law-making power. However, the 
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Constitution did not address whether the reissuance of a provisional measure, which had not been 
converted into law, was permitted.  
In 1990 the Prosecutor General mounted a constitutional challenge against the president’s 
issuance of a provisional measure that differed little in substance from a previous measure, one 
day after its explicit rejection by Congress. The president’s action, he contended, struck not only 
at the separation of powers principle at the heart of the Constitution, essential to a democratic 
state based on the rule of law and “democratic normality”,513 but also at respect for the Supreme 
Court’s decisions, given that the Court had already asserted in 1989 the power to review use of the 
mechanism for manifest abuse.514 The stakes were high: the provisional measure formed part of 
President Collor’s plan to address an acute economic crisis. 
Despite the pressing political context, in a unanimous decision the Supreme Court, having 
confirmed that there was little material difference between the two measures, held that the 
reissuance of a provisional measure rejected by Congress was impermissible. The rapporteur-judge 
Justice Celso de Mello emphasised that the formal controls on the president’s powers in this area 
had been established to prevent the indiscriminate use, and possible abuse, of this “exceptional 
power”515 from usurping the ordinary legislative process, in a new constitutional environment 
where the principle of separation of powers formed one of the ‘nuclei’ of the Constitution and in 
which the executive’s powers were “defined and limited”.516 To allow the reissuance of rejected 
provisional measures, with cosmetic modifications, would “rupture” the harmonious relationship 
between the powers envisaged in the Constitution.517 Various judges pointed to the unappealing 
vista presented by allowing the executive to disregard the legislature’s clear role in policing the 
validity of provisional measures. It would, they opined, entail substitution of the plural organisation 
of political power for the “monocracy of the sole legislator, long banned by the free society that 
has emerged from modern civilization”,518 and even, suspension of the Constitution itself.519 As 
the President of the Court put it: 
The understanding that the executive power…can instantly reissue an interim measure rejected by 
Congress, would have the consequence of maintaining indefinitely a norm with the force of law, 
even against the will of the majority of Congress, expressed in its deliberations which rejected the 
previous interim measure. Such an understanding is in open conflict with the precepts of the 
Constitution that define the exercise of legislative power … and which call for the independence and 
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harmony of the Powers of the Union, of the fundamental principles of the Republic and the basis of 
the democratic order.520 
The decision is thus marked by strong ‘entrenchment’ language, emphasising the exalted 
status of the constitution in the new democratic order. In their opinions the judges repeatedly 
affirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and the necessity to “unconditionally respect”521 the 
constitutional framework for exercising state power. Alluding to the context of economic crisis in 
which the case has arisen, Justice Brossard stated “the Constitution is not merely an ornament to 
be displayed on quiet and mild days”, refuting the “false dilemma” between allowing the president 
to freely issue provisional measures, or “chaos”. Insisting that the president had many other means 
to address the crisis, he denied that the “routine” action of holding the president to respect for the 
constitutional framework could be painted as an institutional crisis.522  
In the above case, the Court was faced with a relatively neat question and a clear 
constitutional provision. In the Prior Laws Case, decided two years later, the Court was required 
to address the much more difficult question of how to address authoritarian-era laws in the new 
constitutional order. As suggested in Chapter Three, the elimination of such laws that are 
incompatible with the new democratic constitution appears central to a successful democratisation 
process. Where the other branches of government are sluggish in repealing such laws–as discussed 
in the post-war Italian context in Chapter Two–the role of the constitutional court takes centre 
stage. 
The question came before the Supreme Court when a teachers’ union challenged by a direct 
action of unconstitutionality (ADI) various regulations on school fees contained in two decree-
laws, dating from 1969 and 1988 respectively, as inapplicable due to their incompatibility with the 
new Constitution. Effectively, the Court was being asked to use the new ADI mechanism for 
constitutional control under the 1988 Constitution to address the constitutionality of laws enacted 
under a previous constitutional text. This question was of particularly acute significance in the 
Brazilian context. The military juntas which ruled from 1964-1985 had never outwardly discarded 
their fidelity to constitutionalism, seeking at all times to achieve their ends through constitutional 
and ordinary enactments: 
In this respect, the methods of military rule in Brazil more closely resembled those of South Africa’s 
apartheid than of Argentina’s Dirty War, in the singular degree to which the rulers’ most repressive 
policies were publicly promulgated as positive law.523 
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With the 1988 Constitution silent regarding the status of such laws, the State argued, on the 
basis of longstanding academic and judicial doctrine in Brazil, based on the views of Hans Kelsen, 
that the ADI mechanism was not an appropriate avenue to challenge such laws given that 
‘unconstitutionality’ refers solely to laws enacted after promulgation of the contemporary 
Constitution. Laws enacted prior to the new constitution could be subject solely to ‘revocation’.524  
The implications of each position were clear. Allowing the ADI mechanism to be used to 
challenge pre-1988 laws would facilitate a quick bonfire of the military regime’s legislative legacy, 
especially given that decisions in ADI actions were binding erga omnes, unlike appeal decisions, 
which had solely inter partes effects. Denying use of ADI actions would require applicants to first 
challenge laws before the ordinary courts, with a slow appeals process to the Supreme Court to 
obtain a definitive judgment on the matter. The votes presented two diametrically opposed 
approaches: that of the rapporteur-judge, Justice Brossard; and that of Justice Sepúlveda 
Pertence.525  
Justice Brossard, siding with the State’s argument, and placing heavy reliance on the Court’s 
established case-law on the subject and key Brazilian scholarship, argued that because the ADI 
mechanism is directed at unconstitutionality it could not be used to challenge legislation enacted 
under the military government.526 His judgment, throughout, appeared to emphasise continuity: 
continuity with the established case-law of the Court; and legal continuity, as far as possible, with 
the previous regime. Like previous periods of constitutional transformation in Brazil’s history–in 
the 1930s, 1940s and 1960s–the Court could only assess old laws on appeal from the lower courts, 
and would revoke them only where the incompatibility with the new constitution was manifest.  
Justice Pertence’s analysis provided a striking counterpoint, going to great lengths to argue 
for a departure from the Court’s previous jurisprudence. The methodology pursued by each judge 
comes to the fore here. Where Justice Brossard’s judgment looked backwards, mining the Court’s 
previous jurisprudence for the solution to the question, Justice Pertence looked outwards, with a 
far-reaching comparative review of European thought on how best to address the legislative legacy 
of authoritarian, fascist and Nazi rule. 527  Focusing in particular on the post-war European 
democracies of Italy and Germany, and Brazil’s sister-democracies of the ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation, Spain and Portugal, his brief tour d’horizon stressed that the newly-established 
constitutional courts in each country had adopted a pragmatic,528 systematic and effective approach 
to addressing authoritarian laws, relying mainly on concentrated constitutional control.  
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While recognising that the mixed Brazilian system of diffuse and concentrated control 
complicated the task, Justice Pertence proffered an alternative solution to allow the ADI 
mechanism to be employed to challenge a pre-1988 law. The Court could follow a doctrine of 
‘qualified revocation’, permitting such a law to be invalidated from the date of the constitution’s 
promulgation. His opinion squarely addressed the fact that Justice Brossard’s approach would 
impede the entrenchment of the new constitution and the disentrenchment of the previous 
constitutional-legal order: 
[This] leaves, in consequence, the disentangling of controversies to fluctuate, for years, based on 
disagreements between judges and courts throughout the country, until they come, if they come, 
before [the Supreme Court], after a long trek through the often tortuous system of appeals. Moreover, 
nor will the decision of the Supreme Court, devoid of binding force erga omnes [in appeals cases 
under diffuse review], settle these contradictions. With all of this, inevitably, not only the speed, but 
the uniformity of the judicial task of ensuring conformity of the old law to the new guidelines of the 
Basic Law will be lost, with patent damage to jurisdictional effectiveness and legal certainty. (…) 
[And] would unnecessarily delay the imposition of the superior norm.529 
He underlined the nature of the new constitution and the break it presented from the 
previous order through the exercise of constituent power: 
… the 1988 Constitution is the result of a rupture from the previous order, effected by [law] EC/85 
which, by altering the constitutional revision procedure of the 1969 Constitution, invested the 
National Congress with the powers of a constituent assembly to vote on a new constitution, which 
could hardly be legally reduced to a simple reform of the previous constitution.530 
This focus on discontinuity rather than continuity is perhaps the touchstone of the entire 
judgment. Emphasising the rupture effected by the new constitution, he cast aside the fig-leaf of 
constitutional adjudication as apolitical in arguing for an approach that would ensure the 
“effectiveness” of the Constitution, a watchword throughout the judgment: 
I am aware…that the option, which the problem imposes, is not only technical. It is high 
constitutional politics: accepting the reasonableness of the various legal solutions presented, the 
choice among them by a court like this is to guide oneself towards that which appears to be the most 
appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of the Constitution, which is the fundamental commitment 
of this House.  
Moreover, nor is it new to recognise straightforwardly that the disentangling of the matter 
cannot dispense with consideration of the consequences of each alternative as regards the efficiency 
and quality of the control of the legitimacy of laws. 531 
The majority of the Court, however, voted in favour of Justice Brossard’s traditional 








of laws enacted prior to the Constitution of 1988 are immune from direct constitutional review”.532 
The Court’s decision led to growing calls in subsequent years for a new constitutional action to be 
established for challenging pre-1988 laws before the Court, culminating in the introduction, in 
1999, of the Petition for Non-compliance with a Fundamental Precept (Arguição de descumprimento 
de preceito fundamental), which permits review of the constitutionality of public acts and laws which 
could not be addressed through the existing review mechanisms.  
Although the Court’s approach tended to bat the ball back to the other branches, no 
immediate move was made to systematically repeal the worst remnants of military-era laws. It was 
not until 2009 that the government proposed the establishment of a working group to discuss bills 
to revoke the remaining laws from the military regime deemed contrary to human rights or which 
have supported serious human rights violations.533 This has led to long delays in various laws 
coming before the Court, including the Press Law of 1969 and the Amnesty Law of 1979, both of 
which are discussed in the following sections. The former wended its way through the ordinary 
courts before finally appearing before the Supreme Court by way of extraordinary appeal (recurso 
extraordinário), while the latter was finally challenged by way of an ADPF action.  
We see here the negative side of the Court’s role. This decision, merely four years after 
promulgation of the new constitution, divested the Court of one its main disentrenchment 
functions: the elimination of authoritarian laws. By departing from the focus in European 
constitutional courts on effective disentrenchment of such laws, the effect was to extend the 
heartland of democratisation jurisprudence beyond its usual confines, requiring the Court to 
address such laws 25 years after the transition to democracy in 1985. 
 
Facilitating the creation of a democratic public sphere 
 
In Chapter Three key aspects of a court’s role in facilitating the creation of a democratic public 
sphere were discussed: the protection of core democratic rights; the shaping of inclusive electoral 
rules; the calibration of a functioning division of State power; and guarding against a re-emergence 
of authoritarianism in the new order. These roles are analysed here through reference to three 
cases before the Court in the 1990s and 2000s: the Right to Protest Case534 in 1999; the Electoral 
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Thresholds Case in 2006;535 and the Press Law Case of 2009.536 Together, these cases demonstrate 
the considerable challenges faced by a court in a new democracy in constructing a meaningful 
sphere of autonomy for politicians, civil society and individuals to engage in deliberation, and to 
ensure that law-making is subject to democratic constraints so that such a sphere is protected.  
They also reflect the cross-cutting nature of the dimensions of democratisation 
jurisprudence discussed in Chapter Three: in the Right to Protest case, for instance, we can discern 
the Court’s curbing of authoritarian governance modalities, already seen in the Provisional 
Measures case above. In addition, the cases discussed here all feature, to some extent, a mediation 
of the shift between the old and new order. This demonstrates once again one of the hallmarks of 
adjudication in a new democracy compared to an old democracy: it is difficult for courts to say 
what democratic law is without referring to the undemocratic experiences of the recent past. 
The Right to Protest Case case concerned a decree issued in March 1999 by the Governor of 
the Federal District of Brasília537 under the legislative powers accorded to him by an Organic Law 
enacted under the 1969 Constitution. The decree placed a blanket ban on public protests with 
sound-producing vehicles, radios and other devices in Brasília’s government district–comprising 
three main squares and adjacent roads in which the seats of the three apex federal powers are 
located (the President, Congress and the Supreme Court itself)–ostensibly aimed at preventing the 
disturbance of civil servants during working hours.  
A number of workers’ unions and the Workers’ Party (PT) filed an ADI action against the 
decree, on the basis that it violated the constitutional right to freedom of assembly.538 We get 
echoes of the Provisional Measures Case here. The dispute at hand had become a flash point 
between the Court and the Governor: the decree in question was the third issued by the Governor 
on this matter, after two previous, and almost identical, decrees, issued in January 1999, had been 
struck down by the Court for unconstitutionality. However, unlike the Provisional Measures Case, 
here was an open attack on the Court as an institution, challenging its authority to control the 
actions of a political organ. The Governor’s exasperation had been openly expressed in a decision 
accompanying publication of the third decree, the first line of which bemoaned the necessity to 
issue the decree again due to a “veritable vicious circle involving the judicial machinery”.539  
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Perhaps in light of the Governor’s intransigence, the rapporteur-judge Justice Aurélio 
appeared to take the opportunity to draw a clear line in the sand, emphasising not only the 
importance of the right at hand to democratic deliberation, but also the repression of the right in 
Brazil’s past. His judgment first set about dismantling any justification for the enacted decree. 
Noting that it did not apply to activities of a “civico-military, religious or cultural nature”, Justice 
Aurélio emphasised that this nevertheless left the control of protests within the hands of the 
district, and as such, represented an attempt to censure alternative ideologies and political outlooks, 
presented as going to the heart of citizenship itself. How could a decree, he asked, impede 
Brazilians from celebrating, hypothetically, the nation winning a fifth World Cup?540 How could a 
decree prevent citizens from protesting for community improvement, or commemorating victims 
of the struggle to achieve democratic transition? 541  His judgment denounced not only the 
authoritarian past, but authoritarian tendencies in the new democracy:    
…the injustice is of those who shame the citizens who wish to live in a democratic homeland, and 
who dishonour the heroes, many anonymous, who fought, some to death, for a country free from 
the disgrace of authoritarianism, the craven shackles of dictatorial despotism. Brazilians cannot bear 
more false protectionism whose sole result is the backwardness, the ignominy of a nation. It is 
commonplace to say that democracy is learned every day and continuously, and that restrictions are 
not placed on one of the most important constitutional guarantees – the freedom of expression of 
thought, closely linked to the right of assembly – which will give force and sustenance to an organism 
which wishes to be democratic… especially the Brazilian state, which aspires to the respect of other 
nations at the auspicious occasion of being definitively placed on the roll-call of politically 
consolidated countries, for which one of the basic presuppositions is the certainty, in no instance 
rebuttable, that the people are assured the full and unrestricted right to demonstrate.  It will not be 
in the Capitol of the Country that we, Brazilians, will retreat from that proposition. (…) 
To repeat: the freedom of assembly…is inextricably associated with another of greater 
importance in societies which call themselves democratic: [it is] attached to the expression of 
thought. The freedom of assembly envisaged in the constitutional provision is not limited to those 
who demonstrate silently. On the contrary, the rationale of the provision is the airing of ideas, 
regardless of their religious, cultural or political aspects. 
Like Justice Pertence in the previous decision discussed above, Justice Aurélio emphasised 
the significance of the new constitution’s break with the past: 
One might think, that the act emanated from the competent legislative authority, in accordance with 
the Charter [Constitution]…of 1969, which permitted ordinary legislation to regulate the locations 
and conditions for holding meetings. However it is no longer that Constitution, enacted by a military 
junta, which is in force, but the people’s Constitution of 1988.542 
By layering longstanding Brazilian and American case-law stressing the wide scope of the 









assembly and expression could not be subject to preventative restriction, but solely to constraints 
where their exercise is “unreasonable”, harming property or people. 544  A majority of the Court 
voted with him for suspension of the decree.  
Almost a decade later, and some twenty years distant from the transition to democracy, we 
find the Court still carving out the essentials of a democratic public sphere, and still preoccupied 
by the experience of authoritarian rule. Having ruled in the early 1990s on matters such as the 
regulation of free airtime for political parties in 1994 (holding it to be a matter for Congress),545 in 
the Electoral Thresholds case in 2007 the Court was obliged to consider the nature of representative 
democracy in the Brazilian constitutional order, its relationship with the 1988 Constitution, and 
the tension between an effectively functioning political system and maximal representation of the 
people. 
The return to electoral democracy in 1985 had brought a liberalisation of the regime for the 
creation of new political parties, and the re-establishment of parties abolished by the military 
regime, which had tightly controlled a two-party system in a show democracy until 1979. Article 
17 of the 1988 Constitution enshrined the liberal regime for the creation of national parties, stating: 
The creation, amalgamation, merger and extinction of political parties is free, with due regard for 
national sovereignty, the democratic regime, the plurality of political parties and the fundamental 
rights of the individual… 
The democratic period witnessed a proliferation of parties, rising to some 29 in total, 
although five parties dominated the electoral landscape. With the stated aim of enhancing the 
functioning of parliament by avoiding the operation of excessively small parties, the 1995 Law on 
Political Parties546 set an electoral threshold, requiring political parties to obtain at minimum 5% 
of all valid votes (i.e., excluding void and spoiled votes) and at least 2% of the total votes in a third 
of the states of the federation in order to operate in the National Congress, and to gain access to 
funding from the Parties’ Fund, as well as significant publicly-funded air time on radio and 
television stations. In the 2007 general election, only seven parties met the required threshold. 
Facing removal from Congress and a significant reduction in publicly-funded air time, nine 
political parties, including the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B) and the Green Party (PV), 
challenged these provisions, arguing that they violated not only the liberal system envisaged in 
Article 17, but also the principle of equal treatment before the law and equality of arms for all 
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political parties, as well as representing flagrant disrespect of minorities and a blatant attempt by 
the dominant parties to preserve their power.547  
In a unanimous decision, the Court held the challenged legal provisions to be 
unconstitutional. The rapporteur-judge, Justice Aurélio, argued that the threshold requirements 
struck at two basic functions of the Constitution: to ensure political pluralism; and to guard against 
the tyranny of the majority. Underlining the need to safeguard fundamental constitutional 
principles including the democratic regime, a plurality of parties and fundamental rights,548 he 
offered the view that even a single representative in either House of Congress could perform the 
constitutional function of countering majoritarian excesses: 
Ultimately, the constitutional provisions envisage neutralisation of the tyranny of the majority, 
keeping hegemonic, and therefore totalitarian, views out of the national arena.549 
The legislature’s competence to address the functioning of parliament, he stressed, could 
not permit unreasonable and excessive measures.550 Not only would the thresholds bar a significant 
number of political parties from Congress, but they would also reduce their public funding by over 
99%, while apportioning virtually all available funds between the seven parties meeting the 
threshold; an “unacceptable” result under the requirement of reasonableness.551 The judgment 
unequivocally linked the countermajoritarian purpose of the Constitution with the exigencies of 
the principle of representative democracy at the heart of the constitutional text: 
Let it be noted… that lying behind all this discussion is the critical point concerning protection of 
individual and minority rights, which does not conflict with the principles of majority government – 
whose purpose is the broad well-being of the people, from the will of the majority, provided that 
they respect the rights of minority groups... 
In a Democratic State based on the Rule of Law, no majority organized around any ideology or 
purpose – however laudable it appears – may take away or restrict the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of minority groups, including the freedom to express themselves, to organize themselves, 
to denounce, to dissent and to be represented in decisions that affect the fate of society as a whole, 
in short, to participate fully in public life, including overseeing the actions determined by the 
majority.552 
Similar reasoning, and a shift from reasonableness to proportionality, is found in the final 
case to be considered in this section: the Press Law Case. The case concerned a challenge brought 
by the Public Prosecutor against a key authoritarian-era law requiring journalists to hold a 











not permit excessive or unreasonable restrictions on professional activity, and that the restrictions 
in place not only violated the generous constitutional free speech guarantees553 but also Article 13 
of the American Convention on Human Rights, which Brazil had ratified in 1992.  
A lower court had upheld the validity of the law on the basis of State arguments that 
“incalculable damage” could be caused by an unqualified journalist, in the same manner as an 
unqualified lawyer, doctor or engineer. Before the Supreme Court the same arguments were made. 
While accepting that freedom of the press was umbilically linked to liberty, freedom of expression 
and information, the State insisted that regulation was required to curb the danger of poor 
journalism damaging pubic order, and that the practice of journalism required broad knowledge 
concerning cultural, social, legislative and economic matters, as well as technical and ethical 
training concerning the conduct of interviews, research, reporting and publishing. 554 Denying any 
incompatibility with the American Convention, the State argued that the law protected rights, and 
ensured a more effective right to information, as well as protecting all of society: 
What exists is simply ordinary legislation which ensures the regular exercise of this right, in order 
that society can continue to progress in a secure manner toward the strengthening of democratic 
institutions.555 
The Supreme Court found for the appellant, holding by an 8-1 majority that the challenged 
provision was invalid under the 1988 Constitution as a direct violation of the guarantee of 
professional liberty, read in conjunction with the constitutional free speech guarantees. In an 
extensive judgment, ranging across German proportionality doctrine, side glances at Spanish and 
Portuguese law, previous decisions of the Supreme Court, Brazilian and American scholarship 
dating back to the nineteenth century, and placing heavy reliance on an Advisory Opinion of the 
Inter-American Court of Justice,556 the rapporteur-judge, Justice Gilmar Mendes, stressed that the 
legislature must have regard to standards of reasonableness and proportionality in establishing 
restrictions by law; with the final assessment falling to the courts as to whether a restriction is 
 
553  Article 5.IX: “[T]he expression of intellectual, artistic, scientific, and communications activities is free, 
independently of censorship or license”. 
Article 220: “The manifestation of thought, the creation, the expression and the information, in any form, process 
or medium shall not be subject to any restriction, with due regard to the provisions of this Constitution. 
Paragraph 1. No law shall contain any provision which may represent a hindrance to full freedom of press in any 
medium of social communication, with due regard to the provisions of article 5, IV, V, X, XIII and XIV. 
Paragraph 2. Any and all censorship of a political, ideological and artistic nature is forbidden.” (Paragraphs 3 and 
4 concern, inter alia, the State’s competence to regulate public entertainment and commercial advertising.) 
554 See pp.706-708. 
555 P.710. 
556 IACHR, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 





justified. 557  He held the challenged provision to be disproportionate, on the basis that the 
requirement of technical training did nothing to avoid unethical or abusive journalism.558  
Justice Mendes emphasised three fundamental points: the express prohibition against prior 
control of free speech in the Constitution; the distinction between journalism and other public 
services such as the practice of law or medicine due to the “umbilical link”559 between journalism 
and the rights to expression and information; and the key value of journalism to a democratic and 
plural society.560 In his concluding remarks, he noted the original authoritarian purpose of the 
decree at issue: 
It is clear that the requirement of a college degree in journalism to pursue the profession had a clear 
purpose: to cut off from the means of communication intellectuals, politicians and artists who 
opposed the military regime. Is clear, therefore, that the said normative act serves other values that 
are no longer valid in our democratic state. […] Decree-Law n.° 972/1969 would not pass under the 
scrutiny of the National Congress in the context of the current constitutional state, in which 
fundamental rights and guarantees are guaranteed to all citizens.561 
This decision, closely following three other decisions in which the Court had declared 
authoritarian laws concerning the press and imprisonment for civil debt as invalid under the 1988 
Constitution, 562 appeared to signal that the bonfire of the military dictatorship’s laws was now in 
train. 
 
Revisiting the democratic transition: the Amnesty Law of 1979 
 
The discussion thus far provides some very useful context for finally analysing the Court’s 
judgment in the Amnesty Law Case.563 In the latter half of 2008, the National Bar Association, 
joined by various other human rights organisations, took an ADPF action to challenge the validity 
of the Law’s application to State agents who had committed crimes during the dictatorship. With 
the Supreme Court evincing greater assertiveness regarding rights protection and an increased 
propensity to strike down authoritarian-era laws, it appeared a propitious time for a challenge. In 
addition, in the wider regional context, various constitutional courts in Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay had already reinterpreted or invalidated amnesty laws, in line with the jurisprudence of 
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The 1979 Amnesty Law had granted a “broad, general and unrestricted” amnesty to all 
individuals, from both the military regime and the opposition, involved in politically motivated 
crimes committed between September 2, 1961 and August 15, 1979. The established interpretation 
of its scope was extremely wide, including torture, kidnapping, and homicide, even where such 
crimes were merely ‘connected’ with political crimes. Coupled with a requirement that 
prosecutions for torture and murder could be taken solely on the initiative of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, few criminal prosecutions had taken place even after the return to electoral 
democracy, fostering, it has been suggested, a “climate of forgetfulness and impunity”.565  
This lay in marked contrast to neighbouring states such as Argentina and Chile, where trials 
of high-ranking military leaders were pursued shortly after the return to democratic rule, even 
where amnesty laws had been enacted. As democratisation progressed and human rights concerns 
became more central to successive governments’ agendas, the State had become more open to 
acknowledging responsibility for serious past human rights abuses and the provision of financial 
compensation to victims of political persecution. 566  However, as regards the issue of the 
disappeared, it continued to avoid the twin issues of investigation and prosecution at every turn.567  
In this context the applicants requested either a holding that the law was invalid under the 
1988 Constitution, or in the alternative, for a reinterpretation of Article 1 of that Law, in 
conformity with the Constitution, to hold that the amnesty granted to the perpetrators of “political 
and connected crimes” does not apply to ‘common crimes’ such as rape, forced disappearance and 
murder committed by State agents against the political opposition.568 They not only argued that 
the law violated constitutional rights by hindering victims of the military regime and their family 
members from identifying persons responsible for committing acts of torture and murder, 569 but 
also challenged the very democratic foundations of its enactment. In particular, it was argued that 
the law violated democratic and republican precepts enshrined in the Constitution given that it 
had not been enacted by the people but, rather, sanctioned by a president who was an army general 
under a military regime, and enacted by a Congress elected at the pleasure of the regime, before 
the elaboration of the 1988 Constitution by a freely elected Congress.570  
For the State, the Prosecutor General argued that the case could not be divorced from its 
historical context: 
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Amnesty, in Brazil, we all know, resulted from a long national debate, with the participation of 
various sectors of civil society, in order to facilitate the transition between the authoritarian regime 
and the present democratic regime. Brazilian civil society, beyond a simple participation in this 
process, articulated itself and marked in the history of the country a struggle for democracy and 
peaceful and harmonic transition, capable of avoiding further conflicts.571 
The Court, by a 7-2 majority, voted to uphold the law. The rapporteur-judge, Justice Eros 
Grau–who had himself been tortured by State agents in the 1970s–strongly argued not only for 
the constitutionality of the law, but for its social value as the catalyst for the democratic transition. 
He challenged the action as ignoring the historical fact that the amnesty was not simply imposed 
by the regime, but fought for by opponents of the regime in a climate of increasing public 
opposition to military rule after the oil crisis of 1974 and the ensuing economic recession, in a 
public campaign “expressive of the most vibrant page of resistance and democratic activity in our 
History”572–and one that the Bar Association itself (now challenging the law) had supported at the 
time. 
Stressing that the democratic movement in that era had been obliged to accept certain limits 
to the accountability of regime agents, the “bilateral” character of the amnesty,573 the dangers of 
focusing on human dignity at the cost of other values, 574  and the Court’s clear historical 
jurisprudence from the 1900s, 1950s and 1980s, which had consistently upheld a broad 
interpretation of successive amnesty laws, 575  he insisted that the amnesty law “[h]as to be 
interpreted in light of the reality of the time in which it was enacted.”576 Essentially, he argued, the 
applicants were attempting to rewrite history itself and, more importantly, that the Court had no 
role in rewriting laws in a democratic state: 
In a Democratic State based on the rule of law the Judiciary is not permitted to alter, or to provide 
a re-wording, different to what [the law] contemplated. It can, from [a law], produce various 
standards. But not even the Federal Supreme Court is authorised to rewrite amnesty laws.577 
… 
Since that agreement resulted in a legal text, it is exclusively the Legislature which can revise it.578 
If we look closely at the reasoning in the majority votes, we can discern a core concern 
regarding the law’s place in Brazil’s new democratic order, which appeared crucial in staying the 
Court’s hand. The Court appeared to view the law, certainly not as an ordinary law and not quite 
an exercise of constituent power, but as a form of meta-constitutional act transcending the old and 
 











new constitutional orders, and the facilitating condition for the constituent act of founding a new 
constitutional order, perhaps somewhat similar to a popular referendum which forms the basis for 
a new constitution–what Tierney calls a ‘constitution-framing’ referendum.579 Conceived in this 
way, it appeared immune to judicial review. This may explain why, despite the clear relevance of 
the Inter-American Court’s significant jurisprudence on amnesty laws, and the conferral of 
‘infraconstitutional’ status on the American Convention in a recent judgment (i.e. below the 
Constitution, but above ordinary law),580 the votes for the majority all cast the case as entirely a 
domestic matter, to be decided within the parameters of domestic constitutional law.581  
 
Carving out a role for the Court: Six key lessons 
 
What do these cases tell us about the Court’s task of carving out a role for itself in the new 
democratic order? Six fundamental lessons come into focus, all of which underscore the 
observation in Chapter Three that we have no way of predicting how a court will act as a 
democracy-builder in the new order.  
The first is that, within the overall democratisation context, a constitutional court’s role as a 
democracy-builder is fundamentally based on a complex dialectic between the constitutional text 
and the insitutional setting of the court. In the Brazilian context the breadth of the constitution, 
coupled with the lack of any direct access to the Court for individuals, appeared to diminish the 
Supreme Court’s ability to focus on constructing the essentials of a democratic order. The 
institutional setting of the Court, in turn, affected the capacity of the constitutional text to effect 
rupture with the old order: in the Prior Laws Case, in particular, the strong disentrenchment aims 
of the constitutional text were diluted in a cocktail of legal-technical reasoning within the Court.  
Second, is the effect of contestation regarding the Court’s role in the new order. It is seen 
in the limits set by the Court to its role in policing the proper exercise of the president’s law-
making powers in the Provisional Measures Case.  While accepting the Court’s ‘American-style’ 
role as a “balancing wheel” to ensure the “proper functioning of the democratic institutions” 
enshrined in the Constitution,582 judges repeatedly emphasised that the control of provisional 
measures was a matter for Congress, and the Court could have no role in exercising ‘preventive’ 
constitutional review of such measures by reviewing the reasons for their issuance, or their 
substantive content.583 Justice Pertence’s unsuccessful argument in the Prior Laws Case for a more 
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central role for the Court as a transformational institution capable of remaking the law in the 
democratic image of the new order also underscores this contestation: 
…to refuse to allow invocation of the direct action of unconstitutionality to purge old laws 
incompatible with the new constitutional order, the Supreme Court would shirk a mission and a 
responsibility that are its alone. Inalienably the Court’s.584 
Third, even when the Court speaks as one, and seeks to positively impact on the 
democratisation process, it can have little immediate effect. For instance, in the Provisional 
Measures Case, although the Court unanimously and clearly stated its position on the exceptional 
nature of such measures, the judgment did little to prevent their abuse. As Rosenn observes: “Until 
2001, there is little doubt that Brazilian presidents seriously misused the provisional measure in a 
way that seriously threatened the separation of powers”585 In reality it required a constitutional 
amendment to reduce use of the power, by placing additional constraints on its use.586 Even then, 
the Court, as recently as 2007, was required to strike down an attempt to reissue a provisional 
measure rejected by Congress in the same legislative session,587 and continues to assert that it will 
only “exceptionally” review whether the requirements of urgency and relevance have been met.588 
Fourth, even where a judgment is effective, it is not always easy to decide whether it makes 
a positive or negative impact on democratisation. In the Electoral Thresholds Case, for instance, 
the Court’s protection of minority political persuasions in the democratic community may have 
rendered governance at the federal level more difficult. As Issacharoff notes, the German 
constitutional court upheld a similar 5% threshold in 1957 in order to ensure good governance, in 
a context where political fragmentation in the Weimar Republic was viewed as a factor leading to 
Nazi rule. The Czech and Romanian constitutional courts, following the German example, have 
done the same to avoid “excessive splintering of the political spectrum”.589  
Fifth, democratisation jurisprudence is not all about the exercise of the strong judicial review 
power to invalidate laws. In the Provisional Measures Case, for instance, the Court’s firm line on 
use of provisional measures ultimately played a part in the passing of a constitutional amendment 
to curb their use. In other cases, the Court has had the opportunity to clearly articulate the 
difference between democratic and undemocratic governance, the value of countermajoritarian 
constraints on democratic decisionmaking, and the relationship between the old and new 
constitutional orders.  
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The final lesson, which provides a good link to the next section, is the significant but 
fluctuating role of external law in the Supreme Court’s democratisation jurisprudence. As with 
other constitutional courts of the third wave, the Court has tended to refer to the case-law of 
foreign constitutional courts to bolster robust decisions. Reference to the Court’s own past 
jurisprudence is more mixed: it can be used to cleave to a more deferential role, as seen in the Prior 
Laws Case, or to underscore continuity in upholding core democratic rights, as seen in the Right 
to Protest Case.  
Importantly, reference to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court’s case-law has been 
rare. We see it in the Amnesty Law Case, where Justice Lewandowski, departing from the majority, 
concluded that agents of the State are not “automatically covered” by the 1979 amnesty law and 
argued for a case-by-case approach to its application. Most exceptional is the significant emphasis 
placed by Justice Mendes on Inter-American jurisprudence in the Press Law Case, citing an Inter-
American advisory opinion holding diploma requirements for journalists to constitute a violation 
of the American Convention, and the need to provide expansive protection of free speech as the 
cornerstone of a democratic society.  
 
2 THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SHAPING 
BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY FROM OUTSIDE 
 
The analysis of the Supreme Court’s case-law above has served to highlight the hallmarks of 
domestic democratisation jurisprudence: the Court’s symbolic and governance power as guardian 
of the new constitution; its embeddedness in the process as both an agent and subject of 
democratisation; its position as a constituted power of the democratic constitution and how this 
informs its role; and the differing impact of its decisions, ranging from the invalidation of laws to 
an inability to constrain certain unconstitutional patterns of governance. We have seen how the 
court’s situation within the State context means its democratisation jurisprudence is inextricably 
bound to the past experience of undemocratic rule: entrenchment of the new constitution, in this 
way, cannot be fully decoupled from disentrenchment. 
In this Part we move to analysis of the Inter-American Court’s engagement with Brazil’s 
democratisation process. The aim is, again, to apply the insights of the conceptual framework 
elaborated in Chapter Three to a concrete empirical context. We will see that the Court’s impact 
on Brazilian democratisation was muted until its decision invalidating the Amnesty Law in 2010, 
some months after the Supreme Court had upheld the law’s constitutionality. Our main points of 
orientation here are how the Court’s institutional setting and its externality to any domestic 




democratisation process from without. The case-study presented here is considerably shorter than 
the first case-study. The main purpose is simply to tease out some of the key differences and 
similarities between regional democratisation jurisprudence and its domestic variant.  
 
2.1 TIME, TEMPO, CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The content of key decisions of the Inter-American Court is discussed in the following sections. 
This section addresses regional democratisation jurisprudence as a creature of time, tempo, context 
and methodology. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, although it was established in 1979, the Inter-American 
Court’s first decision in a contentious case was not until 1988–the year the Supreme Court was 
revived under Brazil’s new democratic constitution. Yet, their institutional experiences have 
exhibited stark differences. For instance, by the mid-1990s, when the Supreme Court’s docket had 
become unmanageable, the Inter-American Court was still issuing at most a handful of merits 
decisions in contentious cases each year, and, in various years during this period, no more than a 
single decision.590  
The impact of the Inter-American Court on democratisation in Brazil was negligible for the 
first decade or so. Brazil was one of the last states in Latin America to submit to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, in 1998. This, coupled with the Supreme Court’s general aversion to citing Inter-
American jurisprudence in the democratic era, considerably dulled the penetration of such case-
law in the domestic order. However, this does not make Brazil an entirely exceptional case: the 
Inter-American Court’s impact on any one state has generally been modest, with only a handful of 
states being subject to more than ten judgments since 1988. It is only when we take its effects 
across the region as a whole that we see its significant influence. That said, as we will see, the 
impact of its decision on the 1979 Amnesty Law on Brazil’s democratisation process has been 
significant.  
In the next section, we will discuss the Inter-American Court’s democratisation 
jurisprudence concerning Brazil, which began in 2002 with its first decision against Brazil. First, it 
is useful to recall from Chapter Two that, despite its underwhelming docket, by 2002, the Inter-
American Court had already established a reputation for forthright decision-making concerning 
the crime of forced disappearance, the invalidation of amnesty laws and criminal defamation laws, 
the importance of the right to information, and placing a clear obligation on all State organs, 
including domestic courts, and had begun to move towards its doctrine of ‘conventionality control’. 
What drove this assertiveness? 
 




The distinct nature of the Court’s setting 
 
In Chapter Two we saw how the Inter-American Court began its operation when transitions to 
democracy were sweeping South America, which required it address a mix of new democracies 
alongside stubbornly authoritarian regimes in Central America. Telling details reveal the precarious 
position of the Court as it set about its task in the 1980s. For instance, compared to the post-war 
modernist splendour of the Supreme Court in Brazil, or indeed the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, the Inter-American Court in its early years “took place in a make-shift 
courtroom which consisted of four tables and the equivalent of lawn chairs.”591 The Court was 
then, and remains, a part-time institution: judges had to take time from their day jobs to attend to 
cases.592 Thus, unlike the Supreme Court of Brazil, the Inter-American Court had to carve out its 
role from rather modest materials.  
Taking a closer look at the cases in which the Court’s landmark decisions were issued, we 
get a sense of certain particularities of regional democratisation jurisprudence and the very 
different institutional setting of a regional human rights court, compared to a domestic 
constitutional court. In its very first judgment, Velásquez-Rodriguez v Honduras593 in 1988, the 
respondent State’s active opposition to the hearing of the matter appeared to incentivise the Court 
to adopt an assertive posture, to address the case on the basis of legal principle, and to show that 
it was not merely a paper tiger.594 In assessing the evidence in the case, it stressed that as an 
international tribunal, the standards of proof would be less formal than in a domestic criminal 
proceeding. More importantly, in addressing the State’s preliminary objection that the applicant 
had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, the Court used the opportunity to assess whether 
domestic remedies for the rights violation were available, adequate and effective, allowing it to 
assess the quality of the justice system in Honduras under authoritarian rule.  
The Court found for the applicant, noting that domestic remedies for forced disappearance 
were ineffective given that the detention complained of was clandestine; inapplicable in practice 
due to formal procedural requirements; ignored by the authorities; or due to intimidation of 
lawyers and judges involved.595 By laying bare the systemic failure of the Honduran judicial system 
to investigate, prosecute or adjudicate on cases of disappearance, and the fact that the rights 
violations by pubic actors were not authorised by domestic law, in a context where the Honduran 
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Supreme Court had played no role, the Court’s externality to the domestic context appeared an 
advantage, permitting it to perform the ‘quasi-constitutional’ function of addressing structural 
defects in the legal order, in the course of dispensing ‘individual’ justice. 
We see the particular challenges raised by the regional setting time and again in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Notable examples among the new democracies in the region are the tactical use of 
allanamientos by States, by which they offer reparation to victims of rights violations as a way of 
‘playing the system’ in order to prevent a full binding judgment of the Court;596 and the persistence 
of arguments claiming that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, sometimes made on 
misleading presentations of the workings of domestic law.597 More particularities will come to the 
fore as the chapter progresses. These are all ways in which the Court’s capacity to pursue not only 
individual justice, but more widely, its ability to elaborate a form of pan-regional ‘constitutional’ 
justice. 
It is unsurprising, given this context, that the Court tends to draw on external normative 
sources to bolster its decisions. Its decision concerning Brazil’s Amnesty Law, Gomes Lund 
(Guerrilha do Araguaia) v Brazil,598 is indicative of its broad approach, with the Court citing 
decisions of the Human Rights Committee, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression, various Special Rapporteurs at the UN, the Secretary General of the UN, the 
European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human Rights, and the 
constitutional courts of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Uruguay.  
 
2.2 THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S KEY DECISIONS CONCERNING BRAZIL 
 
Like domestic democratisation jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court’s democratisation 
jurisprudence concerning Brazil may be identified as relating to the three dimensions of facilitating 
construction of a democratic public sphere, mediating the shift from an undemocratic to a 
democratic order, and carving out the Court’s own role in shaping the democratisation process. 
However, as we will see, the manner in which the Inter-American Court approaches these tasks, 
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A norm cascade to a bare trickle 
 
Compared to the continuous stream of case-law from the Brazilian Supreme Court, to date the 
Inter-American Court has handed down no more than six decisions in actions taken against Brazil, 
between 2002 and 2010. However, it has found violations of the Convention in every case bar 
one–a remarkable strike rate by any standards. No systematic study of these decisions exists in the 
literature, but they address a mixture of authoritarian practices which bled into the democratic era 
and the legislative legacy of authoritarian rule. Four of the six cases are of particular importance 
here.599  
In Nogueira de Carvalho v Brazil600 in 2006 the Court found no violation of the Convention 
in the State’s investigation into the 1996 murder of a human rights activist and journalist who had 
denounced the activities of “the Golden Boys”, a death squad in which civil police officers and 
other government officials had allegedly taken part. In Escher v Brazil601 in 2009 the Court found 
a violation of the Convention right to privacy (Art. 11) due to police wiretapping, and subsequent 
broadcast, of phone conversations of members of the Landless Rural Workers Movement, holding 
that the wiretapping had been conducted in breach of Brazilian law and that the State had provided 
no satisfactory explanation as to how the recordings had made their way into the public domain.602 
In Garibaldi v Brazil,603 also in 2009, the Court found the State in violation of the Convention 
rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection (Arts. 8 and 25) due to the State’s lack of due 
diligence in investigating the death of an activist during an extrajudicial operation to evict the 
families of landless rural workers in the south of Brazil. Finally, Gomes Lund in 2010, discussed in 
the next section, addressed the State’s failure to investigate the disappearance of guerrilla fighters 
in the Araguaia region of the Amazon in the 1970s in the course of a military operation.  
The facts of the Nogueira, Escher and Garibaldi cases are complex and need not detain us 
here. What is important is that, although the State in the latter two cases was ordered to conduct 
an effective investigation, it has for various reasons been unable to fully comply. To a certain extent, 
this stems from the federal structure of the State and the weakness of any mechanism to co-
ordinate portions of the federal government to pursue compliance, or between federal and state 
entities.  
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[C]lassic institutional difficulties still have not been resolved. Repeated non-compliance with 
obligations to investigate, present in all of the rulings [of the Inter-American Court against Brazil], 
indicates an ineffective police and investigative apparatus, as well as a lagging judiciary and deficient 
training program for State human rights agents. 604 
We get a sense here, similar to the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases such as the Provisional 
Measures Case, that what can look at first glance like successful democratisation jurisprudence can 
prove to have very little effect on the ground.  A ‘norm cascade’ at the Inter-American source can 
all too easily turn into a bare trickle at its Brazilian destination. It has also been repeatedly observed 
in recent years that ‘control of conventionality’ is simply not a reality in any of Brazil’s state organs, 
including the police, judiciary and military. 605  This tends to lead to pessimistic conclusions 
concerning the Court’s quasi-advisory rulings in contentious cases where it finds no Convention 
violation. In Nogueira de Carvalho, for instance, while the Court emphasised the importance of 
protecting human rights defenders engaged in revealing the truth of past rights violations,606 which 
may be seen as a core aspect of the construction of a democratic public sphere, it is hard to tell 
whether this had any concrete effect on Brazil’s State machinery. The Court’s intervention 
regarding the Amnesty Law, by contrast, has had a clear impact.  
 
An external take on democratic transition: the Court’s judgment on the 1979 Amnesty Law 
 
The Amnesty Law of 1979 came before the Inter-American Court’s as the end-point of a separate 
legal battle to that which had brought the law before the Supreme Court. It had begun in the lower 
courts of Brazil in 1982, seeking a State investigation into the disappearances of 70 people, 
including local civilians and members of a Communist guerrilla movement, by the military 
authorities between 1972 and 1974 in covert military action to eliminate the movement.  
Political solutions offered to the applicants, including the Law of the Disappeared of 1995 
which provided for compensation to be paid to the relatives of the Araguaia guerrillas, all stopped 
short of investigation. In 2003 President da Silva, spurred by the acceptance of a petition against 
the State to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, had made the further move of 
establishing a governmental Inter-Ministerial Commission, charged with obtaining information on 
the remains of the Araguaia victims. However, that commission solely included state 
representatives and appeared to have submitted to onerous conditions imposed by the military 
regarding the sought information–crucially, that it would not be used to revise the Amnesty Law. 
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The Commission’s final report in 2007 accepted the military authorities’ claims that all documents 
concerning the Araguaia guerrilla massacre had been destroyed.607 Thus, no movement was made 
to repeal the Amnesty Law or to investigate the Araguaia massacre and pursue prosecution of 
those responsible. The military appeared to still wield considerable power as a veto actor in Brazil’s 
democratic order.  
In November 2010, mere months after the Supreme Court had upheld the Amnesty Law, 
the Inter-American Court handed down its decision, holding that certain provisions of the Law, 
in precluding the investigation and punishment of severe human rights violations, are incompatible 
with the American Convention and have no legal basis. Although it recognised the efforts the State 
had made to address past human rights violations of this nature, the Court held that that the law 
was no longer to be invoked as an obstacle to a full criminal investigation of the facts in the case, 
or the identification and punishment of those responsible for the deaths of the guerrillas.  
The Inter-American Court was not amenable to State arguments that the Amnesty Law’s 
validity had been upheld by the Supreme Court, and, unlike that court, was not swayed by the 
contention that the law had implemented a political decision, agreed by actors across the political 
spectrum, which had facilitated “the transition to a State of law”.608 Without engaging with this 
argument, the Court simply reiterated its established position that all amnesties for serious 
violations of human rights, however enacted, are invalid under the Convention.609 Moved to the 
regional setting, the ‘quasi-constituent power’ arguments before the Supreme Court appeared to 
lose all traction in the proceedings before the Inter-American Court. External to the constitution, 
external to the State, and tasked with upholding a separate normative instrument, the Court had 
no institutional connection to, and felt in no way bound by, a domestic meta-constitutional 
agreement made over thirty years previously.  
Having observed that courts in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Colombia had adhered 
to its jurisprudence in divesting amnesty laws of legal effect,610 the Court expressly, though tersely, 
noted that the Brazilian authorities, including the Supreme Court, had failed to carry out any 
“conventionality control” to assess the Amnesty Law against Brazil’s obligations as a party to the 
American Convention, as required under its 2006 decision in Almonacid Arellano v Chile:611  
[W]hen a State is a Party to an international treaty such as the American Convention, all of its organs, 
including its judges, are also subject to it, wherein they are obligated to ensure that the effects of the 
provisions of the Convention are not reduced by the application of norms that are contrary to the 
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purpose and end goal and that from the onset lack legal effect. The Judicial Power, in this sense, is 
internationally obligated to exercise “control of conventionality” ex officio between the domestic 
norms and the American Convention, evidently in the framework of its respective jurisdiction and 
the appropriate procedural regulations. In this task, the Judicial Power must take into account not 
only the treaty, but also the interpretation that the Inter-American Court, as the final interpreter of 
the American Convention, has given it.612 
Beyond reparations for the individual applicants, the State was ordered to, inter alia, 
investigate and prosecute those responsible and to determine the whereabouts of the victims; to 
guarantee to avoid any repetition of the violations, including human rights training for the Armed 
Forces; to recognise a stand-alone crime of forced disappearance in domestic law; to provide access 
to, collation of, and publication of relevant documents in the State’ possession; and to create a 
truth commission. 
 
The decision’s impact on Brazil’s democratisation process 
 
The Amnesty Law decision is notable for its direct impact on Brazil’s democratisation process, 
unlike the negligible impact of the judgments in Escher and Garibaldi. Although the State has not 
been willing to repeal the Amnesty Law in line with the Inter-American Court’s judgment, the 
Court’s decision led to two principal developments with wide-reaching effects. 
First, the decision prodded the Brazilian state into enacting a law613 to give effect to the 
extensive constitutional right to personal information held by the State or public agencies, which 
had lain dormant since the Constitution’s enactment in 1988. Thus, although the Inter-American 
Court did not approach the matter as a domestic constitutional court, we see the clear impact of 
its decision on entrenchment of the domestic constitution–the right to information being one of 
the core democratic rights argued to be central to the creation of a democratic public sphere in 
Chapter Three. It is of course, unclear how fully the right will now be vindicated, but enactment 
of the law giving it effect appears as a strong act of disentrenchment: it may be considered a 
milestone in breaking down one more vestige of the authoritarian state mindset and apparatus of 
secrecy. 
Perhaps more importantly, the decision led to the establishment in November 2011, at the 
initiative of President Rouseff, of a National Truth Commission (Commissão Nacional de Verdade), 
charged with producing a report on human rights abuses committed from 1946-1988. Over a 
period of two years, the Commission conducted hearings and gathered expert testimony 
concerning the military juntas of 1964-85 in particular. Its final report, issued in December 2014, 
found that torture, summary executions and forced disappearances had constituted official state 
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policy under the military government of 1964-85; documented a raft of politically-motivated 
killings; called for the military to recognise their responsibility for the “grave” rights violations 
perpetrated under their rule; identified by name 377 people as responsible for such abuses; 
recommended that those still alive should be brought to trial; and called for amendment of the 
Amnesty Law to preclude its application to such cases in light of their gravity.614 A proliferation of 
truth commissions in individual states and even universities has been said to reflect “growing civil 
society demand for accountability”, in a historical context of weak civil society mobilisation to 
address impunity in Brazil.615 
The Court’s decision, and the domestic constitutional and political change which it set in 
train, also appears to have bolstered a sea-change in the perception of the Amnesty Law. While it 
remains in force, there are increasing moves to challenge or circumvent its application, in the 
context of prosecutions against government officials, and members of the police and military 
forces for authoritarian-era crimes.616 This has all occurred all in the teeth of significant military 
opposition.617 Therefore, not only has the work of the Truth Commission facilitated a society-wide 
discussion of the experience of military dictatorship; it has also confirmed full civilian control of 
the government apparatus and the clear limits of the military as an unconstitutional veto power. 
There is clearly more to be said about the questions this decision raises. First, the next Part places 
the Brazilian experience in the wider regional context. 
 
3 BRAZIL IN THE WIDER REGIONAL CONTEXT OF LATIN 
AMERICA 
 
The above sections have revealed stark differences between the democratisation jurisprudence of  
the Brazilian Supreme Court and the Inter-American Court, in terms of  volume, content, 
motivation and impact. They have also revealed a lack of  engagement by the Brazilian Court with 
the Court in San José in the elaboration of  such jurisprudence, which has dulled the latter’s capacity 
to impact on the democratisation process. How does the Brazilian scenario fit within its wider 
regional context? The following section focuses on judicial interaction between the Inter-American 
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Court and other constitutional courts in Latin America, as a central aspect of  the way in which the 
Inter-American Court seeks to impact on democratisation processes, before considering in more 
depth the way in which the Inter-American Court’s externality to the State affects its adjudication 
within a three-dimensional political space. 
 
3.1 THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT: A REGIONAL OUTLIER? 
  
It is tempting to characterise the Supreme Court’s refusal to genuflect before the Inter-American 
Court as anomalous, given that other constitutional courts have tended to engage in a ‘lively 
interaction’ with their regional counterpart. 618  We have seen above, for instance, that the 
constitutional courts in five of Brazil’s neighbouring countries have shown a marked willingness 
to invalidate or curb application of domestic amnesty laws in line with the Inter-American Court’s 
case-law.  
More generally, various constitutional courts (e.g. Colombia and Peru), inspired by the 
French doctrine of ‘bloc de constitutionnalité’, have through their case-law elevated international 
human rights norms to constitutional status; conceiving constitutional law and certain international 
human rights norms–particularly Inter-American norms–as forming a coherent and combined set 
of standards for judicial review.619 Even the Chilean Constitutional Court, which eschews the 
formal doctrine of a ‘block of constitutionality’, “reflexively” uses Inter-American jurisprudence 
to reinterpret domestic law.620 Inter-American jurisprudence has thus tended to influence their 
democratisation jurisprudence to a greater extent than its peripheral role in Brazilian jurisprudence. 
The Inter-American Court’s elaboration of  a doctrine of  ‘control of  conventionality’ has 
bolstered such moves, due to a growing realisation in the Court since the early 2000s at least that 
its jurisprudence will have little effect without the active assistance of  State organs, especially 
domestic courts. In 2001, Justice Trindade, in a concurring opinion in the Court’s landmark free 
speech judgment in The Last Temptation of  Jesus Christ  case against Chile, emphasised that a 
continuing violation of  the Convention could arise from the content not only of  national 
legislation but also the “jurisprudence constante” of  national courts.621 Speaking of  the “ideal of  the 
full compatibilization of  the domestic legal order with the norms of  the international protection 
of  human rights”, he urged the need for “a true change of  mentality, in the high courts of  almost 
all countries of  Latin America”: 
 
618  D García-Sayan, ‘Una Viva Interacción: Corte Interamericana y Tribunales Internos’ in La Corte 
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A new mentality will emerge, with regard to the Judiciary, as from the understanding that the direct 
application of the international norms of human rights protection is beneficial to the inhabitants of 
all countries, and that, instead of the adherence to juridico-formal constructions and syllogisms and 
to a hermetic normativism, what is truly required is to proceed to the correct interpretation of the 
applicable norms, whether of international or national origin, so as to secure the full protection of 
the human being. 
… 
[T]here exists no legal obstacle or impossibility at all for the direct application at domestic law level 
of the international norms of protection, but what is rather required is the will (animus) of the public 
power (above all the Judiciary) to apply them, amidst the understanding that one will thereby be 
giving concrete expression to common superior values, consubstantiated in the effective safeguard 
of human rights…622 
In place of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s lecture on political morality to the Adenauer 
regime in 1961, discussed in Chapter Two, we see here a lecture on judicial morality, exhorting 
constitutional courts to act as the domestic enforcers of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence. 
Justice Trindade’s approach was reformulated by the Court five years later as the ‘control of 
conventionality’ doctrine in Almonacid Arellano v Chile, referenced in Gomes Lund above: 
[W]hen the Legislative Power fails to set aside and/or adopts laws which are contrary to the 
American Convention, the Judiciary is bound to honor the obligation to respect rights as stated in 
Article 1(1) of the said Convention, and consequently, it must refrain from enforcing any laws 
contrary to such Convention. […] 
124. The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are bound to respect the rule of law, and 
therefore, they are bound to apply the provisions in force within the legal system. But when a State 
has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State, 
are also bound by such Convention. This forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions 
embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are 
contrary to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects since their inception . In other words, the 
Judiciary must exercise a sort of “conventionality control” between the domestic legal provisions 
which are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. To perform 
this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof 
made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.623 
It is notable that the doctrine is expressed in ‘constitutional’ language reminiscent of the 
discussion of ‘revocation’ in the Brazilian Supreme Court’s Prior Laws judgment, in the Court’s 
reference to Convention-incompatible laws having had no legal effects since the Convention’s 
adoption. Rather than an abstract monism, the particular care taken to address domestic courts 
suggests a conception of ‘international law-as-federal-order’, as discussed in Chapter Three.   
However, despite a rather harmonious pan-regional picture from afar, a closer inspection 
reveals that the Brazilian Supreme Court is merely at one end of  a spectrum of  differential 
adherence to the Inter-American Court’s decisions.624 The Argentine Supreme Court, for instance, 
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was a regional front-runner in affirming the interpretive guidance value of  Inter-American 
jurisprudence in its Giroldi judgment of  1995.625 This was seen to full effect in the Simón 626 
decision of  2005, in which it invalidated Argentina’s amnesty laws in line with Inter-American 
jurisprudence, stating that the status accorded to international human rights law by constitutional 
reforms in 1994 would require, at times, exceptions to the Constitution to be recognised; or 
‘bubbles’ in the constitution into which the Court would insert external norms.627  
Yet, as Damián González-Salzburg has observed, the Court’s case-law on the binding nature 
of  Inter-American Court decisions has been quite inconsistent, evincing significant ‘jurisprudential 
swings’, and ignoring the Inter-American Court’s case-law in some judgments after Simón.628 It has 
been noted that the Simón decision dovetailed with the policies of  the new Kirchner administration 
elected in 2003, and that Court’s annulment in 2007 of  pardons granted to the top tier of  junta 
generals after the transition to be unconstitutional was strongly pushed by President Kirchner.629 
This tends to suggest less wholesome drivers for the Argentine Court’s engagement with Inter-
American jurisprudence than a sense of  judicial partnership. 
In other courts, such as Chile, any sense of  a full ‘control of  conventionality’, explicitly using 
Inter-American case-law as an inescapable standard for constitutional adjudication is partial, at 
best.630 For all the talk, and emerging reality, of  transnational judicial community and a pan-regional 
constitutional order, the national context, and the domestic court’s role as a ‘gate-keeper’ regarding 
the reception of  international norms, remains central. 
 
3.2 THE ODDITIES OF ADJUDICATION IN 3-DIMENSIONAL POLITICAL SPACE  
 
The discussion thus far has focused on the relationship between domestic courts and the Inter-
American Court, and how this affects their roles as democracy-builders. In this section, we broaden 
the canvas to get a picture of the interaction of courts and non-judicial actors in a three-
dimensional political space, to use Scheppele’s chess metaphor from Chapter Three. We have 
already seen, for instance, the Brazilian State flitting between different levels of the chess board in 
‘cherry-picking’ its implementation of the Inter-American Court’s orders in Gomes Lund. Here, we 
look at two other examples, offered by two Inter-American Court judgments: The Last Temptation 
of Christ631 case against Chile in 2001; and Gelman v Uruguay632 in 2011.  
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These two decisions allow us to focus more closely on the complex and overlapping 
interaction of different sites of constitutional authority, which complicates the courts’ roles as 
democracy-builders. In particular, in a similar manner to the Brazilian State’s arguments in Gomes 
Lund, we encounter arguments in both cases concerning the democratic credentials of the State 
and domestic decision-making processes, which attempt to ‘immunise’ the State from regional 
oversight by the Inter-American Court. Such arguments, evidently, do not appear in cases before 
domestic courts.  
In the Last Temptation of Jesus Christ, the Chilean State, defending the censorship of a film 
through an administrative decision which had been upheld by the Supreme Court, relied on an 
audacious argument: responsibility for the violation could not be imputed to it on the basis that it 
had occurred as a result of a judicial decision with which it did not agree, but which the government 
was bound to respect due to a democratic concern for the separation of powers: 
In a pluralist society, such as that of Chile, the courts are independent and there are sectors of the 
magistrature whose concept of the legal system leads them to maintain that prohibitions may be 
ordered by invoking other constitutional guarantees, such as those in article 19(4) of the Constitution 
on honor and intimacy. The Chilean magistrature is extremely legalistic. 
[T]he fact that judges have delivered judgments contrary to those articles is not sufficient grounds 
for maintaining that the State violated the Convention. […][T]he context must be taken into 
consideration – which is that of a pluralist, democratic system with separation of powers – and the 
intention of the provision. 
[…] In the instant case, Chile is not alleging its internal law in order to fail to perform the provisions 
of the American Convention. Formal legal texts include international norms, but, unfortunately, 
there are sectors of the profession and the magistrature in Chile that have not been receptive to this 
situation. 
 The State’s solution–a purported constitutional amendment to replace the system of film 
censorship with a classification system–though recognised as important by the Court, did not 
prevent it from finding a violation given that the required change in the law had not been effected 
at the time of the judgment, and ordered the State to amend its domestic law “within a reasonable 
period”.633 The argument made here, as we have seen, led the Court to become increasingly 
concerned with the role of domestic courts as ‘Inter-American’ courts. 
In Gelman v Uruguay, concerning the State’s failure to investigate the disappearance of a 
heavily pregnant student during the authoritarian era, the Court was faced with an amnesty law 
(the ‘Expiry Law’)634 that had not only been enacted by a democratic legislature one year after 
Uruguay’s return to democratic rule in 1985, but also–due to repeated calls for its repeal the law 
and affirmation of its constitutionality by the Supreme Court in 1988–had been upheld twice in 
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referendums of 1989 and 2009. Each time it had been upheld by a relatively slim margin (57% in 
the first and 53% in the second); indicative, one scholar offers, “of a widespread sentiment in 
Uruguay that the majority wants to move forward and focus on continuing to build a sustainable 
democracy.”635  The second referendum, however, pitted ‘the people’ against the Supreme Court, 
which just days prior to the referendum had struck down the law as unconstitutional.636  
The Inter-American Court expended little energy on the constitutional entanglement that 
had arisen in the State. Decided a number of months after its judgment in Gomes Lund, the 
judgment underscored once again the Court’s refusal to bow to arguments stressing the democratic 
credentials of the challenged law; including those linked to popular sovereignty, as well as its 
insistence on a thick conception of ‘true’ democracy as based fundamentally on rights protection, 
reminiscent of Luigi Ferrajoli’s conception discussed in Chapter One, and the Brazilian Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the Electoral Thresholds Case: 
238. The fact that the Expiry Law of the State has been approved in a democratic regime and yet 
ratified or supported by the public, on two occasions, namely, through the exercise of direct 
democracy, does not automatically or by itself grant legitimacy under International Law. The 
participation of the public in relation with the law, using methods of direct exercise of democracy … 
should be considered, as an act attributable to the State that give rise to its international responsibility. 
 
239. The bare existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect of 
International Law, including International Law of Human Rights... The democratic legitimacy of 
specific facts in a society is limited by the norms of protection of human rights recognized in 
international treaties, such as the American Convention, in such a form that the existence of one 
true democratic regime is determined by both its formal and substantial characteristics, and therefore, 
particularly in cases of serious violations of nonrevocable norms of International Law, the protection 
of human rights constitutes a [sic] impassable limit to the rule of the majority, that is, to the forum 
of the “possible to be decided” by the majorities in the democratic instance, those who should also 
prioritize “control of conformity with the Convention” … which is a function and task of any public 
authority and not only the Judicial Branch. In this sense, the Supreme Court of Justice has exercised 
an appropriate control of conformity with the Convention in respect to the Expiry law, by 
establishing, inter alia, that “the limits of the sovereignty of the majority lies, essentially, in two 
aspects: the guardianship of the fundamental rights (first, amongst all, the right to life and personal 
liberty, and there is no will of the majority, nor the general interest, nor the common good wherein 
these can be sacrificed) and the subjection of the public authorities to the law.”  Other domestic 
courts [the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica and the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia] have also referred to the limits of democracy in relation to the protection of 
fundamental rights. 
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In October 2011, five months after a parliamentary vote on a Bill to replace the Expiry Law 
resulted in a 49-49 deadlock, a law637 was enacted to repeal the Expiry Law, lifting all bars on 
prosecutions, including application of the statute of limitations.638  
 
3.3 CARVING OUT A ROLE FOR THE COURT: FOUR OBSERVATIONS 
 
It should be evident from the brief discussion above that the Inter-American Court’s capacity and 
means to support democratisation processes differs significantly from the capacity of a domestic 
courts. Four observations might be made here. 
First, it is important to appreciate that the Court’s intervention in any one democratisation 
process tends to be infrequent. We can compare, for instance, the Colombian Constitutional 
Court’s total of 9,442 judgments from 1992-2004 (an average of 840 decisions per year)639 with the 
three judgments by the Inter-American Court in cases against Colombia during the same period. 
This means its greatest hope of an effective democratisation jurisprudence is for states to submit 
to all of its judgments, whether they are respondents or not before the Court.  
Yet, second, while the Court has considerable success in achieving individual justice, it 
encounters significant difficulty in pursuing constitutional justice, i.e. addressing structural 
deficiencies in the new democracies which impede rights protection, the constraint of public power, 
and reckoning with the rights violations of the past. Despite concrete achievements in, for instance, 
reducing the application of amnesty laws and amending or eliminating harsh criminal defamation 
laws, it has encountered a complex web of obstacles in the reception of its judgments at the 
domestic level, including not only inconsistent reference to its case-law in domestic courts but also 
an overall lack of co-ordination within the State to implement its decisions.  
That said, even where aspects of implementation are lacking, as seen in Brazil’s reaction to 
the Gomes Lund decision, the Court’s decisions can have a profound impact, freeing up a form of 
‘bottleneck’ in the domestic democratisation process by addressing matters that the political 
branches, judiciary and civil society have been unable to address. In addition, the Court’s 
externality to the constitutional order might be characterised as an asset at times. In the Gelman 
decision, for instance, the clash between the constituted power of the Supreme Court and the 
referendum as an expression of popular sovereignty was, once brought to the Court, transmuted 
from a constitutional clash to a simpler question of obeisance to international law. Yet, the ease 
with which the Court in each case dispenses with democratic concerns gives cause for significant 
pause. The idea that ‘true’ democracy simply depends on right protection appears to be a 
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simplification; an example of the tendency observed by Walker, discussed in Chapter One, to 
‘define up’ democracy rather than admitting the iterative relationship between democracy and 
constitutional law, and the tensions between them.  
Third, the Court’s externality to the democratisation process in any given state has a 
profound impact on its conception of its role, the justification for that role, and its limits. The 
Inter-American Court has had to push hard and shout loud to carve out any space for itself in 
domestic political orders and the regional space. Coupled with a docket full of severe and 
widespread rights violations, this has led to a generalised tendency toward assertiveness, which 
leaves little room for differential treatment for different states. From Gomes Lund, The Last 
Temptation and Gelman above there is a clear sense of the Inter-American Court’s unwillingness to 
investigate the democratic quality of the laws and acts that come before it for assessment, or to 
accord differential deference to States based on their democratic progress.  
From its external perch, the only ‘quality’ issue is the compatibility of the domestic norm 
with the Convention. This is ostensibly based on a principled adherence to international law as 
having overriding force and on traditional understandings of responsibility under international law 
as based on the indivisibility of the State. However, it is perhaps also based on an understanding 
that to evince openness to such arguments would lead to every State in the region seeking special 
treatment due either to its democratic success, or, conversely, the difficulties of its democratisation 
process–which, we will see at the end of the chapter, is the reality in Europe.  
Fourth, all courts as they carve out their role become, in a sense, hostage to an accretion of 
doctrinal development, which increasingly limits their freedom to manoeuvre, but they must retain 
some element of flexibility in order to address different contexts. This is seen to starkest effect in 
the Court’s judgment in Almonacid. The majority judgment affirming the Court’s strong line on 
the incompatibility of amnesty laws with the Convention, penned by the Court’s then President, 
Justice Trindade, was, rather unusually, followed by a concurring opinion from the same judge, 
which appeared to suggest (albeit obliquely) that some amnesties might pass muster under the 
Convention. Eventually, in Massacres of El Mozote v El Salvador 640 in 2012 the Court did make a 
distinction between the amnesty laws struck down in its early jurisprudence an amnesty laws aimed 
at ending armed conflict. This must all be considered in the context that Colombia has, for some 
time, been engaged in a peace process aimed at ending a half-century of violent conflict, which 








4 LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTER-REGIONAL CONTEXT: EUROPE 
AND AFRICA 
 
The above Parts have provided a sense of how courts operate and interact, with one another and 
with other sites of constitutional authority, in Latin American democratisation processes since the 
1980s. The very different settings, aims and normative frameworks of domestic and regional courts, 
and how these impact their roles as democracy-builders, has been emphasised. It is clear that the 
validity of amnesty laws has been a particular preoccupation in the Inter-American context, 
bringing regional courts into conflict with governments and courts, domestic courts into conflict 
with ‘the people’, and bringing some domestic courts into conflict with the domestic constitution. 
In this Part the aim is to show how similar patterns of interaction, and similar questions, can be 
seen in the elaboration of democratisation jurisprudence in Africa and Europe; although the 
former appears more similar to the Latin American experience than the latter. 
In Africa the central case to date has concerned the disentrenchment of one-party rule and 
entrenchment of a multiparty system, in Tanganyika Law Society v Tanzania.641 In Europe, the 
main concern has been the struggle to achieve democratic rule in the aftermath of totalitarian 
Communist governance, which shines a light on the difficult balance required to be achieved 
between entrenchment of the new democratic order and disentrenchment of the old order. The 
main decision examined here is Ždanoka v Latvia.642  
 
4.1 AFRICA: NEW CONTEXT, FAMILIAR PATTERNS  
 
As briefly discussed in Chapter Two, Tanganyika, the first merits judgment of the African Court 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights, issued in 2013, saw the Court adopt an assertiveness on a par with 
the Inter-American Court in Velásquez-Rodriguez a quarter-century previous, holding that 
Tanzania’s constitutional ban on independent electoral candidacy constituted a violation of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Even more strikingly, the case presents a mirror 
image of the three-dimensional interaction between judicial, political and constituent power, 
discussed above. 
The case, like Gomes Lund, had a long history before it reached the regional sphere, first 
arising in the context of Tanzania’s transition to electoral democracy in 1995. Amendments in 
1993 to the 1977 Constitution, paving the way from one-party to multi-party politics, had required 
candidates in elections to hold membership of, and be sponsored by, a political party. On foot of 
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a constitutional challenge, the High Court in 1994,643 citing the Indian Supreme Court’s ‘basic 
structure’ doctrine, found the amendments to be unconstitutional on the basis that restricting 
candidacy to political party members held significant potential for abuse and, in its view, would 
“render illusory the emergence of a truly democratic society.”644  
However, a week before the High Court issued its judgment, the government enacted a new 
bill to amend the Constitution,645 which had the effect of nullifying what was anticipated to be an 
adverse judgment. In a further challenge brought by the same applicant the High Court in 2006646 
again struck down the amending act, on the basis that it infringed electoral rights, was unnecessary 
and unreasonable and was therefore a disproportionate measure. It ordered the government to 
establish a legislative framework to permit independent candidates to run in elections, setting the 
deadline as the date of the next general election in October 2010. 
This decision was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal sitting en banc in a 
judgment of June 2010,647 on the basis that a court could not declare a constitutional provision to 
be unconstitutional in a substantive sense; only where the procedure for constitutional amendment 
has been violated. The Court stressed that opening the electoral system to independent candidates 
is a political question, to be addressed by Parliament. However, as Makulilo notes, the Court took 
a shot across the bows of the political branches: 
We give a word of advice to both the Attorney General and our Parliament: The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, in paragraph 21 of its General Comment No.25, of July 12, 1996, said as 
follows on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, very similarly 
worded as Art 23 of the American Convention and our Art 21 [of the African Charter]: The Right 
of persons to stand for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to be 
members of parties or of specific parties. Tanzania is known for our good record on human rights 
and particularly our militancy for the right to self determination and hence our involvement in the 
liberation struggle. We should seriously ponder that comment from a Committee of the United 
Nations, that is, the whole world.648 
The State, following the decision, made moves toward initiating a consultative process to 
seek the views of Tanzanian citizens concerning the possible amendment of the Constitution;649 
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The African Court’s decision 
 
In June 2011 the same applicant (joined by two legal organisations) brought the matter to the 
African Court, claiming violation of the African Charter rights to freedom of Association (Art. 10), 
to participate in public and governmental affairs (Art. 13) and the right against discrimination (Art. 
2), as well as a broader argument that the State had “violated the rule of law by initiating a 
constitutional review process to settle an issue pending before the courts of Tanzania.”651 Freedom 
of association, they argued, is “a core democratic principle” designed to permit citizens to monitor 
the State, ensure proper discharge of its functions, and ensure that the government complies with 
legislation with the aim of achieving transparency and accountability.652 
The State argued, inter alia, that the case should deemed as inadmissible due to the failure 
to exhaust domestic remedies: the Court of Appeal judgment had left the matter to Parliament, 
which had yet to consider it, and the constitutional review process, the State contended, would not 
only permit the views of the applicant to be heard, but would occur within the operation of a 
Constituent Assembly, which would consider the provisions of a new constitution. The matter, 
the State stressed, had thus “been left to the people of Tanzania.”653  
Regarding the merits, the State argued–citing the Inter-American Court’s judgment in 
Castañeda Gutman v Mexico,654 which had been relied on by the Court of Appeal–that the bar on 
independent candidates to stand in elections was based on “the social needs of the country, based 
on its historical reality”655 and sought to achieve various aims, including the exigencies of national 
security, defence, public order, public peace and morality, regional representation in federal state, 
and avoidance of tribalism.656 Of most relevance was the State’s democratisation-based argument 
that at the time of the constitutional reform in 1992 
Tanzania was still in the throes of establishing a multiparty democracy. The country, at the time, was 
as yet to hold its very first general election under the multi-party system, and it was still at its infant 
stage of multiparty democracy, and there was not any compelling social need for independent 
candidature.657 
In response to the applicants’ rule of law argument, the State insisted that it respected the 
principle of the rule of law, the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary as provided 
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for by its constitution, that the Constitution permitted amendment of its text, and that the 1994 
amendment had followed the required constitutional procedure.658 
The Court, in its judgment of June 2013, unanimously found violations of freedom of 
association and the right to participate in public and governmental affairs, and by a majority of 
seven to two a violation of the non-discrimination provisions of the Charter. Addressing the 
admissibility argument concerning the failure to exhaust local remedies, the Court, citing a key 
decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and jurisprudence of the 
European and Inter-American courts of human rights, emphasised that ‘local remedies’ referred 
primarily to judicial remedies which must be “available, effective and sufficient”; criteria which it 
viewed the constitutional review process as incapable of fulfilling.659 Having noted earlier in its 
judgment that the Constitution Review Bill of 2011 was still undergoing parliamentary scrutiny, 
the Court stated: 
The parliamentary process, which the Respondent states should also be exhausted is a political 
process and is not an available, effective and sufficient remedy because it is not freely accessible to 
each and every individual; it is discretionary and may be abandoned anytime; moreover, the outcome 
thereof depends on the will of the majority. No matter how democratic the parliamentary process 
will be, it cannot be equated to an independent judicial process for the vindication of the rights under 
the Charter.660  
Arguments based on the social needs, historical reality and federal structure of the State were 
given equally short shrift. Citing relevant case-law of the European and Inter-American courts, the 
Court affirmed that limitations to the rights and freedoms in the African Charter are restricted to 
the parameters of Article 27(2) of the Charter,661 can only be set out in the form of laws of “general 
application” and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.662  
Viewing the State as having failed to show the ban on independent candidates as falling 
within the scope of permissible restrictions in Article 27(2), the Court stressed that, in any case, it 
could not be deemed proportionate to the alleged aim of fostering national unity and solidarity, 
and, citing the same Human Rights Committee Resolution invoked by the Court of Appeal, that 
any limitations should be “in consonance with international standards, to which the Respondent 
is expected to adhere.”663 The Court further emphasised that the ‘claw-back’ clauses in the Charter, 
which textually provide a wide basis for rights restriction,664 should not be interpreted against the 
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Charter and that regulation of rights and freedoms “may not be allowed to nullify the very rights 
and liberties they are to regulate”.  
In ascertaining a violation of the equality principle in the Charter, the Court found no merit 
in the State’s ‘democratisation’ argument that the history, social reality and federal structure of the 
State required “a gradual construction of a pluralist democracy in unity”.665 The Court declined to 
adjudicate on the ‘rule of law’ argument, on the basis that it was not connected to a specific right.666 
The Court therefore ordered the State to remedy the violations within a reasonable time through 
legislative, constitutional and “all other necessary measures”,667 and to inform the Court of the 
measures adopted. In effect, the State would have to amend the ban on independent candidates in 
the challenged electoral law and provisions of the Constitution to comply with the judgment. 
 
Tanganyika in three dimensions and its global context 
 
The African Court’s judgment in Tanganyika encapsulates the globalisation of the court-centric 
model of democratisation, and the complexity of elaborating democratisation jurisprudence in a 
three-dimensional space.  
Here, we see contestation at the domestic level between different courts as to ‘judging 
democratisation’. We see the normative straitjacket on the domestic courts as constituted powers 
within the constitutional framework, compared to the freedom of externality enjoyed by the 
regional court, which has no qualms in assessing the validity of constitutional provisions or ‘short-
circuiting’ a nascent constitutional amendment process. We see State arguments invoking 
democratic processes and the particularities of the democratisation process itself as reasons for 
immunity from either any review by the regional court, or its finding of a rights violation. We see 
a complex interaction between the Court of Appeal, the government and the African Court, where 
apparent judicial deference by the domestic court puts the political branches on notice of 
international law violations, thus opening a space for assertive action by the African Court. We see 
the African Court’s reference to its sister-courts in San José and Strasbourg, as well as the Human 
Rights Committee, in order to mitigate the deficiencies of the African Charter, while retaining the 
freedom to depart from external jurisprudence which does not serve its needs. Importantly, in this 
connection, like the Inter-American Court it has not adopted any margin of appreciation doctrine 
in the face of a hostile climate.  
We can follow the thread all the way back to post-war Germany in the reliance on 
proportionality reasoning in both the domestic and regional courts. Clearly, some sixty years after 
 
665 Para. 119, p.51. 
666 Para. 121. 




the Federal Constitutional Court’s first judgment in 1951, its pioneering post-authoritarian 
jurisprudence continues to reverberate through the courts of the world.  
Yet, interesting though this all is, as mentioned in Chapter Two the decision appeared to 
achieve little on the ground. The State has vigorously resisted the judgment, and it remains to be 
seen whether it will effect any change in Tanzanian law given that enforcement mechanisms for 
the Court’s judgments, and the political will to use them, remain weak.668 The norm cascade is once 
again reduced to a trickle. 
 
4.2 EUROPE AS THE INTER-REGIONAL OUTLIER 
 
Where does Europe fit in this global picture? At the end of his key work on the transitional 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, James Sweeney suggests that his research  
provides a starting point to inquire into whether any of the lessons learned in Europe have relevance 
outside of it.669   
The answer to this is, yes and no. The discussion in this chapter tends toward the conclusion that 
the European experience is of limited relevance to other regions. Set against the Inter-American 
and African experiences, it betrays three significant fundamental differences.  
First, as discussed in Chapter Two, the European Court was well-established by the time it 
was required to elaborate a democratisation jurisprudence for the new democracies of post-
Communist Europe. Submission to its jurisdiction was an accepted reality in Western Europe, and 
all aspirant members of the Council of Europe (and EU) were required to submit to its jurisdiction. 
It therefore appears that it did not have to exert itself unduly to become as a relevant actor in 
domestic orders. Second, its case-law and doctrine had been slowly forged in a post-war Western 
Europe where democratisation proceeded apace with little call for its intervention until the 1970s, 
by which time it was engaging in ‘fine-tuning’ of domestic law to render it compatible with the 
European Convention. Its core doctrine, the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, was fundamentally 
a recognition, not just of cultural diversity across Western Europe, but of the democratic 
credentials of the states under its supervision. Third, the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe have transitioned, not just from authoritarian rule, as seen in Latin America and Africa, 
but from totalitarian political systems that sought to occupy all available societal space, and which 
left an even stronger residue in the democratic era than military or strongman rule in other regions.  
Even if we confine ourselves here solely to electoral matters, compared to the 
straightforward question before the African Court in Tanganyika the European Court has faced a 
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difficult mix of cases concerning refusals to register new communist parties;670 refusals to register 
other antidemocratic or merely minority organisations;671 and prohibitions on the involvement of 
police officers in political activity,672 as well as lustration measures of differing severity. 673 This can 
involve somewhat different calculations as to the Court’s role in disentrenching the old order and 
entrenching the new, especially when the two functions appear to clash. It has also seen the Court 
evince a limited willingness to accept arguments based on the exigencies and difficulties of the 
democratisation process, compared to the deaf ear turned to such arguments by the human rights 
courts in other regions.  
A good example here is the Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in Ždanoka v Latvia. In 
earlier decisions the Court had embraced the concept of ‘self-defending democracy’ or ‘militant 
democracy’, echoing the German Federal Constitutional Court’s doctrine discussed in Chapter 
Two, under which certain restrictions to electoral rights in the European Convention674 could be 
permitted. This led to different results depending on the context. The doctrine was invoked in 
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v Turkey675  in 2003 to uphold Turkey’s outlawing of its biggest 
political party, on the basis that the party’s aims were anti-democratic and its promotion of sharia 
law lay in fundamental conflict with the principle of secularism in the domestic constitution. 
However, in various post-Communist states the Court has adopted a ‘tutelary’ role in urging states 
to adopt an attitude of openness and tolerance of extreme political views,676 where the danger 
posed by such views to the State is not “imminent”677 or there is no “real threat” posed to the 
society or state.678  
In Ždanoka the Grand Chamber of the Court swung back to a more hardline position, 
holding that a legal prohibition on candidates from standing for parliamentary elections who had 
participated in the Communist Party after 13 January 1991, when it had attempted a coup d’état, 
was not in violation of the Convention. The first judgment by the Chamber of the First Section 
had found the opposite, largely on the basis that the State had offered no evidence that the 
applicant had carried out any act capable of threatening the state, national security or the domestic 
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democratic order. That initial judgment had provoked, as Sweeney notes, significant dissent from 
Judge Bonello, arguing against blind promotion of human rights ideals 
Even in defiance of historical realities, the weakness of emergent and fragile pluralisms and the 
contradictions faced by a democracy called to contain democratically those who consider democracy, 
at best, expendable and, at worst, wholly detrimental. 
We see here the significant challenges in facilitating the construction of a democratic public 
sphere while attempting to mediate the shift from the old to the new order. In Refah Partisi the 
context concerned an entire party with millions of followers. In Ždanoka, by contrast, it is difficult 
to see how the voice of a single person could not be accommodated in the democratic order, even 
if it was linked to the past regime. It is hard to decide between the entrenchment value of allowing 
maximal respect to free speech, association and the right to stand for election and participate in 
democratic deliberation, and the disentrenchment value of excluding anti-democratic voices from 
a democratic public sphere which is nascent and fragile, in a context where portions of the citizenry 
may view the new democratic order with distaste.  
The lesson from Europe for the Inter-American and African regional human rights courts 
appears to be that greater sensitivity to democratisation processes, rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach, brings a new suite of difficulties and judgments into play. Uniformity, as best seen in 
the Inter-American jurisprudence, has the advantage of providing clear markers as to what is and 
is not acceptable, and signals greater respect for the universality of human rights, but lacks 
flexibility and can engender resistance as well as co-operation. Context-sensitivity and flexibility, 
on the other hand, can bring charges of inconsistency and unfairness. In Europe, Sweeney 
observes, for instance, the Court’s more understanding approach to Dutch lustration laws, as 
compared to Slovakian lustration laws.679 There is different treatment in Europe, also, as between 
new democracies, with the Court’s acceptance of electoral restrictions in the Latvian case of 
Ždanoka seemingly at odds with its finding of a violation in earlier Polish and Hungarian cases. 
The fundamental question underlying all of these discussions is the capacity of a regional 
court to assess just what is possible in, and required by, a new democracy, in order to support the 
democratisation process–its ability to ‘judge democratisation’. This point has been most vividly 
made as regards the Court’s judgment in Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina .680 In Sejdić the 
Court, placing significant emphasis on opinions of the Venice Commission, found candidacy rules 
for the respondent State’s tripartite presidency under consociational democratic arrangements, 
painstakingly established in the Dayton peace agreement to end the armed conflict which had 
 





ended over 100,000 lives in the mid-1990s, constituted discrimination contrary to the European 
Convention (Art. 12 and Art. 1 of Protocol No.12, in combination with Art. 3 of Protocol No.1). 
McCrudden and O’Leary681 have taken the Court to task for a rash and poorly reasoned judgment, 
arguing that it not only threatened democratic governance (albeit intensely supervised by external 
actors) and the tense peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina which had lasted just over a decade, thereby 
threatening the lives of those in the state, but also removed the decision on reform from those 
who should make it: 
[D]eciding when to make changes, who is to make them, and how they should be made should not 
be in the hands of a court.682 
 
5 CONCLUSION: A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION 
 
The question above, of course, hovers over every controversial decision made by courts in any 
democratic order, but has a particular added bite when related to a new democracy and the role of 
any court in supporting democratisation. 
This chapter has sought to explore the nature of democratisation jurisprudence at both the 
domestic and regional levels, in order to get a better sense of how the global model of court-centric 
democracy-building operates, through ‘double review’ at the domestic and regional levels. Taking 
in the case-study as a whole, it is clear that there are significant limitations in the capacities of the 
courts at each level to ‘build’ democracy, but that they nevertheless are able to shape and support 
the democratisation process at critical points. This provides the basis for the exploration in the 
next chapter of the crucial question: what should courts do in new democracies? 
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What Should Courts Do In                              
a New Democracy? 
 
 
...Lawfulness reveals all that is orderly and fitting, and often places fetters around the unjust. She 
makes the rough smooth, puts a stop to excess, dries up the blooming flowers of ruin, straightens 
out crooked judgments, tames deeds of pride, and puts an end to acts of sedition and to the 
anger of grievous strife. Under her all things among men are fitting and rational. 
Solon, Athenian law-giver and politician, 6th Century BC683 
 
Men will always prove bad unless, by necessity, they are compelled to be good. 
Niccolò Machiavelli, 1515684 
 
Judges may help us to become a truly democratic community without themselves becoming the 
unguarded guards of that community. 
Roberto Gargarella, 2004685 
 
        HE THESIS SO FAR HAS BEEN TETHERED to the existing reality of the 
world around us. We have been focused on how the global model of court-centric 
democratisation has developed from its primary roots in post-war Germany, to its migration 
across scores of new democracies in three world regions, and how it has retained a particular 
internal logic across time and space while also mutating in reaction to each new context. It is 
important, however, not to remain too tethered to what we see around us. The aim of this 
chapter is to jump from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’; to examine how this global model might be 
made better, and why. In doing so, it aims to preserve what is best about the current model, 
while exploring ways of avoiding the current trend of excessive reliance on courts and making 
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recommendations based on a clear-eyed view of the strengths and weaknesses of adjudication 
at each level.    
 
1 THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR 
 
This thesis started out with three questions: 
 How have domestic constitutional courts and regional human rights courts become 
such central actors in post-war democratisation processes? 
 What roles do these courts actually play in democratisation processes, and how does 
the democratisation context shape their roles? 
 What roles should courts play in a new democracy, as compared to a mature 
democracy? 
 
Chapters One and Two focused on the first research question above, while Chapters Two, 
Three and Four together focused on the second research question. This chapter focuses on 
the final question. First, a brief re-cap of the discussion in the four chapters thus far. 
Chapter One set out a basic analytical framework, which defines ‘new democracies’ as 
polities which have achieved electoral democracy through the holding of full, free and fair 
elections after non-democratic rule. Two basic stages, derived from democratisation theory, 
were adopted: ‘transition to democracy’, which refers to the process of political opening or 
revolution leading to elections; and ‘consolidation of democracy’, which refers to the process 
from the first elections onwards, in which the basic essentials of a democratic order are to be 
put in place. These include a functioning, fair and representative electoral system, core civil 
and political rights, a functioning and free media, and settled executive format.  
Chapter Two charted the development of a widespread perception in the post-war era 
of both constitutional courts and regional human rights courts as ‘democratisation 
technologies’; i.e. as central actors in successful democratisation processes. It was shown that 
this is somewhat of a misconception, mistaking correlation for causality as regards the 
prominence of constitutional courts in successful post-war Western European democratisation 
processes. This has been placed in stark relief by later democratisation processes outside 
Western Europe, where significant judicialisation (the transfer of governance power from 
representative organs to courts) has often not been accompanied by successful 
democratisation, and with the most extreme examples of judicialisation driven by unsuccessful 




of regional human rights courts as central to successful democratisation processes is somewhat 
overstated, with the Inter-American Court having had the most impact, albeit still limited, on 
democratisation processes in states under its jurisdiction.   
Chapter Three conceptualised the roles constitutional courts and regional human rights 
courts actually play in democratisation processes, through a concept of ‘democratisation 
jurisprudence’. This framework argued that the core activity of courts at both levels in 
supporting the democratisation process is related to three dimensions: facilitating the 
construction of a democratic public sphere; mediating the shift from an undemocratic to a 
democratic order; and carving out a role for the court itself in the new order. It was argued 
that the roles constitutional courts and regional human rights courts play in democratisation 
processes differ significantly. It was contended that constitutional courts generally act as 
primary sites of normativity, with regional human rights courts as a secondary site of 
normativity, but that regional adjudication can become more prominent when used as a core 
interpretive reference for domestic adjudication, or where the domestic court is unable to carry 
out its functions.  
Chapter Four applied this theoretical lens to a comparative case-study of 
democratisation jurisprudence in Brazil, which illuminated the challenging task facing courts 
at both levels in attempting to support and shape democratisation. That chapter underscored 
the very different ways the courts at each level approach key questions, due to their institutional 
setting and legal framework, and the lack of full co-ordination between the courts at each level 
in the project of democracy-building. We saw how adjudication at each level is fundamentally 
shaped by the context: for constitutional courts, their embeddedness in one state-bound 
constitutional order and democratisation process; for regional human rights courts, their 
externality to any one democratisation process and any domestic constitutional order. We also 
got a sense of the complex normative landscape in which democratisation has taken place in 
the new democracies of the 1980s onward, involving multiple sites of constitutional authority 
across a three-dimensional political space.  
 
2 THE AIM OF THIS CHAPTER: FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
 
Although there has clearly been a normative element to the discussion in the thesis thus far, 
this chapter takes a much more expressly normative tack in addressing the question of what 
roles constitutional courts and regional human rights courts should play to support 
democratisation processes. As Chapters Two, Three and Four have shown, great expectations 




significant institutional, political and epistemic challenges in this task. More importantly, 
although commonly conceived of as a combined system, there are multiple asymmetries 
between their purposes, setting, embeddedness in the democratisation context, and capacity 
to impact on the domestic order. This leads, at times, to starkly divergent approaches to the 
same key democratisation issues and sub-optimal outcomes in the effort to constrain anti-
democratic actors.  
Keeping in mind these key insights gained from the previous chapters, the problem 
addressed here is two-fold. First, certain prescriptions are offered concerning the roles courts 
at the domestic and regional levels should play within the existing framework, emphasising the 
strengths and weaknesses of adjudication at each level and the need for coordination between 
both levels. The second question is the deeper consideration of whether the global court-
centric model of democratisation itself needs to be re-evaluated, and how we might go about 
redesigning courts in the future to more effectively act as democracy-builders. The 
fundamental claim here is that we should embrace a position of ‘dynamic conservatism’ aimed 
at preserving the best of the judicialised post-war model for democratisation, while considering 
new possibilities for a broader-based system that pays more attention to interaction between 
the domestic and international levels, and which remains cognisant of the need to ensure that 
courts do not stifle the role of other actors in the democratisation process.  
In approaching these questions, it is tempting to jump straight into the discussion of the 
various normative arguments made by scholars such as Kim Lane Scheppele and Roberto 
Gargarella for the roles courts should play in a new democracy. However, in order to fully 
understand those arguments, it is important to first appreciate the essentials of the ‘core’ debate 
on the judicial role in a mature democracy. Although we will see that discussion of courts in 
new democracies is conducted in parallel to the ‘core’ debate, and departs from it in vital 
respects, the core debate has shaped our frameworks for even approaching questions regarding 
the appropriate roles for courts in new democracies, and is linked in various ways to the parallel 
discussion.  
The chapter therefore starts by briefly canvassing the core debate concerning the 
appropriate roles of courts in mature democracies, before contrasting it with the parallel 
discussion concerning the role of courts in a new democracy. Two central claims are made 
regarding the parallel discussion. First, it fails to take sufficient account of relevant arguments 
by political constitutionalists in the core debate. Second, there is a fundamental failure, across 





3 THE ‘CORE’ DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A MATURE 
DEMOCRACY 
 
The proper role of courts in a mature democracy has been at issue since the late nineteenth 
century, when the implications of the US Supreme Court’s arrogation in Marbury (1803) of the 
power of strong judicial review began to become manifest during the forty-year Lochner era,686 
in which it consistently struck down legislation aimed at more expansive state intervention in 
economic activity on the basis of violations of economic liberty or private contract rights. As 
briefly discussed in the Introduction, the deviation of strong judicial review from the general 
principle of democratic governance, majoritarian decisionmaking, has since become a “central 
obsession”687 of constitutional scholars. That obsession has become increasingly intense and 
globalised in the post-war era, given the exponential transfer of significance governance power 
from executives and legislatures to courts in recent decades, at both the domestic and regional 
levels, marking a move from the common pre-war role of policing basic legality to the 
contemporary reality where courts police law-making, policy-making and even ‘pure’ politics. 
 
4.1 LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM V POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
As briefly discussed in the thesis Introduction, the core debate regarding strong judicial review 
is divided into ‘political constitutionalists’, such as Jeremy Waldron, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and 
Mark Tushnet, and ‘legal constitutionalists’ such as Ronald Dworkin and John Hart Ely, who, 
while agreeing on the fundamental proposition that the powers of government should be 
subject to effective limits in order to protect the rights and liberties of the people, disagree on 
the institutional form such constraints should take.  
Political constitutionalists, as briefly discussed in the Introduction, place their faith in 
the political process and the capacity of individuals in a political community for moral 
judgment, and thus perceive a fundamental conflict between democratic principles, such as the 
political equality of individuals in a political community, and the enjoyment of constitutional 
supremacy by unelected judges. Legal constitutionalists, for their part, argue that justiciable 
constitutional limits on governmental power and action, embodied in the judicial power to 
invalidate unconstitutional laws, are necessary to counter dangerous majoritarian impulses and 
to provide sufficient protection for fundamental rights.  
With respect to strong judicial review by regional human rights courts, political 
constitutionalists perceive heightened concerns regarding the legitimacy of such review, as 
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against the domestic setting; while legal constitutionalists focus on questions of heterarchy and 
hierarchy as between domestic and international courts, and the challenge of managing co-
existence and co-operation in a shared transnational judicial space. The aim here is not to re-
tread at length this debate, but to capture its essentials. 
 
4.2 FIVE KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEBATE 
 
Five main points may help to orient the discussion in the following sections. First, due to 
intense engagement between both camps, each position has been constructed to a significant 
extent in an oppositional fashion: political constitutionalists construct a model of political 
constitutionalism as against the model of legal constitutionalism, and vice versa. As Graham 
Gee and Grégoire Webber have observed: 
it can sometimes seem as if, for many of its proponents, a political constitution is defined by the 
array of contrasts that can be drawn with a legal constitution, with much effort being made to 
rebut the challenges that appear to be posed to a political constitution by its legal counterpart. 
More emphasis tends to be placed on making sense of a political constitution obliquely, in terms 
of what it differs from, rather than in terms of its own possibilities.688 
Second, to a significant extent, even today, the core debate remains a very American one, 
or at least a common law Anglosphere one, with the leading lights tending to be American 
scholars, or from other Anglosphere mature democracies but based in the US (e.g. Waldron). 
This US-centred debate, though often couched in universal language, tends to speak in many 
ways to the very particular development of strong judicial review in the US as a polity, and 
betrays acute concerns regarding the crucible of that power and its enduringly slim 
constitutional basis. The ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ of the US Supreme Court, as 
Alexander Bickel put it, is heightened by the fact that it has no textual basis in the US 
Constitution of 1789, unlike most constitutional courts in new democracies of the post-war 
era, which is our broad temporal and geographical focus here. Most expressly, certain scholars 
such as Mark Tushnet and Larry Kramer, ‘thicken’ their theoretical critiques with a particular 
focus on the empirical realities of the US context.689  
By contrast, normative approaches to strong judicial review from scholars outside the 
Anglosphere, in states such as Germany and Italy, tend to have a different starting point given 
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that the express grant of the strong judicial review powers to the courts lends it a less contested 
(though not uncontested) legitimacy than the power as exercised by the US Supreme Court.690  
Third, despite the emergence of various powerful international courts since the 1960s,691 
this core debate has remained largely state-bound for decades, with constitutional courts, 
legislatures and ‘the people’–the source of democratic power–as the main protagonists. In 
particular, the role of regional human rights courts tends to feature as a distant second to the 
primary focus on domestic constitutional courts. To a certain extent, this again reflects the fact 
that the US remains the main intellectual and empirical centre of gravity of the ‘legal v political 
constitutionalism’ debate. The US, after all, is not subject to the jurisdiction of any regional 
court with strong judicial review powers: in particular, it has never accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 692  It is relatively unsurprising then, that the 
extension of the debate to any regional human rights court has tended to come from European 
scholars in mature democracies with enduring traditions of parliamentary supremacy, such as 
the British scholar Richard Bellamy and the Norwegian scholar Andreas Føllesdal, who focus 
on the European Court of Human Rights.693  
To some extent the domestic debate maps on to strong judicial review as exercised by 
regional human rights courts, but the arguments are modified to take account of the different 
empirical context, with particular concerns focusing on the ‘problematic’ of regional human 
rights courts as external to the democratic state system, less subject to the control of any 
electorate, freer to engage in dynamic treaty interpretation, subject to more diffuse standards 
of professional norms, less familiar with the mores and particularities of domestic societies and 
legal systems, freer from even indirect forms of political accountability in the form of co-equal 
constitutional partners, and threatening the coherence of law by competing with domestic 
law.694 Bellamy argues, for instance, that the very nature of regional human rights courts as 
outsiders raises the risk of the regional court misunderstanding the specificities of rights 
realisation at the domestic level. Worse, he argues that their externality means they lack the 
motivation to decide responsibly, given that they remain unaffected by the impact of their 
decisions.695 
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Importantly, outside the EU context, it is hard to find considered arguments supporting 
strong judicial review at the regional level, which squarely address the concerns of political 
constitutionalists. For instance, Føllesdal’s defence of the review function of the European 
Court of Human Rights as “central to the Rule of Law, and in turn as crucial to a domestic 
and international constitutionalism worth respecting”,696 is rooted in his characterisation of 
that court’s review function as ‘weak’ judicial review–a view disputed in Chapter Three. States, 
he observes, enjoy discretion as to how a decision finding a violation of the European 
Convention is to be implemented, and the Court’s margin of appreciation doctrine is used to 
accommodate diversity of opinion across Europe regarding rights issues. 
Fourth, the debate is geared toward, and expressed in the language of, rights; focusing 
on which form of constitutionalism is a more democratically legitimate means to ensure rights 
protection (a primary concern for political constitutionalists), and also which is the most 
effective for rights protection. Regarding democratic legitimacy, Jeremy Waldron famously 
characterises the ability of individuals in a political community to participate in ultimate 
decision-making on an equal basis ‘the right of rights’, and insists that an objection to strong 
judicial review on the basis of democratic principles must be rights-based.697 However, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy argues that this can be somewhat reductive. For him, democracy is not only 
valued for its capacity to protect rights, but also on the basis that, by facilitating citizen 
participation in decision-making and debate, it aids in the development of central civic virtues, 
such as an appreciation of other points of view, and thereby promotes “cooperation and 
compromise, a sense of responsibility to the community, and a more willing acceptance of 
group decisions.”698 
Fifth, ‘democracy’ here tends to mean representative democracy, with the particularities 
of electoral competition, rotations of power and the deliberative, multi-actor and multi-stage 
nature of the legislative process as a decision-making procedure viewed as providing a better 
way of promoting the requisite civic virtues for a functioning democratic political community 
than alternatives such as direct democracy through referendums and plebiscites.699 
As a result, the core debate tends to overlook significant complexities in the contexts 
many courts find themselves adjudicating. Key here, as discussed in Chapter Three, are the 
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transfer of governance power from legislatures to executives in many democracies, the 
increasing use of direct democracy mechanisms such as referendums, and the flow of 
governance power outside the state. 
 
4.3 ARGUING TO A STALEMATE 
 
Although there is significant engagement by scholars in each camp with those from the other 
side, there is a certain sense that they argue one another to a stalemate. Waldron’s concise 
conspectus of the core arguments for and against strong judicial review shows, for instance, 
that claims for courts as better moral reasoners can be countered with a claim for moral 
reasoning of at least equal, if not better, quality in parliaments.700 Legal constitutionalists will 
assert the democratic credentials of strong judicial review, on the basis that courts are merely 
enforcers of a bill of rights adopted by the people, and that judicial decisions can be overturned 
by amending the bill of rights. The response is that bills of rights are merely focal points for 
disagreements concerning rights rather than settling them, and that amending a bill of rights 
tends to be a rather difficult process.701 
Similarly, political constitutionalists such as Mark Tushnet argue that the very practice 
of strong judicial review can operate to reduce the sensitivity of both the people and their 
representatives to the importance of respecting rights, and their very capacity to engage in 
moral reasoning and deliberation concerning the meaning and scope of rights issues.702 Legal 
constitutionalists assert the opposite. Irwin Stotzky, for example, opines that a constitutional 
court can help “to create a moral consciousness in the citizenry through the process of rational 
discourse”.703 Joseph Goldstein characterises judicial opinions as a means of maintaining an 
informed citizenry in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty on which a 
(republican) democratic system rests.704 However, none of these arguments, for or against 
strong review, is easy to verify, and would require extremely sophisticated sociological research 
to assess.  
For Waldron, according the ‘final say’ on constitutional matters to courts fundamentally 
violates the principle of political equality between citizens by disenfranchising current 
democratic majorities. Decision-making by legislatures, in his view, responds best to this 
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challenge in that contemporary representative democracy realises, albeit imperfectly, the 
principle of political equality by means of elections, representation by elected persons, and the 
legislative process itself, with the result that the aggrieved citizen can be assured that she, and 
other aggrieved citizens, have been accorded the “greatest say possible compatible with an 
equal say for each of the others.”705 Yet, scholars such as Richard Kay concede that a particular 
democratic concern is raised where sitting democratic majorities are engaged in shaping 
legislation concerning the electoral system. Courts, in such cases, can pursue ‘representation-
reinforcing review’ by placing constraints on attempts by elected actors to entrench themselves 
in power, by playing a vital role in reviewing legislation concerning the electoral process.706 The 
latter point tends to show that opposition to strong judicial review can be, to a certain extent, 
context-specific. 
 
4.4 WHERE DOES THE ‘CORE’ DEBATE APPLY? 
 
The core debate is often expressly emphasised as relating to decision-making in well-
functioning democratic systems, especially by political constitutionalists.  
Waldron, for instance, emphasises that his argument against strong judicial review relates 
to a functioning democratic order, predicated on “four quite demanding assumptions”.707 
These are: first and second, that representative institutions and unelected judicial institutions 
are in reasonably good working order; third, that most officials and members of society evince 
a commitment to the idea of individual and minority rights; and fourth, there is “persisting, 
substantial and good faith disagreement” concerning the implications of, and meaning of, the 
commitment to such rights. Where one or more of these preconditions is not met by a 
particular political community–what Waldron calls “non-core cases”–his argument against 
strong judicial review does not apply. However, he stresses that this does not automatically 
mean that strong judicial review will be legitimate in such a community. For instance, it cannot 
be considered legitimate where judicial review will not address inadequacies in rights protection, 
or where corruption affects judicial organs to the same extent as legislative organs.708  
While it is not easy to draw a bright line on the basis of Waldron’s assumptions between 
what democracies would be included and excluded, they appear to exclude a significant 
number of new democracies of the post-1974 third wave of democratisation from the 
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application of the core debate. How, then, do normative stances concerning the roles of courts 
in these new democracies differ from those in the core debate? 
 
4 A PARALLEL DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A NEW 
DEMOCRACY 
 
4.1 THE NATURE OF THIS PARALLEL DISCUSSION 
 
In a sense, the scholarship on the role of strong judicial review in new democracies occupies 
the space beyond the outer boundaries set by scholarship on the role of such review in mature 
democracies. However, this parallel discussion does not merely mirror the ‘legal v political 
constitutionalism’ debate canvassed above. A number of distinguishing features may be noted.   
First, there is no neat debate, as found above, between so-called ‘legal constitutionalists’ 
and ‘political constitutionalists’. Instead, we find a variety of normative arguments made by 
scholars in both law and political science, which take somewhat different approaches, although 
the majority of the arguments tend to support a role for strong judicial review in new 
democracies. There is less intense intersection between these arguments, with scholars tending 
to focus on their own proclivities rather than seeking to spark a specific discussion. There are 
thus no ‘ideological camps’ marked out, or clear battle lines drawn, as one finds in the 
scholarship on mature democracies.   
Second, unlike arguments for legal constitutionalism in mature democracies, these 
treatments often do not address at any length arguments against strong judicial review made 
by political constitutionalists regarding mature democracies; usually dispensing with such 
concerns in a rather cursory manner. Samuel Issacharoff, for example, asserts that 
constitutional courts in third wave democracies, granted an expressly central role and 
significant review powers by new democratic constitutions, are “little detained by concerns 
over the authority for judicial review or over the countermajoritarian consequences of 
constitutional challenge.”709 Even where scholars, such as Theunis Roux, argue that this is 
untrue, their claims are descriptive rather than normative: 
[T]hose concerns are real and pressing, and an appreciation for how post-1989 constitutional 
courts mediate them is crucial to a proper understanding of their capacity to act as a hedge 
against democratic authoritarianism.710  
Third, although the majority of the key scholars in the area are American or based in the 
US, such as Samuel Issacharoff, Kim Lane Scheppele and Tom Ginsburg, there is a greater 
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diversity of empirical referents in the form of new democracies worldwide, allowing departure 
from the influence (whether direct or indirect) of the US experience. This parallel discussion 
also include leading voices from Europe (e.g. Wojciech Sadurski), Latin America (e.g. Roberto 
Gargarella) and Africa (e.g. Theunis Roux).  
Finally, the arguments concerning strong judicial review posited by such scholars are not 
expressed solely in the language of rights protection, but extend much more expressly to the 
structural elements of democratic governance, such as separation of powers, electoral rules, 
the power of constitutional amendment, and the overall capacity of majoritarian decision-
making to overwhelm democratic rule itself in fragile new democracies.   
 
4.2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: FIVE BASIC APPROACHES 
 
When we canvass scholarship as a whole concerning the role of strong judicial review by 
constitutional courts, five basic positions can be identified.  
First is a general argument from Kim Lane Scheppele that, where the elected organs are 
unable to fulfil their functions in the same manner as their counterparts in mature democracies, 
a constitutional court can act as a substitute for deliberation and reflection of the popular will, 
with strong judicial review thus recast as a democratic process. Second is an approach that 
simply expects constitutional courts in new democracies to operate in a similar manner to their 
counterparts in mature democracies, with limited tweaks. Third is the argument that 
innovations in strong review in states of the Global South should not be discounted as aberrant 
simply because they do not conform to Western norms. Fourth is the argument for a more 
targeted role, from authors such as Samuel Issacharoff and Roberto Gargarella, aimed at 
shoring up the worst inadequacies of a new democratic political system and thus facilitating 
the persistence and development of democratic rule rather than its decay after the initial 
transition to electoral democracy. Fifth is an emerging argument from Stephen Gardbaum that, 
rather than strong judicial review, weak review should be embraced as a means of establishing 
and maintaining the independence of the judiciary in a new democracy, by providing a more 
““dialogical” mode of judicial intervention”.711  
For the purposes of clarity, and although there are certainly overlaps between them, 
these four approaches are called here the ‘surrogate’, ‘mirror’, ‘Global South’, ‘scaffolding’, and 








The ‘surrogate’ argument 
 
The ‘surrogate’ argument is a radical theoretical position born of extreme circumstances. 
Writing in 2001, Kim Lane Scheppele, charting the remarkable development of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court’s dominant role in the governance of Hungary’s new democracy from 
1989 until the late 1990s, spoke of ‘democracy by judiciary.712 As discussed in Chapter Two, 
the Court had struck down a third of all laws in its first six years, extended specific challenges 
against legislative provisions to review of the entire law itself, and was empowered to weigh 
heavily in the legislative process by providing advisory opinions during deliberations and 
ordering the legislature to enact laws mandated by the Constitution.713 As a new institution 
attempting to mark out a role for itself, the Court’s approach tended to be unleavened by 
restraint, with an approach to the political branches characterised, in Scheppele’s memorable 
term, as “separation of powers as a contact sport”714–a more conflictual model of interaction 
than, for instance, Aharon Barak’s view of constant tension between governmental branches 
as “natural and desirable”.715 
In Scheppele’s view, the standard democratic critique of the vivid amplitude of the 
court’s jurisprudence–that it constituted an undemocratic transfer of power to the judiciary–
failed to account for two key particularities of a new democracy such as Hungary. First, political 
parties, as the main vehicles of representative democracy, were unable and unwilling to reflect 
the wishes of the electorate due to slim or non-existent electoral manifestos and shifting 
alliances and formations. Second, a hard-pressed electorate, saddled with onerous workloads 
to stay financially afloat in a very difficult economic climate, had little time to build the vigorous 
civil society viewed as essential to a functioning democratic order in the Western mould.  
She also argued that the standard critique–focusing on a procedural conception of 
democracy in which merely elections, the fundamental structures of democratic governance 
and a small core of basic rights are guaranteed–failed to reflect the desire in new democracies 
for (and constitutional reflection of) a much thicker, substantive conception of democracy 
based on the recognition of a suite of rights “to be treated decently and with respect”,716 and 
detailed rules for the operation of democratic institutions. An enduring focus on elections had 
to make way for a commitment to democratic values, motivated by a concern of ‘backsliding’ 
to soviet-era modes of governance.717 
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 Thus, for Scheppele, in the particular context of Hungary, the ease of access to the 
Constitutional Court for citizens transformed it into an alternative forum for the mobilisation 
of the popular will. She notes for instance that, from a population of 10.5 million, some 1,500-
2,500 petitions a year were brought to the Court, challenging virtually every major law enacted 
by parliament and seeking to hold the elected actors to “a higher vision of politics”. In this 
altered reality, Scheppele is so bold as to say that “the Court acted as a more popularly 
responsive, democratically thoughtful body than the Parliament”,718 even to speak of the 
Court’s “democratic mandate”.719  
In Hungary, of course, it did not prove to be a lasting governance arrangement: the tide 
began to turn in the mid-1990s when the Court struck down key parts of an economic reform 
package that sought to reduce social welfare benefits, on the basis of a newly assertive approach 
to social and economic rights. This led to replacement of all judges on the Court when their 
terms of office expired in the late 1990s, and most recently, to a significant diminution of the 
Court’s powers in the Basic Law of 2012.  
 
The ‘mirror’ argument 
 
The ‘mirror’ argument generally argues for constitutional courts to approximate the role 
carried out by courts in mature democracies with systems of strong judicial review. That is, 
they are expected to play an active part in democratic governance, but to evince a clear respect 
for the constitutional role of the other actors in the system and to avoid trenching upon their 
sphere of action. The difference, as compared to a mature democracy, is how the court can 
carve out such a role for itself in what can constitute a hostile institutional matrix, in a context 
where the court often has more extensive adjudication powers and a significantly thicker 
constitution to interpret than those of mature democracies. Due to the Hungarian experience, 
and that of serious missteps by courts in other states such as Russia and Mongolia in the 1990s, 
Western authors tend to advise that caution and restraint are the route to effectiveness, 
allowing a constitutional court to engage in progressive institution-building.   
In the European context Lach and Sadurski state, for example: “In the long run, doing 
less and in a more restrained manner might prove more effective than an excessive pro-
activity”.720 Sadurski opines elsewhere that rights protection constitutes “the most important” 
aspect of constitutional adjudication, on the basis that constitutional rights are “at the very 
centre of the self-definition of a polity, and of the construction of the status of an individual 
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vis-à-vis the state”.721 This sentiment is echoed, to a significant extent, by Tom Ginsburg in his 
analysis of the East Asian experience, when he opines that caution is warranted “on core issues 
of the political process for courts in new democracies”, leaving “attention to fundamental 
rights and constraint of state authority as the real roles the courts can play”.722  
Under this view, courts need to engage in strategic behaviour to avoid addressing matters 
that will bring them into conflict with the other branches of government. This can be achieved 
by making use of Alexander Bickel’s ‘passive virtues’ to simply duck the issue and leaving it to 
the political branches. In supreme courts this can be achieved through application of judicial 
tools such as a ‘political questions’ doctrine. For Kelsenian constitutional courts it requires the 
application of other tools, such as strategic case-management. A good example is the German 
Constitutional Court’s ‘stalling tactics’ approach to challenges to the European Defence 
Community Treaty with France in the early 1950s, discussed in Chapter Two. As seen in 
Chapter Four, a court can also neuter some of their express powers which risk greater 
confrontation with the other branches, such as the Brazilian Supreme Court’s diminution, in 
the 1990s, of its power to address legislative omission to a mere declaration that the legislature 
had failed to enact legislation mandated by the Constitution.  
However, Latin American scholars tend to contest the value of caution and restraint, 
suggesting that strategic deferential behaviour in order to develop judicial power can be quite 
costly for courts, leading to perceptions that the court is partisan or reluctant to protect 
fundamental rights, and thereby hampering rather than furthering institution-building. 723 
Conversely, incremental institution-building can be so successful as to lead to what some see 
as an excessive judicialisation of politics. For instance, as seen in Chapter Four, in recent years 
Brazilian scholars have begun warning of the perils of ‘supremocracy’, with the Supreme Court 
enjoying excessive power in the democratic order.724 These arguments do not strike at the 
legitimacy of strong judicial review per se, but rather at the extent to which such review plays 
a part in governance.  
 
The ‘Global South’ argument 
 
Scholars such as Sadurski and Ginsburg do note that courts in new democracies face some 
different challenges to their counterparts in mature democracies, but they do not appear to 
place any special weight on this fact. Other scholars place much greater weight on the different 
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political and social context of new democracies.725 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, criticising in 
particular the “closed and parochial nature of the U.S. legal academy”,726 has argued that the 
jurisprudence of the Indian, Colombian and South African constitutional courts should be 
viewed as a ‘constitutionalism of the Global South’ that has sought to address political violence, 
high rates of poverty and inequality, cultural and religious diversity and “consolidation of the 
rule of law”,727 which should not be discounted simply because it does not faithfully mirror the 
approaches in Western courts such as the US Supreme Court, the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany and the European Court of Human Rights:728  
The jurisprudence of [the Indian, Colombian and South African courts] certainly moves within 
and is supported by modern constitutionalism’s basic rules and principles. These Courts use and 
comply with modern constitutionalism’s grammar. Consequently, as happens with all courts, 
many of the cases that they decide are doctrinally unimportant – they merely reiterate standard 
interpretations of rules and principles. (…) However, some of the interpretations offered by 
these Courts present modern constitutionalism’s basic components in a new light, or at least 
rearrange them in novel ways [and] therefore, has something to contribute to the ongoing global 
conversation on constitutionalism.(…) Constitutional law scholars and other participants in this 
dialogue would discover, for example, interesting ways of interpreting the principle of separation 
of powers, appealing forms of interpreting the practical consequences of connecting social and 
economic rights with the principle of human dignity, and powerful strategies to allow poor 
individuals to access justice.729 
It is true that the particular context of non-Western new democracies has often led to 
expansions in the exercise of judicial review and willingness to exert a great control over 
political actors and governance questions. It is seen, for instance, in the Colombian 
Constitutional Court’s assertive approach to social and economic rights since the 1990s and 
the Indian Supreme Court’s ‘basic structure’ doctrine of the 1970s, through which it asserted 
the power to review constitutional amendments. However, it clearly cuts both ways: the 
democratisation context has also, for instance, been provided as a reason for the South African 
Constitutional Court’s refusal to issue ‘structural’ injunctions to direct policy in the areas of 
health and housing policy, on the basis that the time is not yet ‘ripe’ for such intervention. This 
approach has been strongly criticised by authors such as Upendra Baxi as a failure to realise 
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the promise of a ‘transformative constitutionalism’ common to states such as Brazil, India and 
South Africa.730 
 
The ‘scaffolding’ argument 
 
Others argue for a more targeted role for constitutional courts, aimed not at substituting the 
court for the elected actors, mirroring adjudication in mature democracies, or a general 
expansion of the ‘normal’ Western boundaries of review to address particular societal 
problems, but at actively mitigating the worst deficiencies of new democracies. On this view, the 
constitutional court has a key role to play to prevent the elected organs from overwhelming 
the basic structure of democratic governance.  
As briefly discussed in Chapter Three, Roberto Gargarella’s concept of a ‘democratic 
justice’, hammered out on the empirical anvil of Argentina’s problematic democratisation 
process from 1983-2002, suggests that in a new democracy a constitutional court should seek 
to counteract “two particularly dangerous tendencies”: first, the gradual establishment of 
restrictions on basic civil and political rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression and 
fair trial; and second, the executive’s tendency to amplify its powers and distort or overcome 
democratic controls, such as the separation of powers, or even attempts to discontinue 
democratic rule.731  
In a similar vein to Scheppele and Maldonado, Gargarella asserts that the mere fact that 
Anglo-American theories of democratic governance and the constitutional role of courts are 
attractive in the Anglo-American context does not necessarily render them attractive to Latin 
American contexts (and presumably other contexts), in which, for instance, the right to criticise 
government is always the first right to be curtailed by democratic regimes “under stress”.732 
Thus, he argues, such moves should be subjected to the most intense scrutiny, requiring the 
courts to adopt an assertive posture and reduce the presumption of validity ordinarily 
associated with duly enacted laws.  
The result should be, in his view, not an expansion of judicial power as compared to that 
seen in mature democracies, but a necessary refinement and redefinition of the role of 
constitutional adjudication in a different empirical context. It does not, he emphasises, 
necessitate the court to have the ‘final say’ on all matters. It is also a role, he notes, that requires 
the mobilisation of civil society actors (e.g. social movements) to bring cases to the courts, 
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echoing to some extent Scheppele’s model, but falling far short of her justification of a 
constitutional court substituting for representative organs. As Gargarella expressly notes: 
[E]ven if we had democratically committed and well-prepared judges, they would not be able to 
transform our democracies into stronger ones by themselves.733  
Samuel Issacharoff in his ‘law of democracy’ theory takes a somewhat similar approach 
to the second prong of Gargarella’s ‘democratic justice’ by focusing on the role of 
constitutional courts in helping to mitigate specific structural deficiencies of the political 
system in a new democracy.734 His approach is also strongly rooted in the empirical reality, 
being based on his observation that constitutional courts have appeared to take action to fill 
gaps in the structure of political governance in third wave democracies from South Africa to 
Romania to Colombia. Such courts have found themselves adjudicating on ‘foundational’ 
issues including impeachment, access to the electoral arena, the limits of governmental power, 
and minimum threshold requirements for parliamentary representation.735  
For Issacharoff, the most crucial role courts can play, and one which should be 
“unconstrained by a legitimacy concern over interceding in the political process”, is protecting 
the “vitality of democratic competition for electoral office and the ability of the political 
process to dislodge incumbents”, to guard against the transition to electoral democracy simply 
presenting a brief interregnum before the formation of a new autocracy, with the diminution 
of the opposition, partisan capture of all state power, and control of elections and the media:736  
The role of these constitutional courts is perhaps the most critical in the transition period [which 
would mean ‘consolidation under the framework here] because of the immaturity and likely 
weakness of not only political institutions, but the ancillary civil-society participants in 
democratic life – most notably, program-based political parties.737  
Where Gargarella focuses on excessive concentration of power in the form of 
hyperpresidentialism, Issacharoff’s particular focus is the ability of a court to limit distortion 
of democratic governance in a state, such as South Africa, where a single party dominates 
governance following the transition to democracy.  
Noting courts’ reticence to explicitly lay claim to this role, preferring to couch 
intervention in rights language, he argues that the only means for a court to adequately 
constrain partisan capture of the democratic process in this way is the adoption of a version 
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of the Indian ‘basic structure’ doctrine, in order to police the validity of constitutional 
amendments, and thereby to adequately address instances of Landau’s ‘abusive 
constitutionalism’, discussed in Chapter Three. This, he contends, would empower courts to 
guard the fundamentals of democratic governance, such as plurality of representation, against 
majoritarian pressure–an approach he prefers to the enshrinement of ‘eternity clauses’ in the 
constitutional text on the basis that it affords the courts greater flexibility in their role.738  
In elaborating this argument, Issacharoff places particular emphasis on the fact that 
constitutional courts in new democracies enjoy an express constitutional basis for exercising 
strong judicial review, and the argument that the establishment of such courts is itself integral 
to the constitutional pact facilitating the transition to electoral democracy, as briefly discussed 
in Chapter One.739 He is unconvinced by the arguments of other scholars, such as Sadurski, 
Scheppele and Stone Sweet, for the democratic credentials of strong judicial review as, 
respectively, an alternative democratic expression of the majority will, an integral part of the 
legislative process, or as itself quasi-parliamentary, in the sense of the court’s acting as a ‘third 
chamber’ reviewing draft legislation.740  
 
The ‘weak review’ argument 
 
In contrast to the four approaches above, which all envisage a role for the exercise of strong 
judicial review by a constitutional court in a new democracy, Stephen Gardbaum argues in a 
forthcoming article that ‘weak’ judicial review might be a better option for courts in some new 
democracies, allowing them to adjudicate in a bold and creative manner and maintain the 
coherence of the constitution without the cost, seen in the strong judicial review systems of 
new democracies across the world, of antagonising the other State powers and undermining 
the principle of judicial independence. His argument, like the ‘mirror’ argument, may be viewed 
as speaking to the third dimension of ‘democratisation jurisprudence’, set out in Chapter Three: 
the court’s challenge to carve out a role for itself in the new democratic order. 
For Gardbaum, the independence of the judiciary–both in terms of freedom from 
political interference and impartial performance of functions “without political, partisan or 
personal bias”– at greater risk in a strong review system, which accords a more central 
governance role to the court as a ‘veto player’, placing it in opposition to government and 
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opening it to political attacks. It also, he asserts, heightens claims that the court should enjoy 
democratic legitimacy, which is met by politicising the judicial appointments process.741  
Significantly, his argument does not rest on the normative basis, so familiar to Western 
discourse, that courts should not have the power of strong judicial review due to its democratic 
illegitimacy. Rather, his is a pragmatic argument that strong review can hamper rather than 
help the effectiveness of courts where they are unlikely to be able to withstand political attacks 
or unable or unwilling to exercise the self-restraint required in a febrile political atmosphere.742 
Where Barak views inter-branch conflict as natural and desirable, and Scheppele’s sees 
separation of powers as necessarily a ‘contact sport’ when the court is attempting to assert 
itself in the new order, Gardbaum sees unnecessary and damaging confrontation that is entirely 
avoidable. Departing from the ‘mirror’ argument, he views as insufficient the attempt to 
temper or resolve such confrontation by employing caution and restraint, or techniques such 
as suspended declarations of invalidity regarding unconstitutional laws, which still leave courts 
with the final say on constitutional matters.  
Nor, in his view, can the systemic conflict engendered by strong review be fully 
addressed by embedding the new democracy in a “broader, supervisory international regime” 
to enhance compliance by the government with judicial decisions. Noting the “general success” 
of accession to the Council of Europe and its human rights protection system (and the EU) in 
supporting democratisation processes in Central and Eastern Europe, he nonetheless observes 
that this has not reined in authoritarian ‘backsliding’ in states such as Hungary and Romania, 
which have withstood pressure from these external sources.743  
 
4.3 DEFICIENCIES IN THE EXISTING DISCUSSION 
 
A number of key criticisms may be made of existing scholarship on the role of strong judicial 
review in new democracies, as outlined above.  
 
Taking each approach in turn 
 
First, pace Scheppele, in her defence of the ‘surrogate’ model as democratic, the post-war 
normative paradigm of ‘constitutional democracy’, in which constitutionalism ‘defines up’ 
democracy, is stretched past its breaking point. In Scheppele’s account, the ‘constitutional’, 
instead of ‘completing’ democracy, tends to cannibalise its conceptual partner. Democracy in 
her account is reduced to, not a procedure in which aggregate political and moral preferences 
 
741 Gardbaum (n296) pp.23-26. 
742 Ibid., p.37. 




across the entire population can be fed into governance (particularly legislative and policy-
making processes), but rather a procedure whereby the preferences and moral reasoning of 
shifting, atomised and often unconnected sub-communities (or even single individuals) are fed 
into a judicial process. The latter system cannot be held to equate to the former, especially 
when viewed from the perspective of the core principle of democratic governance: the equality 
of individuals within the political community.  
Such a system may be argued to serve the interests of the rule of law and of 
constitutionalism, but it cannot be democratic. It is perhaps a sign of the symbolic power of 
democracy itself, as noted by Kay, that no author can bring themselves to make an argument 
for a governance system that is not characterised as democratic.744 Indeed, that said, the model 
can also be argued to offend against the core constitutional prohibition against excessive 
concentration of power in any one organ–here, a constitutional court. In many ways, it appears 
to bear unwholesome similarities to the model of hyperpresidentialism, which envisages a 
fundamentally dyadic system with a direct connection between ‘the people’ and a powerful 
president at the apex of the governance structure; unmediated by formal processes for 
representation, and sidelining other sites of governance power. 745  That said, it must be 
recognised that her ‘surrogate’ model is not advanced as a general model, but as a defence of 
a governance model born of the very particular circumstances of post-1989 Hungary. 
The ‘mirror’ argument, in turn, appears to cleave strongly to understandings of ‘judicial 
activism’ and ‘judicial passivity’ in scholarship on mature democracies, which have been shown 
to have limited explanatory power in Chapter Four. The prescriptions of caution and restraint 
overlook the fact that such an approach is easier for some courts to practise than others. Courts 
endowed with the power of abstract review are more easily ‘politicised’, some courts have no 
control over their dockets, some courts are required to interpret particularly badly drafted 
constitutions, or constitutions which enjoy very weak legitimacy, some courts must grapple 
with constitutions which provide for an enormous raft of justiciable fundamental rights, 
especially social and economic rights, and so on.   
In short, it is crucial to bear in mind that while some courts may actively seek to expand 
their jurisdiction and have the last say regarding the most contentious social, political and moral 
questions of the day, others, by dint of constitutional design, have no real choice in being 
pulled endlessly into the political fray. Indeed, the literature is replete with examples illustrating 
the difficulties that certain tasks raise for the courts in one way or another. We might note, by 
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way of example, the undermining of the Slovakian Constitutional Court following its 
inescapable intervention in disputes between the executive powers in the new semi-presidential 
system under the 1992 Constitution.746  In addition, as regards the practice of caution and 
restraint, as Latin American scholars have emphasised, standard models for analysing strategic 
decision-making in constitutional courts, based on research in mature democracies, “wildly 
underpredict” the number of political attacks against the judiciary in that region, which have 
not curtailed courts in the way Western scholars may expect.747  
Turning to the ‘scaffolding’ argument, Issacharoff’s main claim for the court as a 
“stabilizer” of the ‘basic structure’ of democracy at one level has an intuitive appeal, when we 
appreciate its roots in the empirical contexts of India, Colombia, Belize and other states where 
courts have all been pushed into asserting the power to assess the validity of constitutional 
amendments in order to address different strains of ‘abusive constitutionalism’. However, his 
argument has insufficiently defined boundaries. Even if we accept that the courts should 
assume this role, it does not resolve the question of how far a constitutional court may go 
beyond the text of the constitution to fulfil this function. There is little clarity as to where the 
boundaries of the role lie. He also expends little energy on examining the extent to which this 
changes the court’s role from a constituted entity tasked with acting as ‘guardian of the 
constitution’, to an entity external to the constitution tasked with acting as ‘guardian of 
democracy’. One reading, based on the emphasis he places on constitutional courts as part of 
the political pact underpinning the democratic transition, is that he views such courts as meta-
constitutional organs, but this is never expressly stated. 
Theunis Roux has also criticised Issacharoff for failing to fully appreciate how the 
democratisation context places the courts in a precarious position: 
[T]hey are assumed [by Issacharoff] to be in a position roughly equivalent to that of courts in 
mature democracies, with little threat to their independence and consequently free to focus their 
efforts on developing the required constitutional law doctrines. The problem with this 
assumption is that it ignores the fact that a constitutional court’s capacity to act as a hedge against 
authoritarianism may be inhibited by the same political conditions that interventions of this sort 
are aimed at addressing. Not just that, but a court’s intervention to protect the democratic system 
necessarily has an effect, either positive or negative, on its capacity to intervene in future cases.748 
This lack of appreciation for the political context cannot be levelled at Gardbaum, for 
whom context is everything. However, his argument for weak review is, in many ways, more 
problematic than the ‘mirror’ and ‘scaffolding’ arguments. It is hard to see how political actors 
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who refuse to submit to strong judicial review would submit to the ‘softer touch’ of weak 
review. Surely, where courts and such actors have divergent views, the latter would easily 
discard any ‘weak review’ constraints.  
This is not mere conjecture: although Gardbaum presents this weak review solution as 
a constitutional transplant from the mature democracy context (i.e. common law Westminster 
states including Canada and New Zealand),749 he fails to recognise that regions such as Latin 
America are no strangers to weak review models. As Joel Colón-Ríos has observed, several 
nineteenth-century Latin American constitutions, such as the Colombian Constitution of 1858, 
featured a weak form of judicial review that explicitly institutionalised parliament as the 
ultimate arbiter of constitutional validity. As recently as 1945 the Ecuadorean Constitution 
installed a form of weak judicial review whereby a special court, where requested by a final 
appeals court, had the power to suspend a law or regulation temporarily, in order to permit 
Congress to decide on its validity. 750   The historical breakdown of constitutionalism and 
democracy in virtually all of these states, and particularly the move to strong judicial review 
across Latin America in the post-war era, tends to suggest that wholesale adoption of weak 
review may not prove a good fit for any but the most mature democracies.  
 
Four common deficiencies 
 
Taken together, scholarship on constitutional courts in particular suffers also from four key 
common weaknesses.  
First, there is little analysis of the temporal limits of the ‘extraordinary’ context of 
democratisation: all scholars advocate a particular role for the courts based on the context of 
a new democracy, but do not address the end-point beyond which such a role may no longer 
be justifiable. This is particularly true of Scheppele’s argument, which does not appear to 
recognise the inherent unsustainability of the ‘surrogate’ model even while acknowledging its 
end in reality.  
Issacharoff and Gargarella’s approaches appear to imply at the very least a subsisting 
‘scaffolding’ role for the courts beyond the consolidation of democracy. It is particularly 
strongly implied by Issacharoff’s enthusiasm for the ‘basic structure’ doctrine in Indian 
jurisprudence, which is now 40 years old. 751  He does not address, for instance, whether 
fundamental structural developments (e.g. the fragmentation of a dominant party into two or 
more parties) would remove the case for such a role for the constitutional court. Similarly, 
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Gardbaum’s pragmatic approach leaves open the question as to whether weak review might 
cede to strong review at a point when attacks on the constitutional courts become less likely. 
At least in a functional sense, he appears to suggest so when he states that the “partial 
depoliticization” of a constitutional court, achieved by adopting a system of weak review 
may even mean that the (sic) judicial review carries greater weight and authority among both 
legislatures and, more importantly, citizens so that the political costs of overriding it are further 
increased.752 
Second, it may be said that all scholars, bar perhaps Gargarella, fail to engage particularly 
seriously with the arguments of political constitutionalists within the ‘core’ debate. For instance, 
Scheppele’s argument for ‘democracy by judiciary’ on the basis that elected actors are unable 
to carry out the same roles as their counterparts in mature democracies, does not engage with 
Waldron’s position that the solution may be to address the deficiencies in these institutions, 
not to bypass them entirely.753 However, Waldron himself notes a conundrum: some rights 
may be considered too important to leave to the hopeful emergence of a “more responsible 
and representative legislature”, which would necessitate a greater role for the courts. However, 
such a role for courts may itself hinder the development of the desired improvements in the 
legislature.754 This may be viewed as a ‘democratisation’ variant of Tushnet’s ‘democratic 
debilitation’ argument, with the emphasis more squarely on elected representatives than both 
parliaments and the people.  
Scheppele’s ‘democracy by judiciary’ also fails to answer Waldron’s more general 
observation that people “tend to look to judicial review when they want greater weight for 
their opinions than electoral politics would give them.”755 To organise a governance system 
around litigation appears to offend the basic principle of equal respect and an equal voice for 
all individuals of a community. 
As regards regional courts, there is little, if any, theoretical analysis of the democratic 
nature of review by regional human rights courts in Latin America and Africa. Scholarship 
tends to be dominated by legal constitutionalist accounts which, to a significant extent, assume 
its legitimacy (democratic or otherwise) and focus on issues of effectiveness and the content 
of specific decisions.  
Engagement with ‘democratic legitimacy’ arguments tends to be rather cursory. For 
instance, Ezequiel Malarino’s strident critique of review by the Inter-American Court of 
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Human Rights, bemoaning its “illiberal and antidemocratic tendencies”,756 rests primarily on 
arguments as to the basic legality of the Court’s case-law, concerning the Court’s perceived 
illegitimate departure from the text of the American Convention on Human Rights and 
recognition of norms not expressly laid out therein, thus violating the sovereignty of states, 
which have not agreed to be bound by such norms. He places limited and secondary emphasis 
on familiar democratic arguments against the Court’s exercise of its review power, including 
the unelected status of judges, and the argument that its requirements for the creation of new 
criminal offences in domestic law violates the principle that any restrictions on individual 
liberties should be made by the organ most reflective of the popular will (i.e. the legislature).757  
Third, is the weak explanatory power of the enduring ‘strong review’/’weak review’ 
distinction. The choice presented across the literature on new democracies discussed above 
tends to be an either/or dichotomy, failing to recognise that courts, including regional human 
rights courts, often have a mixture of weak review powers alongside the ‘strong’ review power 
to strike down legislation (or, in the case of regional courts, to declare it invalid for 
incompatibility with the human rights convention). Gardbaum’s approach, advocating a 
wholesale adoption of weak review, falls, as so much of the scholarship does, into this 
weak/strong binary conception.  
Yet, as we have seen in Chapters Four in particular, courts calibrate their use of the 
strong review power to invalidate legislation, using or declining to use it depending on the 
specific circumstances of the case before them. At times, when given the opportunity, a court 
will decline to invalidate a law, choosing instead to offer guidelines or suggestions to the 
political branches as to the law’s problematic validity. In this way, it transforms strong into 
weak review; and, in doing so, transforms its capacity to have the ‘final say’ on constitutional 
matters into a more advisory role. That said, most courts, even those considered relatively 
quiescent, appear to be comfortable with striking down laws that are patently unconstitutional, 
and which offend against core democratic rights. 
To a certain extent, the ‘false binary’ focus on weak or strong review reflects the 
influence of the Anglosphere ‘core’ debate, where ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ review are more sharply 
defined (as between the US and UK, for example). It also underscores Bonilla Maldonado’s 
observation that constitutional innovation in new democracies is not integrated into the debate, 
and the extent to which the debate remains, to some extent, tied to the forms and formulae of 
the core debate concerning courts in mature democracies. Colón-Ríos, for instance, surveying 
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the global picture of judicial review, argues that it is time to replace the weak/strong review 
typology with a more nuanced framework that includes two additional types of review as 
separate categories: ‘strong basic structure review’ such as that in India, where the 
constitutional court enjoys the power to make a final judgment on the validity of constitutional 
amendments, and ‘weak basic structure review’, present in certain Latin American countries, 
where the constitutional court is similarly empowered to strike down both ordinary and 
constitution-amending legislation, but accords the final say as to validity to the people, in the 
form of a constituent assembly.758 
Fourth, all five approaches fail to fully account for the role of regional human rights 
courts. In Issacharoff’s account, for instance, international law as a whole is peripheral, 
appearing fleetingly in passing mentions of references to treaty obligations in South African 
case-law, despite also focusing on the Colombian context where the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisprudence has loomed large.759 For those who advocate a generally muscular role for 
constitutional courts, such as Scheppele and Bonilla Maldonado, the question remains as to 
how such a system accommodates regional review. Would, for example, a court with 
overwhelming governance power under a ‘surrogate’ system, or expansive power under the 
‘Global South’ approach easily partner with, or submit to, the jurisprudence of a regional 
human rights court when the two conflict? Colombia suggests a positive answer, while Brazil 
suggests a negative answer. By contrast, how can the posture of caution and restraint advocated 
by Ginsburg and Sadurski operate in a region with a human rights court? It already appears 
problematic under the European system, where courts are expected to pay close attention to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, but appears most difficult to reconcile with the 
Inter-American doctrine of ‘control of conventionality’, which tends to push domestic courts 
toward more assertive decisionmaking. The limits of the cautious Chilean constitutional court’s 
engagement in such conventionality control, for instance, was mentioned in Chapter Four.  
On the other hand, Gardbaum’s argument for weak judicial review at the domestic level 
is particularly vulnerable to the criticism that, in new democracies subject to strong judicial 
review by a regional human rights court, weak review at the domestic level would simply see 
adjudication power flow from the domestic to the regional level. In a region such as Latin 
America, it would tend to place domestic constitutional courts in an even more invidious 
position than the ‘mirror’ argument. Any such argument would have to integrate regional 
human rights courts, with the clearest way of resolving the domestic-regional adjudicative 
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tension being to advocate weak review at both levels. However, to do so would simply replicate 
the difficulties with domestic weak review, discussed above. 
 
4.4 REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
 
The discussion above underscores the highly problematic nature of the gulf between 
scholarship on domestic constitutional courts and regional human rights courts, emphasised 
in the Introduction to this thesis. Scholarship on regional courts tends to focus on the 
relationship between these courts and the state as a whole, rather than their relationship with 
domestic courts. Sweeney, for instance, makes no mention of domestic courts when he argues 
in the conclusion to his monograph that the European Court of Human Rights should 
engage far more robustly with the difficult question of when, and in what circumstances, national 
transitional policies that might secure peace or democratic consolidation are trumped by human 
rights concerns… 
As discussed at the end of Chapter Four, this is also the central question at the heart of 
McCrudden and O’Leary’s analysis of the European Court’s judgment in Sejdić and Finci. 
These authors only pay passing attention to the fact that the European Court’s judgment 
finding the reservation of election to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency also 
tended to bring into question the legitimacy of that State’s constitutional court, which shares 
six of the nine court seats between the three constituent peoples (with three allocated to 
international judges).760 There is no consideration of the possibility that the European Court’s 
‘overruling’ the domestic court on a foundational constitutional question in itself tended to 
damage the latter’s institutional standing. 
Others, such as Başak Çalı and Ximena Soley Echeverría, are more focused on the inter-
court relationship, between constitutional courts and regional courts. However, the dominant 
preoccupation is not about whether strong judicial review is justifiable per se, but rather, about 
which level should have the ultimate say, the degree of deference that should be accorded by 
the court in each sphere (domestic or regional) to its putative ‘partner’, and the justifications 
regional courts provide for deferential and assertive stances.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, these authors identify the democratic credentials of the 
state and the level of seriousness evinced by the domestic constitutional court regarding rights 
protection and the rule of law as criteria by which a deferential approach by the regional human 
rights court should be calibrated. The implication appears to be that a regional human rights 
court should play a more robust role concerning new democracies, whose courts may be 
 




unable to present sufficient credentials to claim greater subsidiarity (especially in the earlier 
years of the new democratic regime), or where the state itself cannot claim the required 
democratic pedigree. The regional court, in this way, can be viewed as playing a legitimate 
tutelary role in the new regime until democratic governance is sufficiently consolidated. 
This, in turn, implies that a certain degree of democratic progress may justify a domestic 
court adopting a less deferential stance to the regional human rights court, shifting from a 
more hierarchical to a more heterarchical position as democratisaton proceeds. However, we 
get no sense of how such a shift can be managed in practical terms.  
 
5 POINTS OF ORIENTATION FOR A NORMATIVE STANCE 
 
The range of positions above reveal the extent to which discussion of the roles of courts in 
new democracies diverges from the familiar debate on this subject concerning courts in mature 
democracies, and provides a useful starting point for considering what role courts should play 
in supporting democratisation, which is the focus for the rest of the chapter. First, this Part 
provides three points of orientation for setting out a normative stance, by indicating a 
preference for the ‘scaffolding’ approach of Gargarella and Issacharoff, canvassing the key 
pathologies of new democracies, and revisiting the concepts of ‘consolidation’ as our 
normative end-point and ‘democratisation jurisprudence’ as our framework.  
 
5.1 A PREFERENCE FOR THE ‘SCAFFOLDING’ ARGUMENT 
 
As a jumping-off point, Issacharoff’s and Gargarella’s conception of the Court as ‘scaffolding’ 
for the new democracy is arguably the most convincing. In essence, it justifies a particular role 
for strong judicial review in a new democracy, but does not place an unrealistic burden on the 
courts or discount any notion of meaningful limits to judicial power. Gargarella’s approach in 
particular shows a sensitivity to the particular exigencies of a new democracy. While 
acknowledging that we must make certain adjustments to our adherence to standard theoretical 
accounts of the proper role of strong judicial review developed in the Western context, it also 
avoids using these contextual differences to abandon all concerns regarding not only the 
legitimacy of strong judicial review, but the capacity of judges to carry out the task of 
democratic transformation on their own.  
Gargarella’s is, at heart, a negative account, seeking normative lessons from the 
perceived failures of the Argentine courts to protect rights and constrain the executive after 
the state transitioned to electoral democracy in 1983. Both Gargarella and Issacharoff’s 




constitutions in new democracies should act to ‘disentrench’ the old constitutional order as 
well as entrenching the new. However, given the criticisms of Issacharoff’s approach in 
particular, above, and the generally state-bound nature of the ‘scaffolding’ argument, it is 
merely a starting-point. This will be addressed in Parts 6 and 7. 
 
5.2 THE KEY PATHOLOGIES OF NEW DEMOCRACIES 
 
If one of the central priorities of a court is disentrenchment and guarding against a return of 
authoritarianism, it is worthwhile to recall from Chapter Three the key deficiencies which tend 
to afflict new democracies, and which sharply distinguish them from mature democracies.  
First, at the constitutional level one finds, characteristically, a new or revised constitution 
that requires very significant interpretation, the legacy of an authoritarian constitution or prior 
façade constitution, a residuum of authoritarian-era laws of suspect constitutional validity, and 
often, as discussed in Chapter Three, certain countermajoritarian elements in the 
constitutional-legal order aimed at mediating the balance of power between the old and new 
regime (e.g. amnesty laws, or electoral posts for members of the previous regime).   
Second, as compared to the empirical context to which much of the ‘core’ debate refers 
(whether implicitly or explicitly), at the political level there is often no stable opposition of two 
political blocs with clearly defined agendas and which together represent the majority of the 
electorate, and which are able to reflect the popular will.761 Rather, there is often significant 
fragmentation of political parties with a lack of clarity concerning political platforms, 
oligarchical party politics where existing parties do not represent significant portions of the 
electorate, dominance of the electoral arena by one party, or diminution of the significance of 
party politics due to the existence of a directly-elected president with broad governance powers, 
and whose role is supported by various parties with conflicting policies.  
Third, at the societal level, commitment to rights and the rule of law tends to be 
underdeveloped, and civil society is usually weak owing to repression of non-state actors and 
popular movements under undemocratic rule. New democracies also often suffer from the 
impact of economic restructuring that often accompanies democratisation. 
To say that these deficiencies commonly exist is not, of course, an automatic argument 
in favour of strong judicial review. It is simply to recognise their existence to enable a clear-
eyed approach to the evils constitutionalism and the law may play a role in alleviating. It is also 
important to recall that these are not permanent or static conditions: the hallmark of the 
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democratisation context, as discussed in Chapters One and Chapter Three, is inordinate flux, 
compared to the relative stability of a mature democracy or authoritarian state. The key 
question, then, is how adjudication can operate so as to mitigate the pathologies of a new 
democracy without also actively undermining the democratisation process by preventing the 
very civic virtues, culture of constitutionalism and respect for others’ views and widespread 
commitment to rights that is required for a democratic system, as we understand it, to function. 
States such as Hungary have underlined that constitutionalism and legalism have very clear 
limits, but have not led to any systematic consideration of what might work better, with the 
exception of Gardbaum’s proposals, which suffer from multiple deficiencies, as discussed 
above.  
 
5.3 OUR END-POINT: CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY 
 
We have a sense, then, of where our starting point lies. As discussed in Chapters One and 
Three, the question here is the role that courts can play, not in the aim to develop the political 
community into a democratic state comparable to the mature democracies of the Global North, 
but a ‘consolidated democracy’ where the essentials of democratic order are in place. Returning 
to Carsten Schneider’s definition set out in Chapter One–this is a regime which  
…allows for the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms or 
associations, information and communication, for the purpose of free competition between 
leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claims to rule…without 
excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting members of the 
political community from expressing their preference.762 
In Chapter Three, building on this notion of ‘consolidation’, the argument was made 
that the main roles constitutional courts could play in helping to achieve this level of 
democratic development involved eight core activities across three dimensions: 
 
(i) Facilitating the Creation of a Democratic Public Sphere 
1. Upholding core democratic rights 
2. Shaping an inclusive electoral system 
3. Curbing the re-emergence of authoritarianism 
 
(ii) Mediating the Shift from an Undemocratic to Democratic Order 
4. Articulating the relationship between the old and new constitutional 
order 
5. Addressing/eliminating authoritarian legislation 
6. Addressing key transitional justice questions 
 





(iii) Carving out a Role for the Court in the New Democratic Order 
7. Delineating the Court’s jurisdiction 
8. Addressing crises 
 
The core contribution of regional human rights courts was suggested as operating across 
the same three dimensions, but as tending to involve less frequent direct interventions and as 
approaching the democratisation process from the very different vantage point of an external 
entity in relation to the state-bound constitutional order.  
 
5.4 MAKING NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FROM TWO ANGLES 
 
With the above starting points in mind, the final two Parts of the chapter consider the central 
question of what courts should do in a new democracy. Each Part approaches this question 
from a different angle. Part 6, based on the existing reality of courts in new democracies, makes 
arguments for how constitutional courts and regional human rights courts might better 
approach the challenge of supporting democratisation, both separately and as a system. The 
final Part goes beyond the existing reality to explore the question of how courts might be more 
fundamentally redesigned to act as more effective democracy-builders.  
 
6 THREE LESSONS FOR EXISTING COURTS: TARGETING, 
TEAMWORK AND TEMPORALITY  
 
If we had the ear of judges on existing domestic and regional courts faced with the challenge 
of supporting democratisation processes, what would we advise them to do? Three key lessons 
can be gleaned from the analysis in Chapters Two, Three and Four. The first is that, if we 
accept the framework laid out in Chapter Three, this provides some guidance to courts in new 
democracies as to when they should engage in assertive decisionmaking to support 
democratisation. The second is a need for greater sensitivity in courts at both levels to the 
context and nature of adjudication at the other level. Third is the need for sensitivity toward 
the temporal aspect of democratisation, which involves a complex dialectic between the courts 
at both levels, as well as an appreciation of the impact of their roles on other potential 
democracy-builders at the domestic level.  
 
6.1 TARGETING: CRITERIA FOR PICKING BATTLES  
 
As discussed above, scholars tend to make rather general arguments concerning the roles 




primary function, but does not select any particular rights. Scholars such as Lane Scheppele 
and Bonilla Maldonado, in advocating an expansive role for courts in a new democracy, make 
no selections as to what a court should accord priority in order to bolster the democratisation 
process. Issacharoff and Gargarella get closest, focusing in particular on core democratic rights, 
such as the rights of free speech, assembly, association and fair trial, as well as the 
disentrenchment function of constraining the accretion of excessive power at any one site 
(whether by an executive or dominant party).  
The framework set out in Chapter Three, and its application to the Brazilian context in 
Chapter Four, suggests that courts cannot do everything. The argument here is that courts 
should focus on the eight core activities set out again in Section 5.3 above, and expend their 
institutional capital on adjudication that furthers these key objectives. This necessarily means 
that courts would have to strategically adopt deferential postures regarding other matters (e.g. 
economic governance, social and economic rights), in order to ‘store’ their power for use when 
needed.  
This approach can be differentiated from all five arguments discussed in Part 4 above. 
In addition it is not an argument for courts to stay within the ‘tolerance level’ of the political 
branches, as argued by Lee, Knight and Shvetsova.763 Nor does it equate to the idea of ‘strategic 
deference’ by constitutional courts, as discussed by Roux and Rodríguez-Raga in the South 
African and Colombian context, which refer to how courts adopt general assertiveness or 
deference based on the macropolitical context.764 Rather, the argument here is for consistent 
robustness on the same core issues that strike to the core of the democratisation process. Such 
an approach would, in any State, still leave a court open to political censure, but it has to be 
accepted that there is no way of entirely immunising a court from such censure. At the level 
of the regional court, a consistent focus on these core issues could lead to greater resonance 
between the domestic and regional levels, and guard against overreaching on other matters 
with lower importance to democratic consolidation. 
Overall, instead of expecting democratic progress to rely mainly on adjudication, this 
approach would allow courts to focus on progressively opening a societal space in which other 
actors, such as civil society organisations, the media, the political opposition and individual 










6.2 TEAMWORK: NEGOTIATING SYSTEMIC ASYMMETRIES 
 
As discussed at the start of this chapter, there are various institutional and epistemic 
asymmetries between constitutional courts and regional courts, which cut across their capacity 
to work in tandem as democracy-builders. There is no easy answer as to resolving these 
asymmetries, or achieving greater coordination, between domestic and regional courts in a way 
that is practically useful.  
As briefly discussed in Chapter Three, Krisch has painted the European regional legal 
order as a plural order characterised by heterarchy rather than hierarchical constitutional order, 
which manages to operate without excessive friction due to judicial strategy and 
accommodation by all courts in the system.765 However, his focus is on interaction between 
the European Court of Human Rights and courts in the mature democracies of Western 
Europe (e.g. Germany, the UK). This provides a picture of domestic and regional courts as 
co-equal entities in the plural legal space, which does not appear to fully capture the reality of 
the relationship between regional human rights courts and constitutional courts outside 
Western Europe. As such, his analysis lacks a normative inflection capable of guiding us toward 
addressing the particular asymmetries between regional and domestic courts in the 
democratisation setting, where the relationship tends to take on a more hierarchical aspect. 
For some, persistent and irresolvable tension between the two orders, international and 
domestic, is both positive and desirable. Alon Harel and Eyal Benvenisti, for instance, in a 
recent working paper 766  make the argument for a ‘discordant parity’ between a ‘robust 
constitutionalism’, which claims superiority in the putative hierarchy between domestic and 
international law, and a ‘robust internationalism’, which would claim the converse. “Clarity”, 
they say, “is the enemy of discordant parity”: 
The pursuit of “hierarchy”, “harmony” and “order” between the international and the 
constitutional is fundamentally at odds with the idea that individual freedom is founded on 
friction and discordance. (…) The conflict between international and state norms need not be 
resolved; in fact it needs to be maintained and even intensified. This conflict is a permanent and 
desirable feature of the legal world.767 
However, this approach appears of little assistance in the present context. Leaving aside 
its disregard for legal certainty as one of the core values of the rule of law, by refusing to make 
any value judgments as to the different ways in which domestic and international courts 
operate, it provides no orientation for any real position on the appropriateness of adjudication 
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by the courts at each level on any given issue. Set against Krisch’s description of co-equal 
courts in Western Europe, its prescription of a norm-tussle between domestic and 
international law is problematic when applied to Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and Africa. It would tend to leave a domestic court in a new democracy at a disadvantage as 
compared to a regional human rights court; frequently reduced to a passive recipient of norms 
rather than an active participant in norm-making. 
Rather than the courts at each level seeking to maximise their power as against the other 
level, perhaps the only route to greater effectiveness as democracy-builders is for the courts at 
each level to develop a greater appreciation of the context of adjudication at the other level. 
This is especially important for regional human rights courts, which should be willing to 
recognise the limits of  their epistemic and functional capacities, and mindful of  assuming a 
normative role that prevents domestic courts from developing their own jurisprudence, 
needlessly undermines their authority, or precludes ‘good faith’ disagreement on rights matters 
that are not amenable to a single solution. In other words, this is yet another variant of  the 
‘democratic debilitation’ argument. Regional courts faced with oversight of  a significant 
number of  new democracies should look in specific cases, beyond the immediate purpose of  
achieving individual justice, or even constitutional justice, to the impact of  their adjudication 
on domestic courts themselves. 
Domestic courts, in turn, should evince greater openness to some form of  ‘dialogue’ 
with the human rights court in their region. Although a much overused metaphor,768 dialogue 
captures the capacity of  domestic courts to explain their positions to the regional court and to 
achieve accommodations in regional adjudication. A good example is the Horncastle decision 
of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2009, where Lord Phillips took great pains to 
explain why the Court refused to follow a decision of the European Court, and the latter’s 
subsequent modification of its position to accommodate the Supreme Court’s decision.769 
Existing literature suggests that such dialogue is rare between constitutional courts in new democracies 
and regional human rights courts, even in Europe.770  
It may be argued, for example, that, if  the majority of  the Brazilian Supreme Court in 
the Amnesty Law Case had provided a clear discussion of  the relevant Inter-American 
jurisprudence on amnesty laws and offered arguments to distinguish the Brazilian scenario 
from that of  previous amnesty law cases concerning Argentina, Peru and Chile, it may have 
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opened a dialogic space for the Inter-American Court to inject more nuance into its position. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Justice Trindade had already signposted a possible change of  
position in the Almonacid decision in 2006, some time before the Amnesty Law Case came 
before the Supreme Court, auguring the Court’s shift of  position in El Mozote in 2012. 
There are, of  course, limits in the extent to which a sensitivity within each court to the 
particular setting of  the other level, and inter-court dialogue, can help to reconcile positions 
where possible and improve the overall functioning of  the courts as a plural system. However, 
the prescriptions here are at least preferable to outright submission by domestic courts to the 
regional level, which may not understand the complexities of  the domestic democratisation 
process, or a refusal by domestic courts to engage with regional jurisprudence, as seen in Brazil. 
The attempt to achieve greater understanding should also not be confined to the rather indirect 
method of  ‘dialogue’ through formal judgments, but should also encompass informal channels, 
such as judicial conferences, seminars and organisations.771 
 
6.3 TEMPORALITY: TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRATISATION SENSITIVITY 
 
The final core lesson from the previous chapters is the extent to which courts at both levels 
need to develop greater sensitivity to the temporal aspects of democratisation, and how the 
democratisation trajectory requires a continuous reassessment of the appropriateness of 
assertive and deferential decisionmaking at each level. This is particularly important in 
negotiating the constitutional balance in new democracies between the old and new regimes. 
At the domestic level, it places a heavy burden on the constitutional court to remain aware of 
the overall political context of the new democracy, and in assessing when addressing 
authoritarian-era laws and unravelling elements of the constitutional pact is timely and 
appropriate. At the regional level, it requires the court to appreciate the overall nature of the 
constitutional settlement underpinning, and giving voice to, the democratic transition, and the 
need for the regional court to recognise the limits of its ability to judge when intervention is 
appropriate. Again, the context of each court is important, and regional human rights courts in 
particular should remain cognisant of their epistemic disadvantage when faced with such 
questions. Intervention may only be fully justifiable where the domestic court lacks the requisite 









7 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: TOWARD A RE-DESIGN OF 
THE EXISTING MODEL 
 
The last Part laid out an argument for how courts should act as democracy-builders in existing 
new democracies. However, suppose we could start again. Knowing what we know from the 
discussion in this thesis so far, would we make any changes to the existing model? This section 
considers more fundamental questions as to how we could design courts in the future, in order 
to ensure their maximum effectiveness as democracy-builders, while remaining cognisant of 
the fact that they cannot be the sole engines of democratisation. In considering this question, 
it is first necessary to address trends in constitution-making in the post-war era, and their 
impact on the roles of courts. 
 
7.1 POST-WAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND THE UTOPIAN BURDEN 
 
In Chapter Two it was observed that a heavy ‘democratisation burden’ has tended to be placed 
on courts in the post-war era, especially since the beginning of the so-called ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation. This is fundamentally rooted in the increasing post-war tendency toward 
thicker, longer, more ambitious, and more internationalised constitutions. We see ever more 
extensive bills of rights, including justiciable social and economic rights; enhanced review 
powers for constitutional courts; additional State organs such as ombudsmen; and direct 
democracy mechanisms such as referendums. There has been expansion in multiple 
dimensions: constitutions are not only designed to provide a broader and more detailed 
blueprint for government, and to provide ever stronger checks on nakedly majoritarian 
decisionmaking. They are also designed to carry a greater symbolic weight as the legal 
expression of the new order, as well as giving greater voice to current democratic majorities by 
moving beyond representative government alone.  
We might call such constitutions ‘utopian’ constitutions, in the sense that they seek to 
provide the basis and blueprint for a fundamental transformation of society, the State and 
political culture. The approach appears to place enormous faith in the capacity of law, and 
courts, to shape reality, echoing at some distance Solon’s sixth-century elegy quoted at the start 
of the chapter, claiming that law “makes the rough smooth, puts a stop to excess, dries up the 
blooming flowers of ruin, straightens out crooked judgments, tames deeds of pride”, and all 
manner of other goods. This places courts in a ‘Solonic trap’, as the primary organ for ensuring 
the realisation and coherence of the new constitutional order. 
Chapter Three observed that, certainly, the constitutional text has path-dependent 




abstract review tend to lead to a central role for a court. Executive format such as the common 
‘third wave’ system of semi-presidentialism can embroil a court in political power plays 
between president and prime minister. A failure to settle ‘first order’ questions (such as 
executive format) heightens the risk of a court provoking a constitutional crisis. Excessive 
prolixity in the constitutional text can lead to a ‘constitutionalisation’ of what would best be 
left to the ordinary legislative and policy-making processes, overburdening the court with 
questions best left to the political branches. In Chapter Four we also saw how the increased 
use of direct democracy mechanisms can cut across the court’s role; as seen in Gelman v 
Uruguay. This much is clear.  
The following sections briefly consider five particular trends in post-war constitutions, 
and third wave constitution-making in particular, which place constitutional courts in a 
particularly invidious position: the recognition of social and economic rights; the extension of 
the Court’s role beyond that of a ‘negative legislator’; the notion of courts as public educators; 
the conception of such courts as programmable technology; and the idea that courts can 
address democratic breakdown as well as facilitate democratic progress. 
 
Courts as purveyors of social justice 
 
Arguments as to the capacities of courts come together most clearly in arguments for and 
against the increasing tendency to enshrine justiciable social and economic rights in the new 
democratic constitution. This accords a role to the courts regarding allocation of resources and 
policy choices that differs in many ways from those affecting the protection of civil and 
political rights (although the difference should not be overstated). For some, the protection of 
such rights is perhaps the most important role a court can play in the context of a new 
democracy where existing levels of socio-economic development and income equality are low, 
or where economic restructuring alongside democratisation takes a significant toll on the 
economic well-being of individuals.  
However, as briefly discussed in the Colombian and South African contexts in Chapter 
Two, the role has a significantly greater potential to bring a constitutional court into conflict 
with the political branches than adjudication on civil and political rights, and to undermine 
popular support for the court. Octavio Ferraz notes that the recognition of justiciable social 
and economic rights places a court in an “intractable dilemma”: it can either robustly vindicate 
such rights when requested by applicants, and face accusations that it has “illegitimately and 
incompetently overstepping the boundaries of judicial power”, or take a more cautious 




constitution’.772 This concern gains added traction in the democratisation context, where the 
very existence of such rights in the constitution raises the stakes for a court’s performance in 
the new democratic dispensation, complicating its task in carving out a role for itself in the 
new order. 
Perhaps more importantly, the added pressure such rights place on a constitutional court 
does not seem to be worth the results they produce. A robust social rights jurisprudence 
focused on individual cases can do more harm than good, by leading to irrational resource 
allocation, creating distortions in slim state budgets, and adversely affecting public spending in 
areas which are not litigated; thereby threatening to undermine the democratic project of the 
constitution as a whole. Courts have limited capacity to protect vulnerable sectors of the 
population: for instance, Romanian Constitutional Court’s invalidation of laws aimed at cutting 
pensions in 2010 simply led to the alternative of a general value added tax increase for the 
entire population.773 Such rights are also prone to ‘capture’ and can easily come to offend the 
basic principle of political equality. Indeed, as Ferraz has observed, health litigation in Brazil 
has become a middle-class phenomenon, facilitated by greater access to justice in the more 
prosperous areas of the country, thus exacerbating rather than alleviating severe social 
inequalities.774  
It is, of course, natural that individuals facing low levels of social and economic 
development will seek to pursue their claims for better treatment when an avenue is provided; 
especially in contexts where the political process is unable or unwilling to hear their demands. 
However, considering the significant downsides and uncertainties concerning the social value 
of such adjudication, and set against the already daunting task and institutional insecurity of a 
court in a fledgling democracy, this choice between ‘usurpation’ and ‘abdication’ appears a high 
price to pay.  
 
Courts as positive legislators 
 
The trend toward conferring a role for courts as ‘positive’ legislators, beyond the ‘negative’ 
legislative role of addressing the constitutionality of enacted laws, also appears to leave courts 
in a difficult position. Beyond abstract review of legislation, which turns the court into a form 
of ‘third chamber’ of parliament, there is the power to address legislative omission, under 
which the court can order the State to enact legislation. Refusal to use such powers leads to 
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criticism. Using such powers appears to place the court in competition with the legislature. As 
Julian Zaiden Benvindo has noted in the Brazilian context, Justice Gilmar Mendes asserted in 
a 2008 decision seeking the Supreme Court to make legislative recommendations to Congress 
under its ‘legislative omission’ power that this tended to transform it into a quasi-legislature: 
in cases like that one, the [Supreme Court] turns into a “house of commons, as the parliament,” 
where the “multiple social claims and the political, ethical and religious pluralism find refuge in 
the debates procedurally and argumentatively organized through previously established norms,” 
such as the public hearings, the amicus curiae intervention, and the participation of society 
through different civil organizations during the procedure.775 
The similarities to Scheppele’s ‘surrogate’ argument are striking, in the sense of public 
democratic deliberation shifting from the parliamentary to the judicial sphere. However, Justice 
Mendes is clearly not suggesting in this quotation, as Scheppele does, that the Court can be an 
overall substitute for the legislature.  
The trend is also seen in the movement toward holding public hearings as part of 
constitutional court proceedings. A recent phenomenon seen in Brazil and neighbouring 
Argentina and Colombia, it is a remarkable move that increasingly blurs the functional division 
of duties as between the judiciary and the legislature. Gargarella has characterised it as a further 
‘dialogic’ constitutional mechanism, to add to existing mechanisms such as weak judicial review, 
with a particular focus on linking disadvantaged groups with decision-making processes. 
However, he notes that its use in states such as Argentina has been hampered by the 
centralisation of power and a ‘top-down’ approach to addressing communities’ demands.776 
Echoing the criticism of Scheppele’s ‘surrogate’ argument above, it might be offered that, 
rather than transforming courts into quasi-parliaments, it may be better to focus on 
ameliorating the deficiencies of parliaments themselves. 
 
Courts as public educators 
 
A further example of the inflated perceptions of constitutional courts is found in the 
arguments, by scholars such as Stotzky and Goldstein, that a court can educate the citizenry 
on the ideals of democratic governance. As well as being difficult to verify, such claims appear 
to make a serious error of overlooking reality. They appear to assume, surely incorrectly, that 
individuals in a political community pay particular attention to not just the outcome, but also 
the content, of judicial decisions; as though key judicial decisions are to be found on every 
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kitchen table in a new democracy. Such arguments also place the court in a rather tutelary role, 
with the individual citizen reduced to passive recipient of its teachings. This overlooks the 
basic fact that democratic governance, like dance, can only be learned through active practice. 
Even if citizens were to pay close attention to court judgments, this is no substitute for their 
participation in democratic order through civil society, social movements, elections and, 
perhaps, mechanisms of direct democracy. 
 
Courts as programmable technology 
 
At the root of the tendency to overburden constitutional courts in the post-war era is the 
fundamental misconception of courts as ‘devices’ or ‘mechanisms’. In Chapter Two, for 
instance, the metaphor of ‘democratisation technology’ was used to refer to the perception of 
constitutional courts as key means to support and shape democratisation processes in a 
positive way. The metaphor speaks to a certain mode of thinking, that affects practitioners as 
well as scholars, which conceives of courts as monolithic entities that can be ‘programmed’ to 
pursue particular ends, through the design of their ‘operating system’ (the constitution) and 
procedures for ensuring the appointment of high-quality members to the court. 
Yet, while it is possible to seek as far as possible to avoid inordinate design deficiencies 
in the constitutional text, and the institutional set-up of the court itself, it is important to 
recognise that design has significant limits. As emphasised in Chapters Three and Four, it is 
impossible to predict how a court, once established, will use its powers. We may, as Conrado 
Hübner Mendes and others have sought, set down principles for courts in carrying out their 
role–such as toeing the line between ‘prudence’ and ‘courage’.777 However, the messy reality is 
that courts are human institutions, where principles of legality, professionalism, and collegiality 
can be interpreted in various ways depending on the particular perspective of the individuals 
appointed. We cannot plan for judges to have the perceptive delicacy, adjudicative dexterity, 
political nous and flair for strategic thinking required to pull off effective jurisprudence of the 
highest quality. Nor can we design judges to adhere to any one conception of the judicial role. 
The likes of England’s Lord Coke, the US Justice Brandeis, Ireland’s Judge Walsh, Brazil’s 
Justice Pertence and India’s Raj Khanna are born, not made.  
In addition, courts cannot meet an ever increasing raft of adjudicative burdens without 
a noticeable slide in the quality and consistency of their case-law–as seen to greatest effect in 
the European Court of Human Rights.778 
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Courts as the last line of democratic defence 
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that law and courts can do little if democratic breakdown 
is inevitable. The capacity of strong judicial review, rights guarantees, eternity clauses, judicial 
doctrines and international oversight have clear limits. In the 1980s the South African scholar 
AR Blackshield, for instance, noted: 
The South African history is not a failure of the courts; rather it demonstrates that if a real 
breakdown in human rights emerges, Bills of Rights and courts are ineffective.779 
In today’s world, examples of possible breakdown abound–in Hungary; Romania; Kenya; and, 
again, South Africa–all of which have enjoyed robust systems of strong review. In some states 
where the constitutional court has achieved overweening power, such as Brazil, 
democratisation often appears stalled and asymmetric.780 In this context, it appears naïve, 
foolhardy, or even pernicious not only to place the lion’s share of our faith in constitutional 
courts, but to expend our time focusing on constitutional courts to the exclusion of all else. If 
broad design choices are “at the heart of the constitutionalist’s pharmacopeia”,781 as Andrew 
Reynolds puts it, strong judicial review alone is clearly no panacea.  
Of course, to say that courts cannot achieve everything does not mean that they can 
achieve nothing. There are core roles courts can play. However, in order to make the most of 
their advantages, it is not enough to prescribe guidelines for adjudication. It is necessary to 
revisit the dominant modes of constitutional design to address structural deficiencies. 
  
7.2 AVOIDING THE SOLONIC TRAP: DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTION 
 
The lesson from the above is that there are clear limits to what any one institution can achieve, 
and the relentless urge in the post-war era to stuff constitutions with promises and rights lays 
an impossible expectation on the courts to deliver; setting them up to disappoint, if not fail 
outright. A growing chorus of voices has begun to question the modes and motives of 
constitution-making in the contemporary world. As far back as 1993, Cass Sunstein had argued 
that in any state “a constitution should be “negative” in the sense that it should be directed 
against the deepest risks in the relevant nation’s political culture”.782 More recently, in 2013 
David Landau has argued for a tamping down of transformational promises and the move 
toward a more pragmatic approach to constitutional design for post-authoritarian societies: 
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Constitution-making moments should not be idealized; they are often traumatic events. In these 
situations, the central challenge of constitution-making is not to achieve a higher form of 
lawmaking but rather to constrain unilateral exercises of power.783 
Instead of attempting to achieve perfection, Landau offers that it is “probably more 
fruitful to focus on avoiding a worst-case outcome.”784 The move might be characterised as a 
shift from ‘utopian’ or ‘transformational’ constitution-making, to a more ‘Machiavellian’ 
approach, in the sense that the focus turns to expediency in terms of what successful 
democratisation requires, rather than a bloated statement of values that achieves few concrete 
results. It appears to suggest that we should adopt a position of ‘conservative dynamism’, 
seeking to retain what works, and discard what is unhelpful. 
The central features of such an approach, in light of the discussion thus far, would be to 
avoid excessive prolixity in the constitutional text, avoid the enshrinement of justiciable social 
and economic rights, avoid transforming the court into a ‘positive legislator’ in designing its 
formal powers, and focusing on aberrations in the specific political order of the new democracy, 
rather than seeking perfection. It might be considered that the court’s purview over matters 
outside the core democracy-building functions discussed under the concept of 
‘democratisation jurisprudence’ might be simply reduced to a weak review advisory function. 
However, for the reasons discussed in connection to Gardbaum’s argument, and the tendency 
of such an approach to still overburden the court, does not appear to be a viable option.  
This all, of course, flies in the face of many nostrums of contemporary constitution-
making, and may be a hard ‘sell’ in constitutional negotiations that seek an expansive 
constitutional settlement that chimes with what has become democratic ‘normality’ in third 
wave states. It would also be hard to reconcile with the global trend toward ever greater public 
participation in constitution-drafting, which has driven the enactment of utopian, expansive 
texts. These matters cannot be addressed here. Instead, the focus is on two central matters: 
first, the possibility of achieving greater balance, coherence and transparency in constitutional 
texts, so as to optimise their capacity to underpin democracy-building (and the constitutional 
court’s role in particular); and second, the possibility of seeking greater formal coordination 
between the domestic and regional spheres (and courts in particular). 
 
Balance, coherence and transparency 
 
Gardbaum is correct when he states: 
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Especially within a thin and fragile democratic culture, it is important to “spread” constitutional 
sensibilities and the practice of  principled political deliberation more broadly than in the single 
institution of  the constitutional court.785 
Post-war constitutionalism has tended to set up the constitutional court as the sole guardian 
of  the constitution, leading other actors in the political order to eschew any role in this regard. 
A post-authoritarian constitution should attempt to spread this role. This is not an argument 
for more State organs: some innovations, such as ombudsmen, have had little success in various 
third wave states in acting as additional constraints on the state. 786  Rather, the emphasis should 
be on reconfiguring the constitutional balance and coherence between existing powers.  
In terms of  greater coherence in the constitutional text, more attention needs to be given 
to complementarity between judicial action, legislative oversight, and mechanisms of  direct 
democracy, with particular attention paid to the role of  ‘the people’ as democracy-builders.787 
Some aspects are procedural: for instance, learning from the Uruguayan experience, it should 
not be constitutionally permissible to hold a referendum concerning a law where a challenge 
to its validity is sub judice. More thought needs to be given to which actors can petition the 
court: individual petitions (and actio popularis in particular) can lead to enormous backlogs,788 
but closing off  any individual access can limit the court’s ability to address rights issues in 
particular. Perhaps ‘third way’ options, such as ‘class action’ constitutional challenges against 
legislation or State action could be considered. The numerical threshold for such action would, 
of  course, need to be carefully designed. Carefully calibrated mechanisms for civil society 
actors and citizen groupings to table debates in parliament, or to seek repeal of  certain 
legislation, might also be considered.789 
More transparency may also be required in post-authoritarian constitutions. In the 
Chilean context, for instance, the open inclusion of  ‘authoritarian enclaves’ in the text (such 
as reserved legislative seats for members of  the old regime) allowed for a progressive removal 
of  these provisions as democratisation progressed.790 By contrast, the Brazilian Constitution’s 
failure to make any mention of  the Amnesty Law of  1979 left it with a special status outside 
the formal bounds of  the constitutional structure, rendering review more difficult. It also left 
a contradictory normative framework that, on the one hand, shielded the old order from 
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prosecution for the crimes of  torture and murder, yet simultaneously voiced a strident 
approach to such crimes, including them among ‘non-bailable’ offences in Article 5.XLIII. In 
addition, countermajoritarian measures designed to shield the old order from the new in the 
transition to democratic governance could be time-limited, at a sufficient distance (e.g. 15 years) 
to provide an adequate incentive for their relinquishment of  power, while also avoiding their 
acting as an ongoing constitutional irritant in the early years of  the democratisation process.  
Similarly, rather than leaving the courts to decide whether they should adopt some form 
of   ‘basic structure doctrine’ in order to address ‘abusive constitutionalism’, perhaps such a 
power should be expressly accorded to the court in the constitutional text. While this would 
of  course be at odds with the theoretical limits of  the court as a ‘constituted’ entity under the 
constitution, given that courts are pushed into arrogating the power to themselves it is perhaps 
the lesser of  two evils to provide the power expressly, in order to remove the impression of  
judicial sleight of  hand.  
The overall aim, then, in designing a post-authoritarian constitution, should be to seek a 
‘joined up’ settlement where different elements work together, rather than a wilderness of  
single institutions, whose value and operation are considered in isolation from one another, 
and which reflects the particular aberrations of  the new democracy.  
 
Toward a coordinated pluralism?  
 
Where do regional human rights courts, and international law more generally, fit into this 
scheme?  
Is it possible, given the above discussion, to achieve more formal coordination between 
the domestic and regional courts? At present, the courts operate on two parallel tracks, with 
regional human rights courts generally used for addressing contentious cases, making little use 
of advisory powers, and generally suffering a significant ‘time lag’ in elaborating 
democratisation jurisprudence due to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. The state, 
in this respect, is reduced to an oubliette from which individuals must escape in order to seek 
justice.  
It might be useful to consider new options, such as a variant of the ‘preliminary reference’ 
procedure in the EU, which allows domestic courts to send questions concerning the 
interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. This would enable domestic 
courts to seek interpretations of the regional human rights court’s case-law, with the 
refinement that would offer their own interpretation when making the referral. We might also 




regional human rights court, which would allow us to escape the domestic difficulty of a 
constituted entity arrogating this power to itself. The latter possibility appears, in part, to 
underlie talk of the possibility of an International Constitutional Court, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, and also speaks to the growing role of the Council of Europe’s official think-
tank, the Venice Commission, reviewing the validity of constitutional amendments under a 
new concept of ‘constitutional justice’, which appears specifically designed to address the 
phenomenon of ‘abusive constitutionalism’, which enjoys surface legality, but which offends 
standard norms of democratic governance.  
Once again, it is important to remain aware of the capacity of non-judicial organs to act 
as democracy-builders. At the regional level, the introduction of democratic charters has 
provided a legal basis for states to place political and diplomatic pressure on states which suffer 
significant authoritarian backsliding and undemocratic regime changes. In Latin America, for 
example, although the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS has been criticised as 
setting out a rather “desultory” procedural framework for arriving at collective decisions than 
a fully-realised normative framework for addressing crises of democracy in the region,791 it has 
nevertheless been invoked nine times since its enactment: against coups in  Venezuela (2002-
2004) and Honduras (2009-2010); and preventively against Nicaragua and Ecuador (2005), 
Bolivia (2008), Guatemala (2009), Paraguay (2009), Ecuador (2010), and, most recently, Haiti 
(2010-2011). 792  The Inter-American Commission has also played a significant part in 
addressing authoritarian backsliding; a role which the Venice Commission is increasingly 
assuming in Europe. 
 
8 CONCLUSION: LAW, DEMOCRATISATION AND THE LIMITS 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION  
 
This chapter, ultimately, boils down to what we expect the law, and courts, to do in the effort 
to achieve meaningful democratic governance. It is not a question we can answer in the abstract. 
Indeed, a rather minor point made by Nijman and Nollkaemper concerning monism and 
dualism gains added importance in the democratisation context. The scholarly turn toward 
monism by thinkers such as Hans Kelsen and Georges Scelle in the early twentieth century 
had, at least partly, its roots in a more general attempt to shore up shaky European democracies 
by enhancing the power of international law to achieve the ends of constitutionalism–namely, 
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the constraint of political power at the domestic level.793 Nijman and Nollkaemper observe, 
for instance, that Scelle’s argument for the hierarchical superiority of international law was part 
of an attempt to address the political and democratic crisis in the French Third Republic arising 
from parliamentary absolutism: 
Monism came to be understood as a relative denial of a fundamental divide between international 
and domestic law, connected with universal, cosmopolitan, or even utopian connotations. 
Dualism tends to be understood as an articulation and appreciation of a solid divide between 
international and domestic law, connected with a conceptual (apologetic) affirmation of state 
sovereignty and international law as inter-State law. 
However, as the terms are used today, the models are disconnected from their contextual 
origins and the urgent problem of endangered European democracy with which they actually 
dealt. What was in origin an intensely political and moral debate became an issue approached 
rather pragmatically. From being a debate loaded with political and moral elements it became a 
more ‘normal’ doctrinal topic although marked, consciously or subconsciously, by a conviction 
of either the moral supremacy of international law or the supremacy of the State will. 794 
When we recall the case-studies in Chapter Four it might be said that this intellectual 
heritage from a century ago–characterising international law as serving domestic constitutional 
purposes to buttress democratic governance–has found a second life in the democratisation 
jurisprudence of  the past three decades. It is also found, more widely, in the myriad ways 
international law and organisations seek to shore up the deficiencies of  domestic law in new 
democracies.  The “urgent problem” of  endangered Western European democracy in the post-
World War I era has, in a way, been replaced by the urgent project in post-1945 new 
democracies, in all world regions, to consolidate and entrench democratic rule on a par with 
democratic systems of  the Global North.  
Rather than endlessly rehearsing theoretical debates which denigrate post-national 
constitutionalism as a postmodern mash-up with no meaningful boundaries, or which applaud 
it as a brave new world of  plural law, the immediate challenge is to marshal our efforts at 
designing new ways of  combining domestic and international law, in practical ways, which can 
provide support to societies that seek to leave authoritarian rule behind, while still ascribing 
meaningful independent value to the fundamental meaning of  democracy as self-government 
by the people. In this task, as in previous eras, we are only held back by the limits of  our 
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      N THE PREFACE TO THEIR WORK on the controversial judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Sejdić and Finci, Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary stress 
the high stakes of the decision by imagining a scenario in which a 2024 decision of the (fictional) 
Pan-American Court of Human Rights finds the bar on foreign-born presidents in the US 
Constitution to be in breach of the Pan-American Convention on Human Rights. This thesis, 
having begun with a tale from the past, ends with its own tale from the future. 
 
* * * 
 
On 6 July 2035, after twenty years of escalating internecine power struggles in the Politburo 
Standing Committee and the wider Communist Party, growing Uighur and Tibetan unrest, two 
decades of sputtering economic growth, a severe four-year clampdown on citizens’ liberties, and, 
finally, a mass state-wide pro-democracy movement sparked by Hong Kong’s Statue Square 
protests of 2027, the People’s Republic of China held the first full, free and fair elections in its 
history. 
At that point in time, twenty years from today, will the current court-centric paradigm still 
be our model for supporting this nascent democratisation process? Will we be advocating a thick 
constitution that seeks to constitute the new democracy with all the trappings of the rule of law, 
an extensive bill of rights, and comprehensive provisions concerning how the new democratic 
order should function? Will we be proposing that a new constitutional court (or a repurposed 





coherence and delivering on its promises? If an East Asian Court of Human Rights has been 
established (or a court covering a larger area), as various scholars desire, will we be promoting it 
to the new democracy as a back-up system? Will we continue to claim that, together, these courts 
will bind the authoritarian Gulliver with ropes, and lead the Chinese state to a brighter democratic 
future? 
 
* * * 
 
 
We cannot know the answers to these questions. However, all signs indicate that the ground is 
already shifting beneath our feet. If the hallmark of governance in the late modern period was the 
wresting of power from monarchs by (increasingly) representative parliaments, and the twentieth 
century was marked by the transfer of significant governance power from parliaments to courts, 
the twenty-first century may yet see the pendulum swing back to a less central role for courts.  
Various signs point to the need for a new model for democracy-building: the backlash 
against the court-centric model in Europe and Latin America; enduring resistance to robust 
adjudication in Africa and Asia; the uncertainties of the current democratisation processes in the 
Arab region and the way they are challenging our ‘democratisation toolkit’; and the emergence of 
new non-judicial democratisation technologies, including international democratic charters and a 
form of ‘constitutional review’ by intergovernmental think-tanks, including the Venice 
Commission and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA). 
As suggested in the final chapter of this thesis, moving away from the present model is not 
necessarily a bad thing. However, it does mean that we must begin to seriously consider the 
enduring viability of our current thinking on courts as central institutions for democracy-building, 
and how we can move to a model, or perhaps multiple models, for sharing the democracy-building 
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        AN COURTS REALLY BUILD DEMOCRACY in a state emerging from 
undemocratic rule? After the end of World War II, special courts, called ‘constitutional courts’, 
were established in the defeated Axis Powers (Austria, Germany and Italy) between 1945 and 
1956, as part of the project of rebuilding the state and returning to democratic rule. They were 
designed to guard the new democratic constitution and were seen as a key institution to ensure 
that the breakdown of democracy in the pre-war years would not happen again. Also, a new 
type of court was established for the region of Western Europe. Called the European Court 
of Human Rights, it was based in France and was seen as a symbol of Western Europe’s 
commitment to democratic rule, human rights and upholding the dignity of the individual. 
Over a period of decades following their establishment, some of these courts managed 
to play a central role in governing the new democracy. The Constitutional Court of Germany 
was the leading example. It played a prominent role in the new state of West Germany, and 
came to be seen as one of the main factors in that state’s surprisingly quick return to 
functioning democracy after the experience of Nazi rule. When more and more states moved 
from undemocratic to democratic rule from the 1970s to the 1990s, across Europe, Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, they were influenced by the German example and put a court at the 
centre of the new democracy. In the 1980s, the regional human rights court for Latin America, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, began to play a role in assisting the new 
democracies of that region. The European Court started to play a similar role in the 1990s 
when it began to supervise post-Communist democracies. Constitutional courts are now found 
in democracies around the world. Regional human rights courts have spread to Africa, and one 
may soon be established for the Arab region.  
These courts are all commonly presented as central to building democracy, but no one 
has tested this view in depth. That is what this thesis aims to do. It explores the existing 
scholarship on this subject and attempts to verify whether these claims are true, how we 
understand the roles courts play as democracy-builders, and whether there is need for a change 
in how we see and use courts for this purpose. This is important, because courts are one of 
our main institutions at present for helping to build democracies in states around the world. 
